Developing Capabilities: A Feminist Discourse Ethics Approach by Kleist, Chad
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects
Developing Capabilities: A Feminist Discourse
Ethics Approach
Chad Kleist
Marquette University
Recommended Citation
Kleist, Chad, "Developing Capabilities: A Feminist Discourse Ethics Approach" (2016). Dissertations (2009 -). 670.
http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/670
		
DEVELOPING CAPABILITIES: 
A FEMINIST DISCOURSE ETHICS APPROACH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Chad Kleist, B.A, M.A. 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, 
Marquette University, 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
 
December 2016 
   
		
ABSTRACT 
 
 
DEVELOPING CAPABILITES: A FEMINIST DISCOURSE ETHICS APPROACH 
 
 
Chad Kleist, B.A., M.A. 
 
 
Marquette University, 2016 
 
 
This dissertation attempts to preserve the central tenets of a global moral theory 
called “the capabilities approach” as defended by Martha Nussbaum, but to do so in a 
way that better realizes its own goals of identifying gender injustices and gaining cross-
cultural support by providing an alternative defense of it.  Capabilities assess an 
individual’s well-being based on what she is able to do (actions) and who she is able to 
be (states of existence).  Nussbaum grounds her theory in the intuitive idea that each and 
every person is worthy of equal respect and dignity. The problem with grounding a 
theory in a version of intuitionism is that it runs the risk of authoritarian moral reasoning. 
I argue Nussbaum, in fact, is the final arbiter who decides which intuitions are mistaken, 
which are not, and how to interpret what people say to fit into her own framework.  This 
method of justifying capabilities is most problematic in cases of social inequality 
whereby dominant group members do not feel they need to check their intuitions against 
non-dominant group members, and even if they did, they are not forced to take the non-
dominant group’s intuitions seriously. 
I find capabilities as a global moral theory to be very promising, and I agree with 
Nussbaum that a list of capabilities is beneficial for identifying people who are not able 
to live a truly dignified human life. However, I am also sympathetic to the criticism of 
defending capabilities using a version of intuitionism. So, I offer an alternative method of 
justifying the capabilities rooted in the discourse ethics tradition. This method seeks all 
persons that are affected by the outcome to freely and equally share their opinion. This 
avoids the charge of authoritarian moral reasoning, because (1) it seeks perspectives other 
than simply one’s own, but unlike traditional ethics, it (2) pays special attention to the 
ways in which power relations shape dialogue. Ultimately, I hope to have preserved the 
central tenets of the capabilities approach while better realizing Nussbaum’s commitment 
to defending a theory that is gender sensitive and has gained cross-cultural support.
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INTRODUCTION 
The capabilities approach is a global ethic that measures well-being based on 
what one is able to do and who one is able to be.  This approach has continued to gain 
international attention since its implementation by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). The capabilities approach was first articulated by philosopher and 
economist Amartya Sen in the 1980s. Since that time, Martha Nussbaum has offered the 
most sustained philosophical elaboration and defense of the capabilities approach, and it 
is her version that is the focus of this dissertation. The aim of this dissertation is to 
provide an alternative defense of capabilities that will ultimately help better realize 
Nussbaum’s own goals of identifying a list of capabilities that best represents what it 
means to live a dignified human life. Specifically, Nussbaum claims that the capabilities 
approach must be able to identify gender-specific harms and have the ability to garner 
widespread cross-cultural support. Nussbaum recognizes that global justice is not one-
size-fits all and specifically that gender mitigates a person’s vulnerability to various 
forms of injustice. Accordingly, she maintains that the capabilities must be able to 
identify gender-specific injustice and garner genuine cross-cultural buy in, in order to 
earn its status as a global moral theory. This dissertation agrees with these two claims, 
but argues that Nussbaum’s philosophical defense of the capabilities fails to accomplish 
these aims. I sketch and defend an alternative philosophical defense of the capabilities 
that I believe is more likely to generate a list (or lists) of capabilities that achieves these 
ends. 
 In chapter one, I will provide a comprehensive account of Martha Nussbaum’s 
version of the capabilities approach and focus especially on the various ways she has 
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attempted to justify the capabilities. Taking a chronological methodology, I begin with 
her earliest version, what I call the flourishing version of capabilities. This version 
grounds the capabilities in a “thick vague theory of the good,” which draws heavily on 
the Aristotelian tradition. A problem with this account is that it does not accommodate a 
pluralistic world since it defends a particular version of the good life. In attempt to 
address this concern, Nussbaum abandons the flourishing version of capabilities in favor 
of what I call the dignity version of capabilities, which is indebted to John Rawls’s 
political liberalism.  
The dignity version generates a list of ten central capabilities that each and every 
human being must be given the opportunity to fulfill in order to say that their life is a 
truly dignified life. Nussbaum offers two methods of justification for the dignity version 
of capabilities—namely, reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus. Reflective 
equilibrium is a process by which one attempts to bring her moral judgments into 
coherence with the capabilities approach; this is meant to show the superiority of 
capabilities over competing theories of justice because the former best coheres with our 
moral judgments and set of principles. One concern with this approach is that democratic 
societies have citizens that hold incompatible comprehensive moral and religious 
doctrines, and so our justification too must be compatible with more than just an 
individual’s intuitions. Nussbaum attempts to address this concern by showing that her 
list of capabilities is an object of overlapping consensus. 
Drawing on feminist scholars, I will argue in Chapter 2 that Nussbaum’s methods 
of justifying the capabilities suffers from three major flaws. First, she covertly imports 
her own values into the theory. This, in itself, is not problematic because we may have 
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good reason for including our values into a theory. However, I am troubled by her lack of 
engagement with values that do not match her own. Second, the way in which she selects 
other diverse perspectives in order to gain cross-cultural support for her theory is 
arbitrary. There is no method to determine why she is seeking certain voices and ignoring 
others. Furthermore, although she seeks perspectives other than her own to confirm or 
raise questions about her approach, she offers no method to demonstrate the superiority 
of her own values or perspectives over others. Finally, even if we grant that Nussbaum is 
seeking other viewpoints from people who inhabit different social strata to help justify 
her theory, she has yet to consider the ways in which power dynamics impact what 
speakers feel comfortable sharing, how a hearer interprets what is said, and how this 
“data” is used to justify our theories. For instance, Nussbaum interviews two Indian 
women—Vasanti and Jayamma—as one way to show that people who have different 
worldviews share the same intuitions about dignity as Nussbaum, although she fails to 
discuss the ways in which the asymmetrical power relations between her and the Indian 
women may impact not only their responses, but her interpretation of their responses and 
Nussbaum’s attempt to incorporate their feedback. All of these criticisms are especially 
salient in light of Nussbaum’s stated goals to defend the capabilities as a gender-aware 
theory that has, or is at least capable of gaining wide cross-cultural support. 
There seems to be an apparent impasse at this point. On the one hand, I am 
committed to the central tenets of the capabilities approach and that it can be a global 
moral theory that identifies a list of central capabilities that can be used to measure when 
a person is or is not living a truly dignified life. That is, I am sympathetic with this broad 
approach, and even find many of the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list compelling. Yet, on 
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the other, I am in full agreement with the above feminist critiques. So, it would appear 
that I would either have to adopt Nussbaum’s version of the capabilities fully knowing it 
is riddled with justificatory concerns or outright reject her theory. I believe that if one 
wants to preserve the capabilities approach while still paying adequate attention to gender 
injustices, then one must construct a method of justifying capabilities that is sensitive to 
relations of social power (which includes, but is not limited to, gender) and is inclusive 
enough to seek all (or as many as possible) relevant perspectives. 
 Nussbaum’s primary methods of justification, reflective equilibrium and 
overlapping consensus, draw on a monological method of moral reasoning, where an 
individual constructs a theory from his own perspective, and so, runs the risk of being 
unable to account for implicit biases and prejudices. One way to address this concern is to 
look to philosophical methods of justification that are dialogical and require critically 
engaging the perspectives of all those who are likely to be affected by an outcome. 
Discourse ethics offers just such an approach. In Chapter 3, I discuss the central tenets of 
a traditional version of discourse ethics and evaluate its suitability as an alternative 
method for justifying the capabilities. Generally speaking, traditional discourse ethics 
claims that moral norms are justified through universal consensus out of free and equal 
discursive conditions. This theory has been advocated most notably by Jürgen Habermas 
and Karl Otto Apel, and more recently modified by Seyla Benhabib. Although discourse 
ethics is a promising alternative and a move in the right direction, I argue that many of 
the criticisms that apply to Nussbaum also pertain to traditional versions of discourse 
ethics, despite discourse being wedded to a dialogical method of moral reasoning. In 
particular, Habermasian discourse ethics cannot generate trustworthy outcomes because it 
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too does not adequately account for the epistemic impact of social relations of unequal 
power. Furthermore, he does not discuss larger issues of structural biases and stereotypes 
that might permeate discussion, and so, fails to adequately accommodate the influence of 
diversity and inequality or (especially vulnerable and marginalized) peoples’ abilities to 
speak and be heard. 
 The criticisms of both Nussbaum and discourse ethics have led me to propose, in 
Chapter 4, the following set of four desiderata that a method for justifying capabilities 
should satisfy: (1) it should facilitate cognizance of relevant power dynamics; (2) it 
should facilitate remaining self-critical; (3) it should have a mechanism that encourages 
and facilitates genuine revision; and (4) it should seek modest aims. This list is far from 
exhaustive, but it begins to provide some guidance for developing an alternative method 
of justification that may better mitigate the concerns raised against Nussbaum and 
traditional versions of discourse ethics. I believe these four criteria can be used to 
evaluate a method of justification that can ground the cross-cultural validity of a 
capabilities list.  
My final chapter consists of two main parts. First, I articulate a version of 
discourse ethics, “Feminist Discourse Ethics” (FDE), that I find more plausible than 
traditional versions, for the purpose of justifying the capabilities. FDE is deeply rooted in 
Alison Jaggar’s Feminist Practical Dialogue, which is a version of discourse ethics that is 
empirically rich, pragmatic, and conscious of feminist concerns. I am sympathetic to 
discourse ethics as a method for justifying capabilities because it is dialogical, but I am 
also seeking a version that better avoids the pitfalls that traditional versions of discourse 
ethics share with Nussbaum’s monological methods. In the first part of this chapter, I 
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develop Jaggar’s “Feminist Practical Dialogue” (FPD), and draw on Iris Marion Young, 
Miranda Fricker and Ofelia Schutte to articulate a more robust set of constraints for moral 
dialogue under conditions of diversity and social inequality. Specifically, I argue that a 
moral discourse under these conditions should: (1) accept non-traditional forms of 
communication, (2) give prima facie moral deference to non-dominant group members, 
(3) support careful, deep listening by treating participants with less social power as active 
informants and subjects, and not as mere sources of information from which one merely 
gleans information, (4) accept some measure of incommensurability between 
interlocutors, and (5) recognize the potential need for temporarily closed or exclusive 
epistemic communities. 
In the second part of this final chapter, I argue that FDE is better able than 
Nussbaum’s monological methods and traditional versions of discourse ethics to meet the 
four adequacy criteria presented in chapter four.  This is highlighted through a case study 
on the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. Here, I show that Nussbaum and 
traditional versions of discourse fail to understand the complexities around high illiteracy 
rates in Bangladesh. I conclude by suggesting that Feminist Discourse Ethics offers a 
more promising way of defending the capabilities as a gender-sensitive global moral 
theory. 
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CHAPTER ONE: NUSSBAUM’S CAPABILITIES THEORY 
The capabilities approach is a global moral theory that determines a person’s 
ability to live well based on her capabilities. In this dissertation, I will closely examine 
Martha Nussbaum’s articulation and defense of the capabilities approach as a global 
moral theory that assesses individual well-being. She develops a version of capabilities as 
a partial conception of justice that can be used as a measurement against which we can 
determine whether or not an individual is living a dignified human life. The hope is that 
in time the international community can endorse the capabilities approach, similarly to 
the way human rights have been adopted. 
Capabilities, in general, are opportunities for one to perform actions and develop 
states; simply put, they are opportunities for doings and beings. For example, one may 
have the capability to ride her bike to work or act angrily toward her co-workers. One’s 
capabilities are distinguished from what one is actually doing and who one is actually 
being—namely, one’s functionings. A “function” is the realization of a capability. When 
a person chooses to ride her bike, she is performing the function of bike-riding; the 
moment an individual lashes out at her co-worker, she is manifesting the function of 
being angry. The difference can be summarized as follows: while capabilities are the 
space to perform actions, the ways in which that space is manifested is one’s functioning. 
The political goal for Nussbaum is capabilities, not functioning, since the decision 
to pursue a capability or not, and if so, how, must be respected. Consider two people 
performing the same function of not eating. Even though each person appears to be doing 
the same thing, it is important to know the motivations behind their decision. A person 
committed to a social justice cause may not be eating because she is on a hunger strike. 
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The capability of nourishment in this instance is possible, but she willfully chooses not to 
eat for political reasons. However, an impoverished person may desire to eat, but due to 
his economic circumstances, does not have the opportunity to do so. Because capability is 
the goal, this theory is able to accommodate variation in individuals’ choices about 
actions and values by, for example, respecting a person’s decision to participate in a 
hunger strike, while also providing tools for criticizing social structures that may be 
unjustly depriving people of access to food. 
To best understand Nussbaum’s capabilities theory, I will reconstruct the 
development of her thought somewhat chronologically. I have discerned two primary 
accounts of capabilities in her work, namely, the “flourishing version” and “dignity 
version” of capabilities, respectively. The former is rooted in what Nussbaum calls 
“Aristotelian internalist essentialism”. Here, Nussbaum engages in a process of looking at 
various cultural myths and beliefs that help her identify essential features of what it 
means to be uniquely human. The basic functions Nussbaum identifies as central to 
humanness offer a conception of the good, or human flourishing. If one does not have the 
opportunity—that is, the capability—to fulfill all of these functions, in some sense, that 
person is not truly human. 
There seems to be two major problems with the flourishing version of 
capabilities, which leads Nussbaum to reject it in favor of the dignity version. First, most 
people are unable to live up to its standards. In such instances, their humanness would be 
called into question. However, it is not their humanity that should be doubted, but their 
quality of life. Second, the flourishing version is too narrow to accommodate pluralism 
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since many people do not accept an Aristotelian account of flourishing, but rather 
embrace a different conception of the good based on their comprehensive doctrine. 
The dignity version of capabilities attempts to address the above concerns. 
Nussbaum offers an intuitive account of dignity, which can be traced to the Stoics 
through Kant. If a person is deprived of fulfilling certain opportunities (e.g., receiving at 
least a secondary education), then, according to Nussbaum, she is not given the 
opportunity to live a dignified life. Nussbaum defends a universal list of ten central 
capabilities (or fundamental entitlements) that every nation must guarantee its citizens up 
to an adequate threshold level. 
The goal of the dignity version is different than the goal of the flourishing version 
insofar as the former is a political project, and the latter merely an ethical project. That is, 
Nussbaum is no longer offering a particular conception of the good to ground the 
capabilities; instead, she constructs a partial conception of justice, which is compatible 
with many comprehensive doctrines. The framework she adopts for her conception of 
justice is political liberalism. Political liberalism creates the space for free and equal 
citizens to pursue their own ends. Contrary to the flourishing version, the dignity version 
allows individuals to endorse capabilities within their own worldview. So, the latter has 
the advantage of remaining universal in the sense that it is a global standard that can 
make cross-cultural judgments based on a list of capabilities, yet it does not depend on an 
essentialist picture of a human being. 
Finally, I reconstruct Nussbaum’s two primary justifications—reflective 
equilibrium and overlapping consensus—for the capabilities theory in general, and her 
list, more specifically. Nussbaum offers very little content for these justifications; so, in 
		
10	
order to fill the gaps, I present a brief exposition of (and motivation for) reflective 
equilibrium and overlapping consensus as provided by John Rawls. Reflective 
equilibrium serves two purposes. On the one hand, it justifies the superiority of 
capabilities over competing theories of justice, and, on the other, it offers a justification 
for an individual by showing how it best coheres with her moral judgments and set of 
principles. However, given the fact that democratic societies have many incompatible 
comprehensive moral and religious doctrines, it is important that the capabilities 
approach be accepted within those frameworks. The goal is to show that reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines have the potential to converge on the capabilities approach and 
her list, and thus, become objects of overlapping consensus. 
 
1. The Flourishing Version of Capabilities 
In a 1992 article, “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of 
Aristotelian Essentialism,” Nussbaum offers an account of capabilities that can be best 
described as a “thick vague theory of the good”. This section opens with an articulation 
of Nussbaum’s theory as it is rooted in Aristotelian internalist essentialism. I will call this 
the “flourishing version” because the method of internalist essentialism generates a set of 
basic functions that represents a conception of the good.1 Finally, I suggest a couple 
reasons Nussbaum abandons internalist essentialism in favor of political liberalism as an 
alternative framework for capabilities. 
																																																								1	I take this version to be articulated in some of her groundbreaking articles such as “Nature, Function, and 
Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution” (1988), “Aristotelian Social Democracy” (1990), “Human 
Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism” (1992), “Non-Relative Virtues: An 
Aristotelian Approach” (1993), “Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings” (1995b), and “Non-Relative 
Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach” (1998). This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but it does offer an 
approximate chronology of the flourishing version. 
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1.1 Internalist Essentialism 
Nussbaum’s (1992) early justification of the capabilities approach is what she calls 
“internalist essentialism,” that is, a “historically grounded empirical essentialism” (208). 
It is an “account of the most important functions of the human being, in terms of which 
human life is defined” (Nussbaum 1992, 214). The process begins by having one ask, 
“what things are so important that we could not call a life truly human without them?” To 
answer this question, the social critic examines a “wide variety of self-interpretations of 
human beings in many times and places…The idea is that people in many different 
societies share a general outline of such a conception” (Nussbaum 1995b, 73).  
In order to best understand the flourishing version of capabilities, it is first worth 
unpacking each of the two main concepts of “internalism” and “essentialism”. 
Internalism is a method of inquiry which demands that we begin by identifying common 
human experiences. We realize through a process of self-discovery and interpretation that 
cultures share certain “spheres of experience,” to borrow Nussbaum’s phrase, that are 
most central to living a truly human life, for example, the aversion to non-beneficial pain, 
developing relationships with others, and expressing humor, among others (Nussbaum 
1987, 27-9). By “truly human life,” Nussbaum means to identify the essential features 
constitutive of flourishing for human beings as a kind. 
Opposed to internalism, externalism is a method of inquiry that “presuppose[s] an 
external metaphysical foundation” (Nussbaum 1992, 208). The externalist offers a 
conception of human nature that transcends culture and history. For example, one could 
draw on science as an “appeal to external facts that can be found in human nature” 
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(Claassen and Düwell, 498).2 The problem with externalist essentialism, according to 
Nussbaum (1995a), is that “human nature cannot, and need not, be validated from the 
outside”, but rather it can be grounded in “the most fundamental and broadly shared 
experiences of human beings living and reasoning together” (121). The goal is to identify 
“essential” features of actual human life, and if one is to offer a proposal of these 
features, then it is vital that the person look at current understandings of various ways of 
life. 
The flourishing version is “essentialist,” then, insofar as it seeks activities that all 
human beings must be given the opportunity to perform if their life is said to be a truly 
human life. These functions give rise to a list of capabilities that constitute a truly human 
life, and while subject to revision, show that “we do have in these areas of our common 
humanity sufficient overlap” (Nussbaum 1992, 224). Nussbaum argues that essentialism 
has been a “dirty word” in philosophy for quite some time, and often for good reason. For 
example, some have argued that the essential nature of human beings is based on deep 
metaphysical realist principles. However, as noted above, this is problematic since 
metaphysical realism, according to Nussbaum, does not examine the world as such. So, 
Nussbaum’s version of essentialism begins with human beings as socially embedded 
creatures, and it is the lessons that get passed down to us from our communities that help 
illuminate the features that make us truly human. 
Furthermore, the process of determining whether or not one has lived a truly 
human life begins by examining cultures from different times and places, including 
myths that separate humans from other beings. In this sense, the process is internal to 																																																								
2 Rutger Claassen and Marcus Düwell note Nussbaum’s criticism of Alasdair MacIntyre and Bernard 
Williams who have interpreted Aristotle as justifying his virtue theory through a metaphysical biology, that 
is, external essentialism. See Nussbaum (1995a). 
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human history. The goal is to identify functions that best represent the life of a human, 
not one for non-human animals or gods. For example, Cyclopes is a mythical creature 
who is not compassionate and lives in solitude. A lesson from this story reveals the 
importance many cultures place on the need for affiliation and caring for others. To the 
extent that internalism identifies shared and unique features of a life for human beings, 
Nussbaum calls this evaluative inquiry “essentialist”. 
A distinguishing feature of the flourishing version is that it is objective, that is, it 
avoids being relativist and subjectivist. One cannot simply adopt the norms of one’s own 
culture since that would not capture what is shared and unique about human flourishing. 
If norms were restricted merely to a given culture, then there would be no universal 
standard by which we could judge actions or ways of life. Nussbaum (1995b) fears that 
with cultural relativism comes “religious taboos, the luxury of the pampered husband, 
educational deprivation, unequal health care, and premature death” for example (66). 
Furthermore, a relativist theory would run the risk of generating functions that appear to 
be necessary for human flourishing, but, in fact, merely represent the norms of a given 
community. It is for these reasons Nussbaum embraces an essentialist evaluative inquiry. 
The hope is that such an (internal) method of inquiry will yield a conception of the person 
that is universally shared. 
The claim here is not that disputes between (or within) cultures on human nature 
do not exist, or that future challenges will not arise. Nussbaum is certainly aware of 
cross-cultural conflict, but takes a very unsympathetic stance towards it. In her view, if 
one engages in the process of “self-interpretation” and “clarification” about stories and 
myths that express ideas about what distinguishes humans from other beings, then one 
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will ultimately reach the same functions that constitute a truly human life. She asserts that 
the “opponent’s failure to endorse the full Aristotelian conclusion is…explained by his 
failure to reflect and imagine” (Nussbaum 2002, 84). 
The list of capabilities proposed by internalist essentialism will serve as a “thick 
vague theory of the good” (Nussbaum 1992, 214). Before explicating the content of what 
constitutes the good life, let’s examine the key terms of “thick,” “vague,” and “good” in 
order to capture how these features function as a theory. First, internalist essentialism is 
“thick,” according to Nussbaum, because it identifies particular functions that constitute 
human flourishing. Nussbaum identifies functions that are shared amongst people from 
different cultures and times in hopes of arguing that people must have that corresponding 
capability. So, despite recognizing the importance of particular functions, the goal 
remains capabilities. The capabilities theory, to the extent that it provides specific content 
about the good life, can then be used to make moral judgments about how well one is 
living. If an individual cannot be given the opportunity to acquire these opportunities, 
then that person is unable to live a truly human life. 
Second, a theory is said to be “vague” because it offers only an “outline sketch” 
of the good life. The advantage of presenting a vague (as opposed to precise) theory is 
that there are many ways in which one can flourish. For example, while affiliation with 
others is part of the good life, an individual’s affiliations cannot be predetermined for her. 
We can imagine a situation in which a loved one associates with people with whom we 
think it is not best for her to affiliate. However, all things considered, we ought to respect 
her decision to associate with whomever she desires. As Nussbaum (1992) says 
succinctly, it is better to be “vaguely right than precisely wrong” (215). To be “vaguely 
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right” in this instance is to value the general capability of affiliation. To be “precisely 
wrong” would include dictating to a friend who her affiliations ought to be. Despite how 
well an individual might know her friend, that person runs the risk of making a poor 
judgment about who is a good friend for her. 
Nussbaum’s theory, then, is thick insofar as it provides substantive content of the 
good life, and yet remains vague enough to the extent that the particular capabilities are 
partially indeterminate and offer space for individual interpretation. There is a tension 
here in attempting to establish a theory that is both thick and vague. One runs the risk 
either of constructing a substantively robust list of capabilities to ensure its thickness, but 
which does not allow enough room for interpretation, or of being too vague such that the 
list is so malleable as to give rise to radically different, perhaps incommensurable, 
interpretations. This results in potentially further incommensurate sub-lists, instead of 
producing a single universally applicable list. A theory that is too thick is problematic 
because it does not properly respect pluralism, and one that is too thin is troubling since a 
single universal list of capabilities is necessary to properly evaluate how well one is able 
to live as a human being. Nussbaum attempts to navigate this tension and we will later 
evaluate whether she does so successfully. 
Finally, Nussbaum offers an objective account of the good, which is necessary in 
order to construct the best political arrangements for people to lead a good life rather than 
a pluralistic conception of the good. If Nussbaum offers many conceptions of the good, 
she fears her theory would not represent the capabilities necessary to live a full human 
life. By “objective,” Nussbaum (1993a) means that her account is 
justifiable by reference to reasons that do not derive merely from local traditions 
and practices, but rather from features of humanness that lie beneath all local 
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traditions and are there to be seen whether or not they are in fact recognized in 
local traditions (243). 
 
Keep in mind, though, that despite not offering an account of flourishing based on 
cultural norms, the theory is vague, and thus allows for people in different contexts to 
achieve the good life in many ways. In other words, Nussbaum offers a thick but abstract 
account of the good that recognizes a myriad of ways to fulfill it. 
One advantage of the flourishing version is that it offers the resources to criticize 
unjust social circumstances. For example, Nussbaum notes regions around the world 
where women are malnourished at exponentially higher rates than men, and it may be 
culturally accepted for women to nourish themselves only after all men in their lives have 
been nourished. If asked, these women often accept the fact that their health is secondary 
to the health of men. Thus, Nussbaum (1988a) claims we need an objective conception of 
the good to “criticize the evaluations of functionings that are actually made by people 
whose upbringing has been hedged round with discrimination and inequity” (175). If the 
theory is not objective, then it may lead people to (implicitly) “accept” their situation 
despite the fact that it curtails their flourishing. 3 
  
1.2 The Early List of Capabilities 
Nussbaum, drawing on Aristotle, puts forth a thick vague theory of the good, 
which grounds capabilities in an evaluative inquiry called “internalist essentialism”. To 
recap, internalist essentialism is a historically rooted process of inquiry that attempts to 
																																																								
3 Nussbaum claims many women, often from so-called “backward cultures,” adapt their preferences to their 
social context. So, a woman may claim that she prefers to feed herself last despite being malnourished. The 
concern of adaptive preferences is part of her larger critique of utilitarianism, which claims that a right 
action is one that simply satisfies desires. For a further discussion of Nussbaum’s critique of adaptive 
preferences, see (Nussbaum 2000, 111-66). 
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identify essential human functions, which ground the capabilities. The evaluative process 
begins with one’s own cultural stories and norms, and then examines them critically 
against other ways of life. Nussbaum believes internalist essentialism will eventually 
uncover “indispensible opportunities” for living a truly human life that are recognized 
across different times and cultures. 
Nussbaum offers the following list of universally shared experiences that best 
captures a truly human life: (1) mortality, (2) the human body, (3) capacity for pain and 
pleasure, (4) cognitive capability: perceiving, imagining, and thinking, (5) early infant 
development, (6) practical reason, (7) affiliation with other human beings, (8) relatedness 
to other species and to nature, (9) humor and play and (10) separateness (Nussbaum 
1992, 217-21).4 Nussbaum claims that the list is open-ended and always subject to 
revision, which is significant because we are always limited, to some degree, by our 
culture. A list, then, could be constructed in a way that reveals an implicit bias in favor of 
one’s own culture and against another. Thus, a space must be created to account for 
learning from other cultures since it could be the case, for example, that some capabilities 
ought to be subtracted from the list, while others need to be added. 
The ten basic capabilities express shared experiences of human life. Nonetheless, 
Nussbaum identifies two of them as architectonic, namely, practical reason and affiliation 
since they “organize” and “arrange” the others from her list. Plants can be nourished and 
animals have the ability to use their senses, but Nussbaum (2002) follows Aristotle in 
																																																								
4 Not all of the lists from her earliest articulations of capabilities is exactly like this one, although, there are 
virtually no capabilities on other lists that cannot be found here. I say “virtually” because Nussbaum makes 
a distinction (albeit seemingly arbitrary) in a list from 1990 between “separateness” and “strong 
separateness”. The former says we have the capability to live our own life, and the latter says that we are 
able to live that life in our own surroundings and context (Nussbaum 2002, 70-1). An identical list to the 
one above can be seen in Nussbaum (1995b, pp. 76-80). 
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saying that humans are unique to the extent that the items on her list are first “planned 
and organized by practical reason, and, second, done with and to others” (72). For 
example, humor and play will require (or, at least be enhanced greatly by) having 
relationships with others. One could certainly play merely by oneself, or even amuse 
oneself, but Nussbaum argues that doing these actions with others enriches the 
experience. 
Despite the more obvious understanding of “play,” the same cannot be said of 
other items on the list, including “mortality,” “the human body,” and “capacity for pain 
and pleasure”. As it stands, these are not capabilities in any obvious way, that is, one 
would not say, “we need to secure the capability of the human body”. To make sense of 
these valued features and experiences, I would like to briefly discern the entitlements and 
meanings associated with them. Mortality, for example, is a fact of life that is recognized 
by all cultures, which explains why Nussbaum says it influences all aspects of human 
existence. So, a person who has no tendency to avoid death or is immortal would live a 
life “so different from our own that the being could not be acknowledged as human” 
(Nussbaum 1992, 217).  
The human body also says very little in itself. Nussbaum offers four entitlements 
that can be understood as part of the capability of the human body, which includes (1) 
food and drink, (2) shelter, (3) sexual desire, and (4) mobility. Each of these has further 
evaluative power since they represent the actions needed, given the type of embodied 
creatures we are, to live a truly human life. Nussbaum does not discuss sexual desire in 
much detail, except that one could live without fulfilling it unlike food, drink, and shelter. 
Nonetheless, the opportunity to experience sexual desire has been a long advocated 
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capability for Nussbaum. She argues that practices such as female genital cutting hinder 
women’s sexual experience, including their desire and satisfaction, and violate autonomy 
(Nussbaum 1999, 118-29).5 So, while we are able to live without fulfilling the capability 
of sexual desire, it is central enough that people ought to have the opportunity to exercise 
it, if they choose to do so. The basic entitlement to sexual desire then may be used to 
criticize practices such as female genital cutting because it curtails one from flourishing. 
Finally, the capability of pain and pleasure is a capacity all human beings share, 
and a society lacking this feature would be beyond the bounds of humanness. This 
explains why Nussbaum (1998b) includes it in her universal “spheres of experience” 
whereby specific features are identified within our common humanity. The way in which 
pain is labeled as non-beneficial will vary between and within cultures. Nonetheless, she 
believes that avoiding non-beneficial pain is a universal response shared by all cultures.6 
It would be easy for one to mistake Nussbaum’s essentialism to mean that she 
does not value autonomy since it may appear that she is dictating how people ought to 
live their lives in order to flourish. This is simply not the case. She is clear that the 																																																								
5 The debate over female genital cutting is much more complex than I have space. For further discussion, 
see Tobin (2009). 6	I find “pain and pleasure” to be interesting not only because Nussbaum abandons it in her later list, but 
also because the normative efficacy of the capability of pain and pleasure remains unclear. She says it tells 
us to avoid unnecessary pain and have pleasurable experiences; so, it seems that one could interpret her as 
saying that a life with excessive suffering is not a truly human life. However, this does not tell us what pain 
and pleasure are, and to what extent we should avoid pain and pursue pleasure. She says we must avoid 
“non-beneficial” pain, but once again, avoiding non-beneficial pain does not explain the capability’s 
normative force. Given her rejection of utilitarian subjective welfarism, we know that simply satisfying 
desires does not suffice to live a truly human life since someone may want to satisfy a pleasure otherwise 
considered unjust, such as a woman ensuring her husband’s needs are always satisfied before her own. 
To be clear, I am not denying the importance of avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure. Like 
Nussbaum, though, I reject utilitarian commitments of maximizing the aggregation of pleasure. If 
Nussbaum wants us to accept this capability as necessary for a good human life, she must tell us how it 
contributes to flourishing and not merely describe it as an essential feature of human beings. The demand 
of this capability as necessary for flourishing is of great importance considering Nussbaum says her list is 
ethically evaluative and not merely descriptive. Moreover, because there are other competing lists of basic 
entitlements, including natural law theory and Rawls’s primary goods, there is further motivation for her to 
articulate the importance and superiority of her list of capabilities For a list of primary goods, see John 
Finnis (2011, 85-90) and John Rawls (2001, 58-9). 
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proposed list is of capabilities, not functioning. Despite the fact that one cannot flourish 
by simply acknowledging that the capabilities exist, Nussbaum still respects an 
individual’s decision to either perform the function or not. Nussbaum claims that 
Aristotle (and subsequently that she) would reject any conception of the good that did not 
leave room for practical reason or choice. The goal of the flourishing version, as an 
ethical doctrine, is to create the proper conditions for each person to exercise practical 
reason in a way that contributes to the good life. 
Nussbaum demonstrates her sensitivity to attaining the goal of creating the right 
material conditions for individuals to possess capabilities by drawing on Aristotle’s 
distinction between internal and external capabilities. First, internal capabilities are 
intellectual and character traits that can be developed through education. For example, a 
person may have an internal capability of reason, but if she has little to no education, then 
it will be difficult to exercise reason to its fullest extent. Second, the proper external 
conditions must be present in order for the capacity to be realized. Just as one may have 
an internal capability, but lack the external conditions, one may also have the right 
conditions and yet lack the internal capability. For example, people with severe cognitive 
disabilities may lack the internal capability to engage in practical reason despite having 
all the proper conditions that would allow reason to unfold and develop. Nussbaum 
(1988a) reminds us, though, that the line between internal capability and external 
conditions is not rigid since the “same conditions that block the activation of a trained 
I[nternal]-capability will also inhibit its development in an immature person” (164). To 
realize a capability, then, one must have both the internal capacity and the proper material 
conditions to cultivate it. 
		
21	
 
1.3 Re-considering Internalist Essentialism 
In a postscript more than ten years after her influential 1990 article “Aristotelian 
Social Democracy” Nussbaum (2002) provides a few reasons for rejecting internalist 
essentialism in favor of political liberalism (90-2).7 First, Nussbaum attempted to 
preserve the Aristotelian framework, but discovered that it did not mesh with the central 
tenets of the capabilities approach. The capabilities approach, on the one hand, allows 
people to pursue their own conception of the good, while Nussbaum’s flourishing 
version, on the other, offers a specific account of human flourishing. To be fair, her 
account of the good, which is rooted in Aristotle, was meant to accommodate cultural and 
religious pluralism, but still it could not escape the fact that living a truly human life 
requires living in a very particular way, namely, one compatible with a virtue-based 
global ethic. So, one problem with Nussbaum’s early version of capabilities is that its 
conception of flourishing is too narrow insofar as certain worldviews would not be 
compatible with the flourishing version, yet would be acceptable on a more liberal 
framework. 
Second, she abandons the flourishing version because it is dependent upon an 
essential view of the human being such that a “life that lacks any one of [the items from 
her list], no matter what else it has, will be lacking in humanness” (1992, 222). Arguing 
that a person who cannot fulfill certain capabilities in a truly human way is not fully 
human leads Nussbaum to the problematic claim that she lacks humanness; instead, 
Nussbaum needs to simply argue that she is not living a life compatible with dignity. 																																																								
7 For a brief analysis on the relationship between Nussbaum’s earlier and later version of capabilities, see 
Deneulin (2002). 
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We begin to see a development in thought in Women and Human Development 
(2000). Here, she argues that a person who is unable to realize all central capabilities is 
not living a “truly human life” (Nussbaum 2000b, 250). Again, this is deeply problematic 
because it raises questions about whether one’s situation (of not being able to acquire all 
central capabilities) calls one’s humanness into question. However, as noted immediately 
above, the person’s humanity should not be questioned; rather, what should be questioned 
is the type of life she is living. So while Nussbaum has rightfully jettisoned notions of 
essentialism (i.e., offering a particular conception of the good) in Women and Human 
Development, she still preserves the language of living a “truly human” life.  
Nussbaum does not abandon the language of “truly human” until Frontiers of 
Justice, where she replaces it with a life compatible with “human dignity”. Nussbaum 
(2006) explicitly says that a person who fulfills all capabilities is living a “dignified life 
for a human being” (184). If an individual is unable to acquire all central capabilities up 
to an adequate threshold level, then we can claim rightfully that she is not given an 
opportunity to live a life compatible with human dignity. Contrary to the flourishing 
version, we can say she is still fully human, but is simply not afforded the opportunity to 
express her humanity in a dignified manner. Rather than internalist essentialism, 
Nussbaum adopts the framework of political liberalism, which allows her to offer a 
universal list of central capabilities without being essentialist. 
Finally, Nussbaum has been forced to answer the critics who have pointed out that 
her theory is biased against those who are cognitively disabled, cannot accommodate 
nonhuman animal justice, and does not consider the differences between those who 
inhabit radically different social positions. Nussbaum argues that her newer version of 
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capabilities, what I will call the “dignity version,” is better positioned to address these 
“frontiers of justice”. For instance, dignity can be extended to nonhuman animals by 
discussing what a life worthy of dignity would look like for a given nonhuman species.8 I 
will show in the final section of this chapter why Nussbaum believes the dignity version 
better serves those with cognitive disabilities and issues surrounding unequal social 
power. 
In sum, the important point to keep in mind is that Nussbaum abandons the 
flourishing version because essentialism, as it identifies functions that represent a truly 
human life, wrongly calls people’s humanness into question and is too narrow to 
accommodate the “frontiers of justice” involving global justice, nonhuman animals, and 
the cognitively disabled. However, Nussbaum still aspires to preserve a universally 
applicable standard by which we can judge whether an individual is living well. Thus, by 
adopting political liberalism, which is not about ends and does not smuggle in the 
language of flourishing in the way that internalist essentialism does, Nussbaum attempts 
to remain a universalist without essentialism. 
 
2. The Dignity Version of Capabilities 
Grounding a global moral theory in Aristotelian internalist essentialism has its 
limitations, such as putting forth too narrow an account of flourishing, and not properly 
accommodating moral and religious pluralism. Nussbaum attempts to address these 
problems by drawing on John Rawls to provide a theoretical framework through which 
she can defend a version of the capabilities approach. She does not completely abandon 																																																								
8 See Nussbaum (2006, ch. 6). Nussbaum’s capabilities approach has been applied to nonhuman animals by 
other theorists, including Cripps (2010), Ilea (2008), and Schinkel (2008). 
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Aristotle, but situates his insights within this new framework. For example, Nussbaum 
finds Aristotle’s understanding of the person as social and dependent to be central in 
articulating her account of dignity, which will be used to generate a revised version of 
capabilities and a new list of central capabilities. 
 
2.1 Political Liberalism 
Martha Nussbaum explains, in some detail, her newfound commitment to political 
liberalism in a 1998 article, “Political Animals: Luck, Love, and Dignity”. To my 
knowledge, this appears to be the first time she articulates the need for political liberalism 
as a framework for capabilities, in addition to the need to jettison internalist 
essentialism.9 Nussbaum (1998a) writes, 
I now understand the list of central human capabilities as the core of a specifically 
political form of liberalism, in the Rawlsian sense. I imagine that citizens of many 
different comprehensive doctrines can all endorse items on the list, as things that 
are essential to a flourishing human life. It is neither an exhaustive account of the 
good nor a metaphysically grounded account. […] Muslim traditionalists will 
advance one conception of womanly modesty; secular feminists will advance 
another…The hope is, however, that they can all agree on a liberal political 
conception that protects opportunities, liberties, and material quality of life for all 
citizens (284-5). 
 
Political liberalism, as described above, begins with the fact that citizens are free 
and equal. Because a democratic society has free and equal citizens, it will likely have 
many competing and irreconcilable comprehensive philosophical, moral, and religious 
doctrines. So, political liberalism allows people to pursue their own conception of the 
good, and thus, it is said to accommodate pluralism within society. Global ethics accepts 
																																																								
9 It would be remiss of me to not acknowledge another article by Nussbaum in 1998, “Public Philosophy 
and International Feminism”. She also uses the concept of “political liberalism” here, but not in any great 
depth; not to mention this article, unlike the one used above, does not draw the explicit contrasts between 
the two frameworks. 
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the fact that pluralism exists and maintains that it is important to have a framework that 
allows pluralism to thrive while still providing a way to identify injustices across national 
and cultural boundaries. Even though a theory of justice may be used to identify harms, it 
must remain compatible with reasonable comprehensive doctrines within society. For 
example, two religious groups may have different accounts of the afterlife, a higher 
power, and the soul, yet both be able to agree on some principles of justice within their 
own particular worldview. In this sense, justice is said to be “freestanding”. It is 
especially important for a theory of justice to be freestanding in a liberal pluralist society 
in order to demonstrate that the state’s use of power is legitimate and that the citizens 
accept the laws derived from it.  
Nussbaum (2000b) situates capabilities within political liberalism, which “makes 
them specifically political goals and presents them in a manner free of any specific 
metaphysical grounding” (5). It is of note that capabilities for Nussbaum has always been 
political, but political liberalism will offer the resources to respect pluralism in a way that 
internalist essentialism cannot. To say the capabilities approach is “political” is not to 
claim the theory is not moral, but for purposes of constitution-making and offering 
international guidance, it is also a political project, that is, a freestanding conception of 
justice that can be affirmed within reasonable comprehensive doctrines. For Nussbaum 
(and Rawls), this includes the liberal commitments of ensuring basic equal civil and 
political rights for everyone.  
The capabilities approach is also liberal to the extent that well-being ought to be 
measured non-aggregatively, that is, priority must be given to the individual over the 
group. The Kantian principle that each person ought to be treated as an end in herself is 
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reformulated as a “principle of each person’s capability: the capabilities sought are 
sought for each and every person, not…for groups or families or states or other corporate 
bodies” (Nussbaum 2000b, 74, her emphasis). Nussbaum’s acceptance of liberalism gives 
rise to the priority of the individual over the group. 
It seems that Nussbaum merely asserts the fact that all human beings are worthy 
of living a dignified human life. She does not argue for it except in a quasi-Kantian 
fashion mentioned above. That is, each person, not group, is entitled to such secure 
capabilities compatible with dignity. However, no independent justification is given for 
why each person simply in virtue of her or his humanness is entitled to such a life. At 
best, she claims no one can deny humanness to all persons because we can identify 
people in our “daily life” to whom we already grant the status of humanity. Thus if we 
deny humanness to others, we would be engaging in some form of performative 
contradiction. 
Nussbaum draws on an “imaginary recalcitrant husband” who interacts and is 
attentive to his wife in various domains of her life, including childrearing, household 
duties, and sexual relations, to demonstrate the intuitive plausibility that allows us all to 
grant that women are as much full persons as men. She argues that such a husband will 
admit, based on experience, that women have the “basic capabilities to perform a wide 
variety of the most important human functions […] They have the ability to think and 
reason, just as males do. And, finally, they have responsiveness to ethical 
distinctions…between the good and the bad” (1995b, 97). By the husband acknowledging 
her ability to perform truly human functions, he is implicitly granting her status as a full 
human person. Nussbaum believes this argument reveals a “universal conception of the 
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human being in claims of justice for women” since the husband cannot fail to recognize a 
woman’s full status as a human being given his daily interactions with her. 
Margaret Walker questions Nussbaum’s “symmetrical recognition” commitment, 
that is, one’s ability to recognize the moral standing of another as like oneself. The 
problem with Nussbaum’s argument, according to Walker, is that there is “no 
incompatibility between seeing one’s wife as human and continuing to believe that 
certain things are better for human beings of her kind, where the relevant kind is 
‘women’” (Walker 2003, 148, her emphasis). So, there is nothing uniquely just with 
having her humanity recognized since that can be done in accordance with the 
expectation that she ought to perform certain tasks simply in virtue of being a woman. 
This is problematic for Nussbaum since she believes a “universal conception” is a claim 
of “justice for women”. Furthermore, a “closer look” and “little reflection” on history 
will not reveal the common features shared amongst all human beings (Walker 2003, 
148). 
Susan Wolf, in a commentary on Nussbaum’s capabilities, explains that 
throughout history human nature has actually been defined as male human nature. If we 
want to avoid denying full humanity to an individual, then we must ensure that “women 
as well as men participate in the task of theory construction, that both be sensitive to the 
history and the dangers of excluding women from consideration” (Wolf 1995, 113). In 
other words, there are many counter-examples to Nussbaum throughout history of a 
dominant group, in this case men, denying full humanity to a non-dominant group despite 
interacting with them very closely. As a matter of fact, it is such interactions that often 
perpetuate the conditions for ongoing oppression. These early criticisms are important to 
		
28	
keep in mind because they highlight problems with Nussbaum’s liberal justification of 
the capabilities that foreshadow the feminist criticisms of Nussbaum’s defense of the 
capabilities that I discuss in the next chapter. 
Nussbaum (1998) sums up the difference between Aristotelian internalist 
essentialism and political liberalism nicely when she says the latter “is not grounded in 
any theory of the human being that goes beneath politics” (285). The problem, once 
again, with the flourishing version is that it is rooted in an essential picture of humanness 
that offers a particular conception of the good for flourishing rather than protecting a 
political subject who is free and equal to pursue her own good, which is compatible with 
a theory of justice. 
 
2.2 The Emergence of Dignity as Central to Capabilities 
The capabilities approach needs a new grounding now that it has been situated 
within political liberalism. The new framework cannot be rooted in a version of 
flourishing since political liberalism remains neutral towards the good life. So, Nussbaum 
draws on the intuitive idea of human dignity. For Nussbaum, political liberalism and 
dignity emerge in conjunction with one another and neither is taken as conceptually or 
practically prior to the other. 
Nussbaum (2011) contends that the dignity of a human being is an “intuitive 
starting point [that] offers definite, albeit highly general, guidance” (78). By “intuitive,” 
she means that we have the basic ability to agree when someone is (or is not) afforded a 
truly dignified life. We may not be given all the particulars of a situation, but we can 
understand that not being educated or granted the opportunity to play, for example, are 
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harmful. However, there is great risk basing an entire political doctrine on intuitions. One 
could question whose intuitions are being represented, to what degree those intuitions 
have been challenged by others, and whether the intuitions genuinely represent an 
individual’s beliefs; or one could simply challenge a framework that is built entirely on 
intuitions as reliable guides since (as Nussbaum acknowledges) they are shaped so 
heavily by social and cultural norms. 
Despite the so-called intuitive nature of dignity, Nussbaum acknowledges, upon 
further reflection, that the concept is not all that clear. At a basic level, people have a 
minimal sense of decency. However, when we articulate what we mean by dignity, 
substantive content from our conception of the good (e.g., religious commitments) begins 
to define it. Defining dignity in terms of one’s comprehensive doctrine may be 
permissible morally and religiously, but is not an appropriate basis to ground political 
principles. For example, if dignity were interpreted according to a Protestant worldview 
and this represented the state, then those who did not hold such views would be either 
forced to assimilate or fear repercussions. Nussbaum (2007) argues that if the state 
adopted a version of dignity that did not respect other religious traditions, then it would 
be an attack on one’s “equal dignity that consists in being told that you are not a fully 
equal citizen because of your commitment to your religion” (341). Thus, she aspires to 
use a conception of dignity that is compatible with all reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, but applying it requires articulating its central tenets. 
Nussbaum opens her discussion of human dignity with the Stoics, who maintain 
that human beings gain their worth by possessing the capacity for rationality. Because the 
worth of each rational individual is “boundless,” all rational persons possess the same 
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equal worth. In other words, one’s human nature is bound up with one’s rationality, and 
so a person is worthy of respect and dignity insofar as she is a rational agent. Nussbaum 
is sympathetic to Stoicism insofar as it does not matter if a person is a woman or man, 
poor or rich, or slave or free; as long as that individual has rational capacities, she has the 
same worth as anyone else. Nussbaum retrieves the Stoic commitment to “inalienable 
worth”. Despite her support of the belief that each and every person ought to be treated 
with dignity, she departs from the Stoics in maintaining that the source of dignity is 
grounded in more than rationality. 
In order to extend dignity beyond rationality, Nussbaum draws on Aristotelian 
insights. A human being for Nussbaum, following Aristotle, is a thorough unification of 
rationality and animality, whereby the former is merely one aspect of the latter. Because 
rationality is only one part of animality, rationality no longer grounds dignity on its own. 
Dignity for human beings is now manifested in three ways—namely, through and in 
practical reason, sociability, and bodily need. Nussbaum’s account of human nature 
allows her to go beyond rationality, to include our “vulnerabilities” and relationships of 
“dependency” and “asymmetry” (i.e., human need) as worthy of dignity. For example, 
living a dignified life will not only include developing practical reason, but also creating 
opportunities for people to interact socially and providing nourishment for all human 
beings to meet (at minimum) their basic needs. 
The Aristotelian account of the person is “ethically evaluative,” that is, a process 
that selects actual features of a human life whereby not “exercising one of them, at any 
level, is not a fully human life, a life worthy of dignity, even if the others are present” 
(Nussbaum 2006, 181). Even though Nussbaum is grounding her theory in political 
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liberalism, she continues to draw from Aristotle to articulate a conception of human 
dignity, and subsequently, help identify a universal list of capabilities. Political liberalism 
offers people the opportunity to pursue their conception of the good, however, not just 
any conception will be permissible within a liberal framework. We need constraints on a 
theory of justice to aid in identifying when a person is harmed or living well. Nussbaum 
has abandoned flourishing as the standard of living a truly human life and dignity now 
serves that role. A person has an opportunity to live well for Nussbaum when she is able 
to exercise capabilities compatible with dignity. 
Nussbaum, however, has not completely abandoned the general method from the 
flourishing version. The dignity version engages in another essentialist-like project 
insofar as she is now attempting to offer capabilities compatible with dignity rather than 
to being human, and in doing so, she draws extensively from Aristotle. This is significant 
because it shows that she has not only preserved aspects of Aristotelian thought, but also 
continued her general commitment to a universal (essential) list of capabilities. I am not 
claiming that the contrasts between the two versions of capabilities are insignificant since 
dignity allows for more latitude on individuals’ choosing how to live than the narrow 
conception of the flourishing version. 
 In sum, the flourishing version and dignity version of capabilities both draw on 
Aristotelian insights. However, their appropriation of those insights is very different. The 
former uses an Aristotelian methodology to defend a version of flourishing based on a set 
of essentially human functions, which makes this project overtly ethical. More 
specifically, the functions from her early list are a result of an essentialist account of the 
human being. In contrast, the dignity version offers an alternative kind of essentialism; it 
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is part of a political project built on an egalitarian principle that each and every person is 
worthy of a life compatible with dignity. This life for Nussbaum is expressed through a 
list of capabilities. The dignity version has an advantage of not offering too specific of a 
list because its goal is not to identify the specific features of human flourishing, but 
simply general guidelines of what constitutes a dignified life. 
 
2.3 Understanding Capabilities through Dignity 
The precise relationship between capabilities and dignity thus far has not been 
spelled out very clearly by Nussbaum. I have attempted to construct a reasonably 
cohesive account of their relationship through her various works. Now, I would like to 
show that there seems to be textual evidence to support the claim that dignity is 
understood through capabilities and not vice-versa. In the previous section I argued that 
dignity provides a new grounding for capabilities and this interpretation will not be 
abandoned here. However, this section will discuss capabilities as constitutive of dignity. 
These two points are not inconsistent, and, in fact, complement each other well since her 
particular list of capabilities will emerge from a specific account of dignity. In other 
words, dignity both grounds capabilities and provides content to the list. 
Nussbaum contends that her list of capabilities should not be understood as 
independent from, or prior to, an account of dignity, but rather as an expression of 
dignity. The guiding notion to determine the content of the list is not dignity itself, “as if 
that could be separated from capabilities, but, rather, that of a life with, or worthy of, 
human dignity…at least in part, by having the capabilities on the list” (Nussbaum 2006, 
162). Furthermore, Nussbaum (2006) claims her list is “implicit in the very notions of 
		
33	
human dignity" (155, emphasis added), and “implicated in the idea of human dignity” 
(Nussbaum 2011, 32, emphasis added). Furthermore, she claims these fundamental 
entitlements are “very central prerequisites of a life worthy of human dignity” (2008, 
361, emphasis added). The concept of a “prerequisite” is not the same as something that 
is “implicated” or “implied”. Nonetheless, despite Nussbaum’s lack of clarity on the 
relationship between these concepts, we can discern from what she says that the 
capabilities are in some sense constitutive of a dignified human life. Because dignity is 
understood through rationality, sociability, and bodily need, her list of central capabilities 
will also need to be defined as such. 
Joel Feinberg’s “rights-as-observance” analysis is helpful to understand how 
Nussbaum connects dignity with capabilities. Feinberg argues that we cannot have 
respect for human dignity without respect for their rights. Justifying human rights does 
not entail a wholly independent appeal to respect for human dignity, but rights are 
already presupposed in the account of dignity. In other words, we cannot respect human 
dignity without first knowing the content of one’s rights. Consider an example Michael 
Rosen borrows from Feinberg. Feinberg claims that we can no more “observe the law 
without knowing that there was a speed limit” (Rosen, 57). One could refer to this as the 
“observance view” since the content of X cannot be identified until whatever X refers to 
has been observed. Respecting the law, then, entails knowing something about its 
content, such as the speed limit. Likewise, we cannot simply demand that everyone be 
treated with dignity until the content of dignity is clear. Nussbaum’s version advocates 
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for “capabilities-as-observance” since her account of dignity cannot be understood 
properly without articulating a set of fundamental entitlements.10 
 
2.4 A Revised List 
The transition from constructing a list of capabilities grounded in an Aristotelian 
theory of the good to one based on political liberalism and rooted in dignity has led to a 
slightly different list. I believe Nussbaum offers two main versions of her list, the first of 
																																																								10	Despite Nussbaum’s commitment to capabilities over human rights, she believes their “very close” 
relationship explains how capabilities is a “species” of human rights, that is, a kind of global moral theory 
that offers a set of universal values that must be guaranteed to each and every person. In an article 
contributing to a special issue on “human rights and capabilities,” Nussbaum offers the following three 
reasons in favor of the capabilities approach over human rights. See Special Issue: On Human Rights and 
Capabilities, Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 12 (1), 2011. First, the language of 
capabilities does not imply a Western imposition on colonized peoples, which she fears is embedded in 
rights-language. She mentions frequently that capabilities language is “down-to-earth” because it is 
common language used by people “all over the world…in their daily activities” (Nussbaum 2011a, 29). 
Second, the rights tradition is rather unclear on state intervention for securing rights and often remains 
absent; however, the capabilities approach demands the “state has an affirmative task of securing 
capabilities” (32). Finally, human rights are divided frequently into first generation rights, civil and 
political rights, second generation rights, and socio-economic rights. Meanwhile, Nussbaum argues that this 
distinction is problematic because it “suggests that the political and civil rights have no economic and 
social preconditions” (33). This is not the case since running for public office, for instance, may be a 
political right, however its realization is greatly hindered if one is extremely poor or lacks education. 
It is beyond the scope of the project to assess each of the above claims in detail, but I should 
mention briefly that human rights advocates have responses to each of Nussbaum’s points. In regards to the 
first point, she would need to show in what ways human rights is any more of a Western imposition than 
capabilities. For instance, it cannot be a commitment to autonomy and individual freedom for human rights 
since those commitments are also shared with capabilities proponents. Not to mention, the language of 
capabilities is not as “common sense” as Nussbaum maintains. In fact, the term “capabilities” is understood 
differently amongst capabilities theorists. This discussion can be found in Robeyns (2005, 100-2). 
Furthermore, Jack Donnelly (2003) argues against the second point by noting that securing rights is not 
merely a matter of state-absence since all “human rights require both positive action and restraint on the 
part of the state” (30). Other human rights theorists, such as Charles Bietz (2009) and James Nickel (2007) 
have made similar arguments. Finally, while it is certainly true that human rights have been traditionally 
divided into first, second, and even third generation rights, this does not imply that specific rights are not 
interconnected. It could be the case that in order to truly have a fair hearing one may need to have a proper 
amount of resources. 
So, it is not clear that Nussbaum successfully defends the capabilities approach over human rights. 
Nonetheless, I agree with Nussbaum’s (2011a) claim that the two theories should “march forward as allies 
in the combat against an exclusive focus on economic growth, and for an approach to development that 
focuses on people’s real needs and urgent entitlements” (37). To this end, Nussbaum offers a list of central 
capabilities, which best represents that of a dignified human life. 
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which can be found in section one. The second version of Nussbaum’s list of ten central 
capabilities (or fundamental entitlements) include11: 
1. Life – Being able to live the normal length of a human life; to not die 
prematurely or before one’s life is so reduced as to no longer be worth living. 
2. Bodily Health – Being able to have good health, which includes reproductive 
health, adequate nourishment and shelter. 
3. Bodily Integrity – Being able to move freely; to live free from assault, including 
sexual and domestic assault; to have the opportunity for sexual satisfaction and 
choice in reproductive matters. 
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought – Being able to use the senses to imagine, 
think, and reason in a “truly human way,” that is, one cultivated by an adequate 
education. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by artistic speech and 
freedom of religious exercise. Also, the ability to have pleasurable experiences 
and avoid non-beneficial pain. 
5. Emotions – Being able to have attachments to things and people outside 
ourselves, love those who care for us, and express justified anger. 
6. Practical Reason – Being able to form a conception of the good and critically 
reflect on it. 
7. Affiliation 
 A. Being able to live with and towards others and engage in various social 
interactions. 
																																																								
11 This list can be found in the following major works of Nussbaum (1999, 41-2; 2000b, 78-80; 2006, 76-8; 
2011b, 33-4). 
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 B. To have the social bases for self-respect and non-humiliation, and to be 
treated as a dignified being worthy of equal respect. 
8. Other Species – Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, 
plants, and the eco-system in general. 
9. Play – Being able to laugh, play, and enjoy recreational activities. 
10. Control over One’s Environment 
 A. Political – Being able to participate effectively in political choices that 
govern one’s life, including protections of free speech and association. 
 B. Material – Being able to hold property (land and movable goods) on an 
equal basis with others; and to have the right to seek employment equally 
to others. In work, being able to exercise practical reason and engage in 
meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers. 
These ten central capabilities are intentionally very abstract in order to create the 
space for them to be fulfilled in many ways. For example, the capability of senses, 
imagination, and thought allows people from not only different social strata, but even 
intra-household, to possess the capability in many ways. Furthermore, this list, like her 
flourishing version, is not fixed or static, but she claims it is always subject to revision. 
She claims further, that because her list is open to change, it is able to accommodate 
cultural and religious pluralism. Finally, in order to live a dignified human life, one must 
be given the opportunity to acquire all central capabilities up to an adequate threshold 
level. If the threshold standard cannot be secured, then a state is not fully just. 
I have discerned a few sub-capabilities from Nussbaum’s list. I present them here 
because she references them frequently throughout her works, despite the fact that they 
		
37	
do not appear on her list, and because some of my later criticisms target these sub-
capabilities. Nussbaum never discusses the relationship between the vagueness of the 
central capabilities and the sub-capabilities, which can be derived from them except that 
her list must remain highly abstract so that it can be realized differently in various 
contexts.  
The fourth capability, for example, entails that of political and artistic freedom of 
expression. Freedom of expression is not an explicit capability on the list, but when 
understood properly, the right to express oneself without fear of harm is included in the 
general capability of senses, imagination, and thought. The capability of education is also 
included in the fourth capability since thought entails having the proper training in basic 
math, literacy, and science. Another capability Nussbaum references often, but cannot be 
found directly on the list is “access to credit”. It is derived as follows. The capability of 
control over one’s environment has both a political and material component. Political 
control includes protections of free speech and association, and material control allows 
one to have the same opportunity as others to hold property. One important aspect of 
holding property is having access to credit; thus, Nussbaum endorses the important 
capability of “access to credit”. 
There are some differences between the early and later lists. First, and most 
importantly, the early list represents functions based on shared experiences. For example, 
human beings seem to share their aversion to non-beneficial pain universally and 
recognize their fate as mortal beings. On the other hand, the later list represents a list of 
capabilities compatible with a dignified life. 
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Second, some capabilities were retracted (e.g., early infant development) and 
others added (e.g., emotions and control over one’s environment). For instance, 
Nussbaum (1992) explained the capability of early infant development as babies who 
recognize their “helplessness, experiencing their alternating closeness and distance…on 
whom they depend” (218). The notion that human beings are dependent is never 
abandoned, and indeed as I have shown, it plays a prominent role in her conception of 
dignity. Thus, to some degree, it is implicitly present in all capabilities on her list and, 
perhaps, this is a plausible reason why it no longer needs to be stated explicitly. I note 
this capability in particular to highlight what might appear as a difference between her 
two lists, but further examination reveals its presence in both. This shows that just as 
there are common strands between the types of essentialism found in the flourishing and 
dignity version of capabilities, so too with particular capabilities. 
Another capability that is found on her previous list, but not the newer one is 
“sexual desire”. It is not clear how sexual desire is a capability; it seems that in order for 
a capability to be central, it needs to be more than simply a desire. As I argued in Section 
1.2, one could interpret the capability of sexual desire as providing a criticism of female 
genital cutting to the extent that it harmfully impacts a woman’s sexual experience. In 
that respect, it may be similar to the capability of “bodily integrity,” which is on the 
newer list, however, bodily integrity is much broader than sexual desire since it includes 
leading a life free from domestic and sexual assault and not merely creating the space to 
be capable of having sexual desires. 
A capability shift from sexual desire to bodily integrity is more than a 
terminological change, but also a conceptual one. The flourishing version of the list 
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sought to identify experiences shared by everyone, which makes performing its function 
truly human. Because having sexual desires for Nussbaum is a feature shared by nearly 
all human beings, she included it on her list. A problem with the capability of sexual 
desire is that it merely describes a feature of human beings, but offers little to no 
normative guidance. In contrast, the dignity version seeks capabilities that uphold what it 
means to live a life of dignity, which includes living free from sexual assault. However, 
one should not mistake the dignity version as telling us how we ought to live our lives 
since it is situated within a politically liberal framework. This allows an individual the 
option to fulfill a given capability from Nussbaum’s list, if she chooses. The important 
point is not whether she possesses the capability or not, but that she has the potential to 
do so. 
Other capabilities appear to be jettisoned, but, upon closer examination they have 
in fact returned in a different guise. For example, the flourishing list included mortality, 
which cannot be found in the dignity version; however, it has been replaced with “life” 
and “bodily integrity,” respectively. The capability of mortality/life entails being honest 
that human beings are not immortal, but despite this inevitability, we still grieve at the 
loss of a loved one. Nussbaum never explicitly says which capabilities can be discerned 
from mortality/life, but I would suggest two possible candidates, both of which are 
compatible with the revised list. First, human beings should be able to live their normal 
lifespan, and second, we should be given the opportunity to grieve properly at the loss of 
a loved one. 
In Women and Human Development, Nussbaum offers a glimpse into a reason 
why changes were made to her list, which will be important when we consider her 
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methods of justifying the capabilities and her claim that she consulted a wide-range of 
diverse perspectives. She explains that after “discussions” with people from India, 
primary changes were made, which include “bodily integrity and control over one’s 
environment…and a new emphasis on dignity and non-humiliation” (Nussbaum 2000b, 
78 n.82). She does not tell us the extent of these discussions and with whom they took 
place, but they had an impact on her. In Chapter 2, I will examine the plausibility of these 
discussions on the alterations and justifications of the list. 
 
3. Expanding on the Dignity Version 
3.1 Introduction 
 The dignity version of capabilities demands that each and every citizen be given 
the opportunity to exercise all capabilities from her list up to an adequate threshold level. 
This section will explore thresholds for some capabilities from the list. I will then explain 
a problem surrounding individuals who are not given the opportunity to fulfill all central 
capabilities, but instead are forced to choose between one central capability or another. 
Nussbaum calls such decisions “tragic”. I will suggest, following Nussbaum, that one 
possible way to temporarily address tragic choices is to identify capabilities that lead to 
the possibility of manifesting other capabilities, namely, “fertile capabilities”. 
 
3.2 Thresholds and Tragic Dilemmas 
Nussbaum argues that in order to live a dignified human life the capabilities from 
her list cannot be met at just any level, but must satisfy a certain threshold. Any society 
that falls short of ensuring that each individual is able to satisfy the threshold for all 
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capabilities on the list cannot be considered just. However, the threshold cannot be set too 
high. Nussbaum (2011b) is aware of navigating this space when she writes that we need 
to “select a level that is aspirational but not utopian” (42). This is a precarious position 
since it is difficult enough to identify tangibly the “appropriate” threshold, much less 
articulate it. Nussbaum settles on the claim that thresholds must be set at a “reasonable 
level”. One can go beyond the threshold requirement. For instance, Nussbaum argues that 
the threshold for children is secondary education, but one may pursue post-secondary 
education if one chooses. Nussbaum admits that this is one of the largest gaps in her 
theory; that is, discussing the nature of justice above the threshold. 
 There is no exact measurement to determine a reasonable threshold level. So, 
Nussbaum advocates for approximate and general levels for two reasons: first, the 
threshold may shift over time, and second, the appropriate threshold level, at the margin, 
may require adapting to its context. For example, Nussbaum says we can argue over 
whether leaving school at an appropriate age should be 17, 18, or 19, but not 12 in light 
of employment opportunities. 
 The fact that capabilities must be secured at an appropriate threshold level for 
everyone does not tell us how much each person should be guaranteed. Nussbaum says 
some capabilities must be secured “equally,” while others only “adequately”. Capabilities 
such as political, religious and civil liberties can be “adequately secured only if they are 
equally secured” (Nussbaum 2006, 293, her emphasis). Equal security must be the goal of 
capabilities in situations where any lack of that capability would result in harming one’s 
dignity. For instance, there is no adequate amount of voting rights that some deserve 
more than others. All citizens deserve the equal right to vote. 
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However, not all capabilities demand equality. For instance, adequate housing is 
required in order to satisfy the capability of “control over one's environment”. Recall, 
there are two ways to have control over one's environment—politically and materially. 
Material control over one's environment includes the ability to hold property and have the 
same access to property as others. Nussbaum says adequacy could be understood as an 
“ample minimum”. Houses do not need to be equal in size, but everyone should have 
adequate housing and shelter compatible with human dignity. 
 Nussbaum acknowledges that achieving an adequate level of capabilities for each 
and every person is a fantasy in the current state of affairs, and thus we are often left with 
what Nussbaum calls “tragic choices”. A “tragic choice” occurs when two or more 
central capabilities collide, and therefore any action will involve wronging someone.12 
Tragic dilemmas are especially problematic for Nussbaum since none of her central 
capabilities can be expended for another. She presents the following example. In Kerala, 
a state in India, it was more advantageous for children to stay home and make an income 
to help their family meet basic needs than to attend school. The tragic choice here 
involves the children receiving an education, on the one hand, and attempting to provide 
a basic living for their family, on the other. Nussbaum maintains that both education and 
nourishment are fundamental entitlements; thus, for an individual to be forced into a 
position to choose one or the other is tragic. 
 One possible response to the tragic dilemma is to offer more of a certain 
capability in order to compensate for the loss of another capability. However, 
Nussbaum's (2006) approach forbids trade-offs since these fundamental entitlements are 
“radically nonfungible,” that is, a lack in “one area cannot be made up simply by giving 																																																								
12 For a full discussion of tragic choices, see Nussbaum (2000a). 
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people a larger amount of another capability” (166-7). In contrast to aggregate 
approaches that could offer more of something else to compensate for a loss, Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach demands all central capabilities be secured at an appropriate level 
for each and every citizen. 
 Nussbaum's primary solution to a tragic dilemma problem is “ingenuity and 
effort,” and she praises the state of Kerala as one example of what she means by solving a 
tragic dilemma in this way.13 Kerala set up a school program with “flexible hours” that 
also offered a “nutritious midday meal”. This solution nearly wiped out illiteracy in the 
state. India would eventually adopt the midday mandatory meal for all schools. 
Nussbaum praises Kerala for their ingenuity and effort to wipe out illiteracy while still 
providing nutrition to the children. Nussbaum (2011b) demands the state “ask what the 
best intervention point is to create a future in which this sort of choice does not confront 
people” when individuals are faced with a tragic choice (38). For Kerala, that point was 
offering midday meals to offset the wages otherwise earned from not attending school, in 
addition to more flexible school hours. 
 I find the Kerala example compelling. It illustrates Nussbaum’s point that justice 
requires securing each of the central capabilities for every citizen up to an adequate 
threshold level. However, we are not afforded many details about the case. It would be 
important to know how this decision has impacted employment and the families these 
																																																								13	It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to spell out fertile capabilities in any detail, but it’s worth 
noting this as a strategy Nussbaum uses to address tragic dilemmas. Drawing on concepts from Jonathan 
Wolff and Avner De-Shalit, Nussbaum pursues a strategy for handling tragic dilemmas that appeals to the 
idea of fertile capabilities. Fertile capabilities explain how and why it might be necessary, in certain 
contexts, to privilege certain capabilities. The ultimate goal remains to ensure everyone has the ability to 
acquire all central capabilities, however, in instances where this is not possible, privileging certain 
capabilities, namely, those fertile in that context, become a means to realize as many central capabilities as 
possible. Nussbaum (2011b) claims we should seek fertile capabilities in order to (1) identify tendencies to 
alleviate corrosive disadvantages and (2) prepare for a tragedy-free future (45). 
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children were helping to support. Nonetheless, a greater concern remains with the 
solution of ingenuity and effort. That is, Nussbaum offers a resolution of what one state 
did to address a tragic choice, but we are still left with no principled way of moving 
forward for those situations in which there are in fact no options that are not tragic. 
 
4. Justifying the Dignity Version 
Even though the capabilities theory and list are already constructed, the moral and 
political legitimacy of them are highly dependent on their justification. Nussbaum’s 
initial justificatory strategy for the capabilities offers a weak defense of capabilities as 
justified norms for liberal societies through an imaginative exercise. However, Nussbaum 
desires a stronger grounding for capabilities. Since she is operating within the framework 
of political liberalism, Nussbaum seeks justifications that are compatible with competing 
comprehensive doctrines, and thus not wed to any one doctrine in particular. She finds 
the methods of reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus effective to this end. 
It is very difficult to offer a single, coherent account of Nussbaum’s uses of 
reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus because she says very little about the 
nature of the justificatory strategies themselves. She dedicates no more than a couple 
pages in any of her major works to either of them. As a matter of fact, reflective 
equilibrium is almost completely ignored in Frontiers. So, I draw on Rawls to help fill 
these gaps. In Frontiers of Justice, her most comprehensive work on the dignity version 
of capabilities, she says nearly nothing about reflective equilibrium other than the fact 
that she spelled it out in Women and Human Development (5) and that it constitutes, 
along with overlapping consensus, part of the Rawlsian “holistic justification” (389). She 
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does briefly elaborate reflective equilibrium in her 2000 manuscript, however, she never 
explains some of the key elements demanded by it. For example, the reader is left not 
knowing what ought to come into equilibrium or what determines which doctrines are 
worthy of becoming an object of overlapping consensus. So while she uses the terms 
“reflective equilibrium” and “overlapping consensus” in all her capabilities works since 
1998, there is very little substance to them. She leaves gaps in the theory that I will 
attempt to address. 
Moreover, even when she discusses the justifications, the terms are rather unclear. 
In Women and Human Development, for instance, Nussbaum distinguishes between 
narrow and wide reflective equilibrium. She says that wide reflective equilibrium, unlike 
the narrow method, will consider “not only our own judgments…but also the judgments 
of our fellow citizens” (Nussbaum 2000, 102). A footnote to this quote says that 
reflective equilibrium is “intersubjective”. A similar passage is also explained in her 
latest capabilities book, Creating Capabilities, where she claims that achieving 
equilibrium is a “multivocal character: justification is achieved not by individuals acting 
alone but by debate among Socratically deliberating individuals” (77). She says this 
understanding of reflective equilibrium is Rawlsian, but that hardly seems to be the case 
since he never demanded the need for another agent in this process. There seems to be a 
larger problem with her account of reflective equilibrium, namely, the process to achieve 
equilibrium is performed in the theorizer’s mind, and yet she insists that it is a result of 
dialogue. So she either misunderstands Rawls’s use of the term “reflective equilibrium” 
(which is doubtful) or she has created a new meaning for them without clearly explaining 
the concepts. 
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Claassen and Düwell express a similar frustration with Nussbaum’s later 
justificatory strategies. They argue that she presents “at least three methods 
simultaneously, without reflecting on their mutual compatibility” (500).14 Specifically, 
overlapping consensus and reflective equilibrium are “completely different method[s] of 
justification and it is prima facie hard to see how the two may be reconciled” (Claassen 
and Düwell, 501). I am sympathetic to their concern. In an attempt to reconcile the two 
justificatory strategies of reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus, I will explain 
the terms as articulated by Rawls, and then show how they can be used to justify the 
capabilities approach in a way Nussbaum wishes. 
 
4.1 Weak “Justification” of Capabilities 
Nussbaum (2006) argues that the intuitive force of each capability is a result of 
“imagining a form of life” without that capability (78). This method is similar to 
Aristotelian internalist essentialism insofar as we, as individual theorizers, are pondering 
features of human life that are uniquely human. However, unlike internalist essentialism, 
the imaginative exercise does not demand that we confront beliefs and practices from 
other societies, and it is not situated with an Aristotelian framework. I believe Nussbaum 
uses this method as a starting point to subject particular capabilities that constitute her list 
to further scrutiny. 
Consider, for example, the capability of play. Play refers to having the 
opportunity to laugh and enjoy recreational activities, following a strict set of rules in 
																																																								
14 I am only discussing two of Nussbaum’s justifications because they are most central to her theory. 
However, it is worth mentioning others she considers, for example, imaginative exercises (See Section 2.5), 
narratives (Nussbaum 2011b, chapter 1), and a “limited and ancillary role” to Jean Hampton’s informed-
desire proceduralism (Nussbaum 2000, 158-61). 
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attempt to win a game or competition, or simply an “openness to being a fool” (Lugones 
1987). Nussbaum’s imaginative exercise asks us to imagine a life without play or a life of 
being forced to “play” in a particular way. In the former case, an individual would be 
deterred from fully expressing herself, for instance, from using her imagination and 
emotions, gaining and strengthening relationships, and receiving a break from the 
challenges and monotony of daily routines. This explains why living a dignified human 
life entails the opportunity to play. In the latter case, if one is commanded to play, is it 
really play? The answer is “no” because “if we dragoon people into a total mode of 
functioning, we are not fully respectful of them” (Nussbaum 2000b, 160). Play, then, 
cannot be coerced or forced since it would no longer be play, and it would violate one’s 
dignity insofar as a person is deprived of the opportunities to decide for herself whether 
she will play or not, and how she will do so. The capability of play makes the list because 
if a person is denied the opportunity to play, then she would be missing a key feature of a 
dignified life. 
An easy initial objection to this way of justifying Nussbaum’s list of capabilities 
is that it seems viciously circular. Nussbaum appears to define what constitutes a 
dignified life through the list of capabilities, on the one hand, and yet maintains that 
capabilities are an expression of dignity, on the other, that we can intuitively grasp 
through this imaginative exercise. Nussbaum doesn’t attempt to avoid the circularity 
problem by offering an independent account of dignity and then showing how the 
capabilities is linked to it. Rather, she simply acknowledges that we cannot “look at a life 
or listen to a story without having some preliminary hunches about what is significant” 
(Nussbaum 2011, 15). So Nussbaum seems to answer the above problem with one’s 
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“hunches”. In other words, the initial criterion to ground or justify her list of capabilities 
as the right list is in one’s own gut-reactions, so to speak. Nussbaum recognizes this is 
insufficient to provide a strong justification of the capabilities as universally valid norms, 
but she nonetheless finds it as a useful starting point because she thinks many of us do 
and will share these intuitions. 
The above example is meant to illustrate two points. First, Nussbaum utilizes 
these types of imaginative exercises as a way of motivating a weak justification for her 
list. I say “motivating” because full justifications are a result of general agreement on the 
capabilities list. All theories must begin with assumptions, and then further justification 
for those original commitments can be given. Nussbaum starts with a list of central 
capabilities, which is an expression of her account of dignity and invites us to see if we 
could really imagine a dignified life without even one of them, and if we cannot, then her 
list is to some degree justified. 
Second, we gain a better understanding of Nussbaum’s account of dignity. We 
learn that the capabilities list is her substantive account of a dignified human life, which 
becomes the basis for measuring and evaluating cross-cultural quality of life judgments. 
Again, the intuitive exercise does not fully accomplish Nussbaum’s ultimate goal of fully 
evaluating whether an individual is able to realize all ten central capabilities. However, 
an individual’s “preliminary hunches” offers the first step toward identifying which 
capabilities might possibly be the standard against which we judge a person’s well-being. 
I have argued that the list should not be divorced from Nussbaum’s account of 
human dignity but taken as constitutive of it. Assuming one accepts her basic idea of 
human dignity, which entails the opportunity to secure the ten central capabilities on her 
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list up to an adequate threshold level, then in principle one would also seem to endorse 
her single, universal list of central capabilities as fundamental entitlements (as opposed to 
a thick conception of the good life) to be ensured for each and every citizen. 
Intuitions or hunches in regards to which capabilities seem most appealing will 
vary between and within cultures. So, Nussbaum’s next move is to bolster support for her 
intuitions by demonstrating that she has refined her beliefs by considering alternative 
perspectives. Nussbaum calls this a “narrative” method of justification. 
 
4.2 The Narrative Approach 
The narrative approach purports to go beyond a crude intuitionism because it 
aspires to consult the intuitions of diversity situated others. Nussbaum employs this 
method when she interviews two Indian women, Vasanti and Jayamma, in order to better 
understand what those who inhabit different social and economic strata may think about 
dignity. Nussbaum uses their responses to spark her “imagination and the emotions” in 
regards to what it means to live a life with dignity (2000b, 15). For instance, Nussbaum 
says one can use one’s imagination, in light of hearing another’s story, of how one would 
address a given situation, perhaps, a tragic dilemma. Furthermore, Nussbaum uses this 
method of justification to suggest that her list of capabilities is not merely endorsed by 
her, but also shared by people who do not share her worldview. 
One interviewee, Vasanti, inhabits a good social caste but was subject to domestic 
violence at the hands of her alcoholic husband. He would eventually leave her, but 
thankfully her father and brothers have been supportive. She managed to secure a bank 
loan from the Self-Employed Women’s Association, and is now earning a “decent 
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living”. By contrast, Jayamma struggles to meet her daily subsistence needs. She carries 
bricks on her head for eight hours per day for very little pay. She lost her husband, but 
cannot collect a widow’s pension because the government said she has “able-bodied 
sons” to help her. However, her sons refuse to offer their support. Despite their obvious 
differences (e.g., class and caste), Nussbaum notes that they are similar in many respects. 
For example, they live in a society that claims women have the same political equalities 
as men, but in reality, this is far from the case (Nussbaum 2000b, 20). Furthermore, they 
suffer from poverty as a result of sex discrimination and both are highly dependent on 
men for economic independence. 
 Nussbaum’s (2000b) interviews with these women reveal grave challenges in 
their lives, and yet, despite these, they still maintain certain aspirations to flourish that are 
“recognizable across differences of class and context” (31). Even though they never fully 
articulate what it means to live well, Nussbaum is able to extract values they cherish such 
as having the ability to  politically participate, to develop affiliations, and live a life free 
from bodily harm. In a footnote to her list of central capabilities, she attributes 
“discussions with people in India” for helping her place “greater emphasis on bodily 
integrity and control over one’s environment” (Nussbaum 2000b, 78 n.82). An advantage 
of the narrative approach as a method of justification is that it first seeks out people who 
do not share the same worldview as most of Nussbaum’s readers, along with collecting 
similar data in various cultural contexts, in order to show that despite cross-cultural 
differences, almost all people around the world share the same basic hunches or intuitions 
about what it means to live a dignified life. Interestingly, Nussbaum limits her 
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examination to India although capabilities studies have been employed around the 
world.15 
 The advantage, then, of the narrative approach over crude intuitionism is that the 
former at least minimally engages others. This, in turn, allows Nussbaum to have a better 
understanding of a way of life otherwise unfamiliar to her. However, Nussbaum asserts 
that the narrative approach is “not a method of political justification […] The ‘narrative 
method’ is a method of civic education” (2004, 202). That is, it primarily serves as a 
heuristic device to help those who would otherwise never experience a particular way of 
life to gain some access into their world. This is far from justifying a theory or list of 
capabilities. Nussbaum rejects the narrative approach as a primary justification since it 
merely depends on respondents’ desires and preferences. Preferences may be adapted to 
unjust social circumstances, and thus, are not reliable materials for theory-construction 
and defense. So, Nussbaum turns to Rawlsian methods of reflective equilibrium and 
overlapping consensus as her primary source of justification to demonstrate the cross-
cultural validity of the capabilities. 
 
4.3 Rawlsian Methods of Political Justification: Reflective Equilibrium and Overlapping 
Consensus 
 
 
 In a Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls attempts to construct and defend “justice as 
fairness” as a theory of justice. Justice as fairness is not only political but also moral, of a 
particular kind, namely, for political and social institutions. In brief, Rawls defends 
justice as fairness through reflective equilibrium in Theory, and later introduces 
																																																								
15 Solova (2011) has focused her research primarily in Egypt, Simone Cecchini and Francesco Notti (2011) 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, Sabina Alkire (2002, ch. 7) has studied local projects in Pakistan, and 
Tania Burchardt and Polly Vizard (2011) apply the capabilities approach to Britain. 
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overlapping consensus as a justificatory strategy for justice as fairness as a political 
conception across societies. In Theory, he defends this account of justice by showing that 
its political principles can be acceptable within a liberal pluralistic society. 
Rawls offers two principles of justice that serve as a basis for any liberal 
democratic society. First, each person has equal basic rights, which include freedom from 
physical assault, liberty of conscience, freedom of speech, the right to hold personal 
property, etc. The second principle, referred to as the “difference principle,” states that 
social and economic inequalities are acceptable only insofar as they work out to the least 
well-off’s advantage. On this model, wealth need not be distributed equally, but 
inequalities are justified if and only if they help those who are least advantaged (Rawls 
1999a, 53). 
 One may ask how Rawls’s two principles of justice are fair. To this, he provides a 
hypothetical situation in which an agreement is reached on the principles of justice for the 
basic institutional structures of a well-ordered society. In the “original position,” rational 
and mutually disinterested free and equal citizens reach a “valid agreement” on the basic 
structure of society. Rawls argues that a valid (or fair) agreement is best ensured through 
the “veil of ignorance”. Individuals behind the veil choosing principles of justice do not 
know their race, class, sex, geo-political positioning, ethnicity, sexuality, or intelligence. 
However, they are aware of human motivations and how markets work, in addition to 
primary goods including a desire to “protect their liberties, widen their opportunities, and 
enlarge their means for promoting their aims” (Rawls 1999a, 123). Any agreement 
behind the veil is fair, according to Rawls, since it is made between genuinely free and 
equal citizens who, due to the veil of ignorance, cannot be influenced by bias toward their 
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own actual social positions and interests. And, because the parties agree on the principles 
of justice, the “agreement in the original position specifies the fair terms of social 
cooperation between citizens regarded as such persons. Hence the name: justice as 
fairness” (Rawls 2001, 16). 
 Two questions arise from Rawls’s discussion of justice as fairness and its two 
principles. First, why should I (an individual) adopt justice as fairness as the correct 
theory of justice? Second, how can justice as fairness work in a democratic pluralistic 
society where there are many competing conceptions of the good? These questions are of 
great significance because their answers reveal Rawls’s justifications, which Nussbaum 
borrows. Rawls answers the first of these questions in the same way throughout his work, 
namely, with the coherentist justificatory method of reflective equilibrium. However, the 
second question is addressed in his later works, beginning with “Justice as Fairness: 
Political not Metaphysical” (1985). Here, Rawls uses overlapping consensus to show how 
people with radically different moral and religious comprehensive doctrines can still 
accept the political principles of justice as fairness. This is significant considering their 
conceptions may often conflict with the “public political culture,” whereby individuals 
draw from their comprehensive doctrines to offer reasons in favor of a political 
conception for their given society (Rawls 2001, 6). 
Rawls (1999a) explains that to justify a theory of justice one must give “proof of 
its principles from premises we both accept” but it is not until “starting points are 
mutually recognized” that a proof becomes a justification (507). Our intuitive starting 
points for Rawls are the most “recalcitrant,” to borrow a term from Quine.16 Rawls 
maintains that justice as fairness better captures our intuitions of being free and equal 																																																								
16 For further discussion of a coherentist method of justification, see W. V. Quine (1951). 
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than competing theories of justice. In Theory, Rawls sets out to defend justice as fairness 
through a coherentist method of justification which draws heavily on our intuitions, 
called “reflective equilibrium”. 
Reflective equilibrium is a method of justification that attempts to seek coherence 
between (a) an individual’s considered moral judgments, (b) sets of principles, and (c) 
background assumptions. The process can be summarized as follows. An individual 
begins with her “fixed” considered moral judgments, and then uses those intuitions to test 
a theory, which in turn is used to scrutinize moral judgments.17 After going back and 
forth, testing intuitions against one’s background theories and using those theories to 
check our intuitions, one will hopefully achieve a state that “expresses reasonable 
conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and 
adjusted” (Rawls 1999a, 18). This procedure helps revise one’s intuitions if, for example, 
they clash strongly with a given theory, or one may endorse a different theory that better 
captures one’s fixed points. 
Rawls answers the first question above, why an individual should adopt justice as 
fairness, by showing that if some of her judgments are incompatible with the proposed 
theory (like justice as fairness), she may well revise them. However, if the theory is 
completely incommensurate with her most fixed intuitions, then she may want to revise 
the theory or seek a new one. Justice, according to Rawls (1999a), rejects a theory that 
claims “the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others” 
(25). Utilitarianism, for example, may demand violating a person’s rights in order to 
																																																								
17 I am very cautious in using the term “fixed” because Rawls says no intuition is free from scrutiny. To 
that extent, all of our intuitions are subject to change. Nonetheless, some intuitions are significantly more 
stable than others. For example, Rawls, drawing on a quote from Abraham Lincoln, says, “If slavery is not 
wrong, nothing is wrong” (Rawls 2001, 29). 
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maximize overall utility. In contrast, according to justice as fairness, such violations are 
unacceptable since all people are entitled to equal basic civil and political rights. So, if a 
person values basic equal liberties as a “fixed point” then she would likely reject 
utilitarianism on the grounds that it cannot guarantee these liberties and more likely adopt 
a conception of justice similar to that of Rawls. 
However, “narrow reflective equilibrium” is insufficient since an individual is 
seeking more than coherence simply amongst her own judgments, but also among the 
judgments of other people and theories. In attempting to respond to the second question 
above, how one defends justice as fairness in a democratic society, Rawls suggests 
seeking “wide reflective equilibrium”.18 Wide reflective equilibrium considers one’s own 
judgments, in addition to “alternative conceptions of justice and the force of various 
arguments for them” (Rawls 2001, 31). Unlike narrow reflective equilibrium, wide 
reflective equilibrium scrutinizes one’s principles and moral judgments based on a 
different set of theoretical commitments. For example, a utilitarian may criticize Rawls 
for appealing to “ordinary moral judgments as a ‘test’ with justificatory force” (Daniels 
1996, 4).  
If one were to adopt justice as fairness as a theory of justice, one would need to 
respond to the above criticism. It is beyond the scope of my project to investigate this 
complex debate, however, for our purposes I want to show how wide reflective 
equilibrium can be used as a justificatory strategy for society as a whole as opposed to 
merely an individual. Rawls uses wide reflective equilibrium to show why justice as 
fairness is superior to utilitarianism, and as I will show later in the section, Nussbaum 																																																								
18 Rawls never used the phrase “wide reflective equilibrium” in a Theory of Justice. However, Norman 
Daniels explains that he used the concept “implicitly” in it and explicitly beginning with “The 
Independence of Moral Theory” (Daniels 1996, 41 n.2). 
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will draw on this same strategy to argue for the superiority of capabilities over Rawlsian 
social contract theory. 
A well-ordered society is constructed when wide reflective equilibrium has been 
reached amongst its citizens. Rawls (2001) explains that in this society there is not only a 
“public point of view from which all citizens can adjudicate their claims, but also this 
point of view is mutually recognized as affirmed by them all in full reflective 
equilibrium” (31). The advantage of such a society is that everyone has endorsed the 
same theory of justice as a regulative measure. Coherence among moral judgments is 
reached within and between citizens; specifically for Rawls this means justice as fairness 
would gain public approval. 
One problem Rawls saw with grounding justice as fairness in wide reflective 
equilibrium is the “fact of reasonable pluralism”. People in a liberal pluralistic society 
may in principle converge on a theory of justice, however, they would do so through 
radically different comprehensive moral and religious doctrines. If different groups of 
people accepted a theory of justice, they would do so for very different reasons. A 
problem with wide reflective equilibrium is that it is (nearly) impossible to achieve 
because that would require the theory to run through everyone’s comprehensive doctrine. 
Rawls, in attempting to respond to this concern, re-introduces justice as fairness as a 
“freestanding” political conception, that is, a theory not dependent on a comprehensive 
doctrine for its justification.  
Rawls develops a new justification (viz., overlapping consensus) to offer a more 
realistic approach to the fact that reasonable pluralism exists in democratic societies. 
Overlapping consensus is a convergence on a political conception, specifically for 
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political purposes, which is compatible with “all the opposing philosophical and religious 
doctrines likely to persist and to gain adherents in a more or less just constitutional 
democratic society” (Rawls 1985, 225-6). It is a political justification that avoids making 
metaphysical commitments. Rawls argues that in this sense primacy is given to the 
political conception over the comprehensive doctrine since we should not seek to “strike 
a balance” between competing comprehensive doctrines to develop a political 
conception; instead, the political conception ought to be “defensible in its own right and 
is such that those who support…that kind of regime can also endorse that conception” 
(Rawls 2001, 37).  
Like reflective equilibrium, there is no guarantee overlapping consensus will be 
achieved, however, Rawls hopes through time that justice as fairness will become an 
object of overlapping consensus. Overlapping consensus is like a modus vivendi to the 
extent that people agree on the political conception and tolerate one another, but the 
former is more choice worthy insofar as a society may have a modus vivendi for the 
wrong reasons (e.g., political authority or group interests). It also has the added 
advantage of achieving stability over time since people would continue to endorse the 
theory of justice should the “relative strength of their view in society increase and 
eventually become dominant” (Rawls 2001, 195). 
In sum, Rawls argues that through wide reflective equilibrium one is able to 
justify a theory of justice individually. However, defending a theory of justice based on 
wide reflective equilibrium throughout a democratic society is nearly impossible given 
the fact of pluralism. Thus, Rawls gives precedence to a different justificatory strategy—
namely, overlapping consensus. So, while wide reflective equilibrium uses an 
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individual’s political commitments for its justification, overlapping consensus does not, 
according to Rawls, depend on a political culture for its realization.  
 
4.4 Nussbaum’s Use of Reflective Equilibrium 
Nussbaum, like Rawls, uses both reflective equilibrium and overlapping 
consensus to justify the capabilities approach and her list. She believes their combined 
efforts offer a Rawlsian “holistic justification,” one that “looks for reflective equilibrium 
and uses the idea of overlapping consensus” (Nussbaum 2006, 389). The ultimate goal is 
to bring one’s moral judgments and the capabilities theory into equilibrium, and then 
show how it can be respected internationally by becoming an object of overlapping 
consensus from a plurality of religious and cultural worldviews. 
Just as Rawls used wide reflective equilibrium to demonstrate the superiority of 
justice as fairness over utilitarianism, Nussbaum draws on the same strategy to show how 
the capabilities approach is more choice worthy than competing theories of justice, 
including utilitarian desire-satisfaction and Rawlsian social-contract theory. Now, I will 
briefly examine the process of reflective equilibrium and note the advantages capabilities 
has over competing theories. 
Recall that for reflective equilibrium, we start with the most secure of our 
intuitions, and attempt to seek stability between our judgments and theoretical principles. 
Consider one of the only examples Nussbaum offers in regards to reflective equilibrium. 
She says an individual could have a moral judgment that rape and domestic violence 
harms one’s human dignity. Nussbaum does not provide criteria to guide us on which 
intuitions are worth consulting, except noting the importance of identifying intuitions that 
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are refined and scrutinized, but we are given no direction as to how to know which 
intuitions have this status. The goal, then, is to seek coherence between the judgment that 
rape and domestic violence harms a person’s dignity and our basic political principles. 
Here, one must investigate various theories which maintain that one’s human dignity is 
violated in such cases. One could then make the case in favor of the capabilities approach 
since the theory, as constructed by Nussbaum, accepts political principles such as each 
person having a right to live a dignified human life, which is incompatible with rape and 
domestic violence. Nussbaum notes that a utilitarian desire-satisfaction theorist may not 
be able to morally condemn such actions since people adapt their preferences to their 
situations, and thus, a woman may “accept” abuse from her husband. 
Once Nussbaum has shown capabilities is superior to utilitarianism, the next 
“logical step” in attaining reflective equilibrium is to compare capabilities against other 
strong competing theories of justice. In Frontiers, Nussbaum takes the next step by 
attempting to show that capabilities is more choice-worthy than Rawls’s social contract 
theory in three areas: disabilities (chapters 2 and 3), transnational justice (chapter 4 and 
5), and non-human animals (chapter 6). It is beyond the scope of this project to 
investigate the moral judgments, principles, and background theories, and their 
interactions towards achieving equilibrium. However, I will briefly describe Nussbaum’s 
argument, in a reflective equilibrium fashion, in favor of capabilities over Rawlsian 
contractarianism in regards to protecting disabled peoples.  
Let’s consider briefly Nussbaum’s argument for capabilities over Rawlsian 
contractarianism with respect to disabilities as one example of how she employs 
reflective equilibrium in defense of capabilities. Rawls and Nussbaum, unlike proponents 
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of utilitarianism, are committed to the belief that each and every person ought to be given 
equal basic political rights, including people with disabilities. However, Nussbaum 
questions the extent to which Rawls is able to fully incorporate people with disabilities, 
specifically, cognitive disabilities, as a matter of justice. Nussbaum identifies two 
problems for Rawls. First, he is unable to address the special needs associated with 
mentally impaired individuals because of their lack of “social productivity” and high 
“cost”. Second, Nussbaum argues that a deeper problem for Rawls is that his reasonable 
citizen in a well-ordered society assumes an “idealized picture of moral rationality”. 
Nussbaum (2006) ultimately agrees with Rawls’s own conclusive dilemma that either 
people with cognitive disabilities do not present “issues of justice, or we should say that 
justice as fairness does not offer a complete account of social justice, and we should 
figure out what we would need to alter in order to make the theory capable of going 
further” (135). 
Nussbaum attempts to answer Rawls’s challenge with the capabilities approach. 
As I mentioned above, she says each and every person ought to be given the opportunity 
to live a dignified human life. Thus even people with cognitive disabilities ought to be 
given the opportunity to live such a life. Nussbaum believes this is an intuition shared by 
nearly everyone. And if we want a theory that best coheres with our intuitions that still 
achieves justice, then capabilities is superior to Rawlsian social contract theory. Even 
though Rawls’s theory is one of justice, it does not mesh well with our intuitions insofar 
as it does not provide everyone an opportunity to live a dignified human life; Nussbaum 
claims that on Rawls’s model, cognitively disabled individuals are not afforded the same 
citizenship status in virtue of their lack of full rational capacity. For this reason, 
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Nussbaum attempts to show how capabilities is more in line with our intuitions about 
cognitively disabled persons by bringing into equilibrium our intuitions with the 
capabilities since Rawls’s theory maintains a narrow conception of rationality and thus 
has difficulty including the cognitively disabled as full persons worthy of justice. 
In order to achieve political equality, each and every citizen must be given the 
opportunity to acquire all central capabilities relevant to this task. An individual with a 
cognitive disability will likely have a more difficult time acquiring certain capabilities, 
but Nussbaum, unlike Rawls, claims justice demands that all the necessary resources be 
given to ensure their realization. Nussbaum explains that, for Rawls, a necessary 
condition of being granted the status of full personhood is rationality. However, 
cognitively-disabled persons are not fully rational. Because they are not full persons  on 
the Rawlsian model in any obvious manner, he cannot grant them political equality. To 
address this concern, Nussbaum parts ways with Rawls by not grounding her conception 
of justice in an idealized version of rationality. The advantage of not doing so is that all 
citizens, irrespective of their mental faculties, have the opportunity to “develop the full 
range of human powers, at whatever level their conditions allows, and to enjoy the sort of 
liberty and independence their condition allows” (Nussbaum 2006, 218). 
Nussbaum’s argument here relies on intuitions about human nature, agency, and 
dignity that she claims better match the capabilities approach than Rawlsian 
contractarianism. The version of capabilities espoused by Nussbaum maintains that 
dignity ought to be extended to each and every person regardless of their intelligence. A 
person’s dignity is connected with her opportunity to fulfill certain capabilities up to an 
adequate threshold level. Given Nussbaum’s egalitarian commitment to dignity, she 
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claims Sesha, Eva Kittay’s cognitively-disabled daughter, has an equal opportunity to 
possess the central capabilities on her list. 
However, not everyone shares the same intuitions as Nussbaum. Eva Kittay, for 
instance, questions Nussbaum’s conception of dignity. Kittay (2005) suggests that we 
should “not look for the basis of dignity in attributions we have as individuals, but in the 
relationships we bear to one another” (111). Dignity then is wrapped up in our 
connections with others and not based on an individual’s opportunities to pursue certain 
capabilities. Kittay (2005), in her conclusion, claims that the “source for the claim to 
equal human dignity” should be found in our “common connections to others in our need 
for care, in our dependency and vulnerability and in the worth actualized when other 
beings with intrinsic worth devote themselves to our well-being” (118). 
I draw on Kittay to illustrate that Nussbaum’s intuitions are certainly not shared 
amongst everyone. She can claim her intuitions are “widespread” or in agreement with 
“most people,” but empirically this seems false; at the very least, she has not 
demonstrated this to be the case. The fact that Nussbaum’s intuitions are not as widely 
shared as she proclaims not only reveals a problem for addressing those with cognitive 
disabilities, but also raises greater concerns over the capabilities list in general. Intuitions 
are the basis for reflective equilibrium. The most troubling aspect of drawing heavily on 
her own intuitions is that Nussbaum uses reflective equilibrium to justify both the 
capabilities approach over competing theories of justice and specific items on the list in 
hopes that they can become an object of overlapping consensus. So, the claim to use 
intuitions that are shared by nearly everyone without demonstrating that they are in fact 
shared at least by many calls Nussbaum’s defense of the capabilities and theory itself into 
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question because it ultimately rests on an implicit, uncritical endorsement of her own 
values and intuitions under the guise of having been widely vetted. I will return to this 
problem in the next chapter. 
To summarize thus far, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is a theory of justice 
that is supposed to (1) cohere with our intuition that each and every citizen ought to be 
given the opportunity to live a dignified human life and that (2) maintains that each 
person be granted equal political and civil liberties. One could accept (1) and deny (2), if 
one rejected Nussbaum’s assumed moral egalitarianism, that is, each and every person 
ought to have an opportunity to secure the central capabilities from her list up to an 
adequate threshold level. This is significant because one could, in principle, embrace her 
conception of dignity, but not extend it to everyone in the same manner as in a Utilitarian 
theory. 
Both of the above two points corresponds to the Rawlsian type of reflective 
equilibrium.19 Because the set of principles that define capabilities coheres with “our” 
intuitions, “we” are able to achieve narrow reflective equilibrium. However, Nussbaum 
follows Rawls in noting that our goal is not simply narrow reflective equilibrium, but 
rather wide reflective equilibrium. Thus, by testing the capabilities against other theories 																																																								
19 However, it is worth mentioning a difference between Rawls and Nussbaum in regards to reflective 
equilibrium. Nussbaum, unlike Rawls, offers an intuitive argument on the nature of a good outcome, and 
the outcome itself defines what is just. Since Nussbaum’s list is produced out of the intuitive idea of living 
a truly dignified life, justice entails each and every citizen having the opportunity to exercise the central 
capabilities up to an adequate threshold level. Political procedures for Nussbaum are only adopted if they 
confirm this outcome. In other words, the procedure is only valuable insofar as it produces the outcome that 
justice demands. For example, if a procedure did not find the capability of “practical reason” (or any of the 
other central capability) valuable, then the procedure itself would have to be rejected because it did not 
yield a just outcome. So justice, according to Nussbaum, is the outcome, and the procedure is good only to 
the extent that it realizes this outcome. Rawls, on the other hand, would privilege the procedure that begins 
with the original position and constructs his two principles of justice in hopes of achieving a just outcome. 
Nussbaum criticizes Rawls because regardless of how well the procedure is constructed, there is no 
guarantee that it will achieve a just outcome. 
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of political justice, including utilitarianism and social contract theory, and concluding the 
superiority of capabilities, “we” are closer to achieving wide reflective equilibrium 
because we have shown that the capabilities approach not only meshes with our 
considered judgments, but does so better than competing theories of justice. 
 
4.5 Nussbaum’s Overlapping Consensus 
The second method Nussbaum uses to justify capabilities is 'overlapping 
consensus'. Nussbaum never explicitly discusses the relationship between overlapping 
consensus and reflective equilibrium. However, because she is drawing directly from 
Rawls, it seems fair to say that she would adopt overlapping consensus in the same way. 
This is suggested when she says that capabilities “offers a good basis for political 
principles in a pluralistic society, by demonstrating that it could, over time, become the 
basis for an ‘overlapping consensus’ among holders of the main religious and secular 
views” (Nussbaum 2011b, 79). Like Rawls, she seems to recognize that it would be 
nearly impossible to achieve wide reflective equilibrium between all citizens within a 
democratic society given their incommensurable comprehensive doctrines. 
Recall that overlapping consensus is achieved when reasonable citizens are able 
to agree on a theory of justice that is compatible with many reasonable comprehensive 
moral and religious doctrines. A 'reasonable citizen' is someone who may not choose to 
fulfill a right, but, based on liberal principles, accepts that everyone ought to be afforded 
that given right. For example, Nussbaum explains that the Amish choose not to exercise 
their right to vote; however, they can still accept that everyone ought to be given the right 
to vote. The goal of overlapping consensus is to reach a valid consensus. Valid consensus 
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occurs when citizens can accept a political doctrine consistent with their own 
comprehensive doctrine. An illegitimate consensus occurs when it appears that everyone 
accepts a political doctrine, but in fact they only do so because they are forced or coerced 
into consenting. 
Nussbaum’s capabilities theory is a political doctrine that can be justified through 
overlapping consensus since it is a freestanding partial conception of justice. Unlike 
Rawls, whose theory of justice is wedded to a public political culture of a pluralistic 
democratic society, Nussbaum offers capabilities as a partial theory of global justice. For 
Nussbaum, justification requires the theory be “an idea of acceptability to all or at least to 
the major conceptions of value” (Nussbaum 2006, 163). There are two reasons agreement 
is significant—namely, respect and stability. More respect is given to a doctrine that has 
been subscribed to by (nearly) everyone as opposed to one that has very little support. 
Nussbaum acknowledges that overlapping consensus of capabilities has not yet been 
achieved, but hopefully over time it can be an idea acceptable to all. So, Nussbaum 
advocates for a weaker form of overlapping consensus, which claims that we need only 
imagine its realization over time. She argues that this form of overlapping consensus is 
plausible because capabilities begins with an intuitive conception that everyone deserves 
a dignified life, which has cross-cultural appeal. 
Overlapping consensus, as mentioned above, also has the advantage of providing 
“stability” for capabilities in a way reflective equilibrium does not. If there is a single list 
that achieves consensus, then identifying harms and offering solutions to them will be 
more uniform. In this manner, Nussbaum constructs a theory that is more ambitious than 
Rawls since she hopes to achieve overlapping consensus on the list in order to provide a 
		
66	
basis for international action. For example, it can be used as a “set of goals for 
cooperative international action and a set of commitments that each nation holds itself to 
for its own people” (Nussbaum 2000b, 104). One should not mistake this to mean that if 
the capabilities from her list are not being realized in a given state, then intervention is 
demanded. Nussbaum makes an explicit distinction between “justification” and 
“implementation”. We ought to justify the list as a foundation for constitutions around the 
world, but this does not mandate intervention if a nation does not recognize a central 
capability. Military and economic sanctions, according to Nussbaum, should only be 
implemented in the most severe cases. Those who find the list to be necessary ought to 
engage in “persuasion,” not intervention. 
There is a bigger difference between Nussbaum and Rawls that is worth 
discussing a bit. Rawls, in Law of Peoples, sets out to show “how a world Society of 
liberal and decent Peoples might be possible” (6). He hopes to accomplish this by having 
both agree on his conception of justice. Nussbaum, on the other hand, offers a universal 
standard for all people, which seems sympathetic to cosmopolitanism. She is aware of 
this reading, but outright rejects the label because cosmopolitanism is a comprehensive 
doctrine that prioritizes humanity as a whole whereas the capabilities approach is a 
political doctrine. Nussbaum, however, admits that it could “probably accept most of 
what I recommend” (2011, 93). I draw the distinction between Rawls and Nussbaum to 
show that despite relying on Rawlsian inspired methods to defend capabilities, she is 
ultimately engaging in a fundamentally different project. 
This section explicated Nussbaum’s justificatory strategies to ground capabilities. 
In doing so, she draws primarily on Rawls. However, because she does not offer an in-
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depth account of either reflective equilibrium or overlapping consensus, but calls her 
approach “Rawlsian,” I used Rawls to fill the necessary gaps while also identifying their 
divergences. Nussbaum, in a reflective equilibrium manner, argues that the theoretical 
principles of the capabilities approach better cohere with our considered judgments and 
interrogation of background assumptions than Rawlsian or utilitarian justice. To that 
extent, she argues that we ought to endorse capabilities as our theory of justice. However, 
it is very difficult (if not impossible) to achieve wide reflective equilibrium in a 
democratic state given the fact that capabilities, as a theory of justice, would be justified 
from one’s own particular worldview. Thus, Nussbaum hopes capabilities as a 
freestanding political conception of justice and her list can over time become an object of 
overlapping consensus for everyone in the world and not merely those who inhabit liberal 
democratic societies. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 
 This chapter has attempted to provide a comprehensive account of Martha 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. It began with an Aristotelian framework of internalist 
essentialism to construct and defend a list of basic functions that constitutes a truly 
human life. I call this the flourishing version of capabilities because it represents an 
account of the good life, what Nussbaum calls a “thick vague theory of the good”. The 
problem with the flourishing version is its inability to accommodate religious and ethical 
pluralism. Democratic societies have many competing conceptions of the good life, 
therefore Nussbaum needed a framework for capabilities that is compatible with many 
worldviews, unlike Aristotelian internalist essentialism.  
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Nussbaum addresses the problem of pluralism by adopting political liberalism as 
a new framework. Political liberalism begins with the commitment that free and equal 
citizens are able to pursue their own conception of the good. However, not just any 
conception will suffice. Thus, Nussbaum constructs a revised list of capabilities based on 
a life worthy of dignity. The dignity version of capabilities, as I call it, better 
accommodates pluralism than the flourishing version since the former does not provide 
an account of flourishing, but more vaguely, a life compatible with dignity. Indeed, 
Nussbaum argues that this account can be extended to include justice for nonhuman 
animals and cognitively disabled peoples. 
Nussbaum’s revised list of ten central capabilities, which has changed slightly 
from her flourishing version, is constructed by imagining a life without one of the central 
capabilities. Nussbaum says a life worthy of dignity entails the opportunity to exercise all 
ten central capabilities up to an adequate threshold level. However, if an individual is 
forced to choose between central capabilitiesshe faces a tragic dilemma. Nussbaum 
advocates for ingenuity and effort to alleviate such choices; however, not all tragic 
dilemmas can be alleviated, and not for lack of effort. 
Finally, I argued that while an imaginative exercise is an acceptable starting point 
for developing a list of capabilities, it cannot ground them in a way that has universal 
appeal. Drawing on Rawls, Nussbaum offers two primary justifications for capabilities—
reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus—to offer universal validity to her 
theory. First, reflective equilibrium is an individual endeavor to bring one’s moral 
judgments into coherence with the capabilities approach, which helps identify the 
advantages of capabilities over competing theories of justice such as utilitarianism and 
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Rawlsian contractarian theory. However, wide reflective equilibrium has its limitations in 
trying to ground a theory of justice in a society with reasonable pluralism. To answer this 
challenge, overlapping consensus offers a justification for a democratic society by 
showing that capabilities as a freestanding partial conception of justice can be accepted 
by those with otherwise different worldviews. If valid consensus on a public political 
conception is achieved, it gives great indication that the capabilities approach and list are 
respected and offer stability for the international community. 
In order to realize stability, however, Nussbaum must show which comprehensive 
doctrines are “reasonable” and, equally important, which citizens are “reasonable” 
enough to contribute to the capabilities list. It is not all that clear whose comprehensive 
doctrines are worthy of consideration. I fear that those who do not share the same 
enthusiasm for Nussbaum’s list may not be given genuine consideration because they 
may easily be dismissed as being wedded to an unreasonable comprehensive doctrine or 
may be considered unreasonable for an unwillingness to accept her ten central 
capabilities. I do not believe these risks mean it is impossible to achieve genuine 
universal justification for the capabilities approach or the list. However, we must ensure 
sufficient mechanisms are in place to allow the list to be truly considered “ours” under a 
much wider scope for that term. Justification requires acceptance in order for the list to 
have moral and political authority. Furthermore, I fear some of the similar concerns that 
raise questions about her use of overlapping consensus can also be charged to her 
appropriation of reflective equilibrium; for example, her justification for the list of 
capabilities may run the risk of smuggling her own values and beliefs.  
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The following chapter will draw from primarily feminist philosophers, including 
Brooke Ackerly, Susan Moller Okin, Alison Jaggar, Nkiru Nzegwu, and Ingrid Robeyns, 
who scrutinize Nussbaum’s method for constructing and defending her list of capabilities. 
Specifically, I build on the work of these theorists to show how Nussbaum’s intuitions 
have not gained as much cross-cultural support as she maintains, which subsequently 
calls her list into question. In order to mitigate the problem of presenting one’s values as 
universal, I present Robeyns’s four guidelines for generating and defending a list, in 
addition to four methodological criteria that I offer. I suggest that this critical assessment 
of Nussbaum’s approach calls for a different justificatory strategy to defend the universal 
validity of the capabilities theory. 
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CHAPTER TWO: FEMINIST CRITICISMS OF NUSSBAUM’S CAPABILITIES 
With the capabilities theory, Martha Nussbaum seeks to develop and defend a 
global ethic that pays special attention to gender-specific injustices. She offers four 
methods of justification—internalist essentialism, narrative approach, reflective 
equilibrium, and overlapping consensus—to defend her specific list of central capabilities 
as a cross-culturally valid standard of justice.20 In this chapter, I evaluate the success of 
Nussbaum’s methods of justification by drawing on the work of four feminist critics—
Brooke Ackerly, Susan Moller Okin, Nkiru Nzegwu, and Alison Jaggar. These critics 
reveal that Nussbaum fails on both accounts, that is, that Nussbaum’s list does not gain 
the cross-cultural validity she claims for it, and that her list of central capabilities fails to 
properly identify gender-injustices. Building on the work of these theorists, I discern 
three general flaws with Nussbaum’s methods of justification—namely, that she (1) 
uncritically imports her own values into her theory without having a procedure to either 
prevent this from occurring or recognizing when it happens, (2) arbitrarily selects the 
intuitions and perspectives of others to “confirm” aspects of her theory, and (3) neglects 
significant power dynamics that influence her interactions with others. 
I argue at the end of the chapter that one reason Nussbaum fails to achieve her 
two goals is due to her methodological commitment to monological moral reasoning. 
Here, an individual constructs and defends her theory from merely her own perspective, 
and monological moral reasoning can occur even when someone claims to consider the 																																																								
20 For our purpose, I will use the term “method” to refer to methods used to justify her theory (e.g., 
reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus), as opposed to “methodology,” which discusses how 
well a theorizer attempts to justify her theory. For instance, I examine the following three methodological 
concerns, namely, importing values, arbitrarily selecting others to confirm aspects of one’s own theory, and 
neglecting power dynamics between relevant parties. The success of a theorizer’s methodology will be 
measured by how well it is able to realize her method in a way that satisfies her theoretical and political 
commitments. 
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viewpoints of others. One concern with reasoning monologically is that it runs the risk of 
being unable to account for harmful implicit biases and prejudices. I suggest that a 
possible way to address the concern of implicit bias would include adopting a dialogical, 
as opposed to monological, account of moral reasoning as the basis for a method of 
justifying the capabilities. This would require that a theorizer critically engage others 
through actual dialogue while constructing and defending a theory. 
I’ve organized the feminist criticisms of Nussbaum and my elaboration of them 
around the three flaws mentioned above. Not all three flaws are necessarily found in each 
of the four justificatory strategies Nussbaum uses, but it is likely that each method of 
justification is subject to more than one flaw, especially because we will see they are 
intimately connected. Taken together these three flaws will illustrate a deeper concern 
with Nussbaum’s method of justification, which in turn will call for the need to replace it 
with a different methodology. 
 
1. Flaw #1: Importing Values 
 
 Importing one’s own moral and political values into one’s own moral or political 
theory is not itself harmful and does not necessarily de-legitimate the theory’s broader 
validity. It may be the case that a theorizer has a very good argument for the values she 
posits. However, we should question a theorizer who imports values into a theory and 
then dismisses out of hand those who do not share those values, or at the very least, does 
not critically engage perspectives that challenge her own. Several critics of Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach argue that she is guilty of this charge throughout her works—from 
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her earliest method of justification (viz., internalist essentialism) to her latest defense of 
reflective equilibrium. 
 
1.1 Importing Values in Internalist Essentialism 
 In her book, Political Theory and Feminist Social Criticism, Brooke Ackerly 
carefully examines Nussbaum’s articulation and defense of the capabilities using the 
Aristotelian method of internalist essentialism. Recall that internalist essentialism 
examines different cultural myths and beliefs in hopes of achieving a cross-cultural list of 
capabilities, or what Nussbaum calls a cross-cultural list of “spheres of experience”. 
Ackerly situates Nussbaum as a social critic who offers a list of capabilities for public 
policy makers as Nussbaum navigates the space between essentialism, values that are 
shared cross-culturally, and relativism, where local communities have the opportunity to 
interpret and manifest those values contextually. Drawing on internalist essentialism, 
Nussbaum will confront a potential incommensurability between her own values and 
other conceptions of the good being examined. Ackerly (2000) criticizes Nussbaum’s 
method of justification because, as she puts it, it 
allows her to import her own values into her analysis of practices unfamiliar to 
her by inadvertently attributing to the essential list characteristics that are familiar 
to her through her own society’s means of promoting basic capabilities (107). 
 
As a social critic, Nussbaum must be careful not to ignore particular worldviews simply 
because they are radically different from her own beliefs and practices, but she likewise 
cannot simply embrace another community’s way of life simply because that group of 
people claim it as praiseworthy. She attempts to address this tension by interpreting 
others’ worldviews and, if they challenge her list, then Nussbaum must decide which 
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capabilities are worth preserving and which ones must be jettisoned. Ackerly argues, 
however, that this justificatory strategy offers no fair way to adjudicate between 
conflicting values and so allows Nussbaum to import those values most familiar to her 
without facing criticism. 
There is strong textual support in favor of Ackerly’s criticism. For instance, 
Nussbaum believes a basic good that must be guaranteed to all is “education”. One aspect 
of education that Nussbaum has touted is literacy, especially since it promotes the same 
opportunities for women as their male counterparts. Ackerly calls Nussbaum’s conflation 
of education and literacy into question, and subsequently, the value of education as it is 
commonly understood in the West. Ackerly (2000) argues that economic flourishing, 
autonomy, and self-respect, the values Nussbaum believes have the potential to be 
realized through literacy, have “significantly different meanings…in the context of poor 
rural Bangladesh” than in Nussbaum’s Western, academic context (108). Ackerly doesn’t 
mean to claim the Bangladeshi women do not value education categorically, but rather to 
challenge a narrow understanding of education defined simply as literacy. In fact, they 
are certainly aware of the potential benefits education may bring to their families. 
Ackerly’s criticism is not merely a semantic quibble over the definition of 
education. Nussbaum states repeatedly that her capabilities are vague enough to be 
multiply realized. However, she would not accept all interpretations or realizations since 
a capability could conceptually be understood in a way that is incompatible with her 
understanding of dignity. For instance, in the context of a food desert, people have access 
to high calorie foods thereby seemingly satisfying the capability of access to food, but 
they are unlikely to have access to healthy, affordable food, which is necessary to realize 
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the capability that access to food is attempting to promote. A threshold would need to be 
set high enough to allow an individual to have access not to food per se, but to nutritious 
and cost-effective food. Thus, Nussbaum needs to defend a more substantive 
interpretation of central capabilities to avoid generating such an abstract list that its 
respective interpretations are so vast as to render the capabilities vacuous. This becomes 
significant for our purposes since Nussbaum must demonstrate what the best 
interpretations are and then offer a fair process to adjudicate between conflicting beliefs. 
As it stands, Nussbaum simply offers her own interpretations of each of the capabilities 
from the list without argumentation. 
Let’s again consider the capability of education to understand how Nussbaum 
uncritically imports values into the list. Nussbaum attributes the problem of illiteracy in 
Bangladesh to a lack of understanding of, and appreciation for, the value of education. 
She says that Bangladeshi women, specifically, “may not even know what it means to 
have the advantages of education” (Nussbaum 1995b, 91). Ackerly is very skeptical that 
Bangladeshi women do not grasp the value of education. She writes, “having spoken with 
over 800 rural Bangladeshi women…I am confident that adult rural Bangladeshi women 
are aware of the value of education, generally, but consider their own education irrelevant 
now that they have children” (Ackerly 2000, 107). 
Rather than failing to understand the potential benefits education may have for 
one’s child, Ackerly suggests that Bangladeshi parents are in a tragic dilemma of being 
forced to choose between realizing one of two central capabilities. Here, the situation is 
tragic since all people should have the opportunity to secure each of the ten central 
capabilities from Nussbaum’s list. Education in rural Bangladesh is very expensive since 
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children need school supplies and tutors, for example, to pass their grade and parents 
often do not have the financial support to pay for these expenses. Parents realize that 
education is an “investment” for their children, but an expensive one. The investment is 
more often than not too much considering the alternative is immediate work, which 
ultimately helps provide an income (and nourishment) for one’s family. So Nussbaum’s 
understanding of the situation—that these women are illiterate because they do not value 
education—is, if Ackerly is correct, a serious misunderstanding. 
Nussbaum has a particular understanding of education, and when she applies her 
understanding of the term to an unfamiliar context, serious interpretive and practical 
concerns arise. Given high illiteracy rates in Bangladesh, Nussbaum concludes wrongly 
that Bangladeshi people do not value education. Furthermore, because Nussbaum 
supposes Bangladeshi people are misinformed in regards to their lack of appreciation for 
education, she does not take their position as a genuine challenge to her list based on 
Bangladeshi reasons for not pursuing the type of education that Nussbaum endorses. 
Specifically, they challenge her list insofar as Nussbaum wrongly believes that “literacy 
promotes women’s economic flourishing, autonomy, and self-respect”, when in fact 
Ackerly maintains that these cannot be achieved in the same manner for Bangladeshi 
women since flourishing, autonomy, and self-respect do not have the same meaning 
(Ackerly 2000, 107). So, Nussbaum imports her liberal interpretations of autonomy, for 
instance, into her account of education. 
I have two general concerns, drawing from Ackerly, with Nussbaum’s use of 
internalist essentialism as it pertains to education. First, Nussbaum presumes to know 
what Bangladeshi women mean by education, which is shaped by her commitment to the 
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liberal, autonomous self. That is, as long as a person is not being physically impeded 
from receiving an education, she can choose to value education by attending school. So 
Nussbaum (1995b) concludes that Bangladeshi women “may not even know what it 
means to have the advantages of education” (91). Moreover, their actual interpretation of 
education seems irrelevant to Nussbaum since she does not seem open to considering 
whether their views present a real substantive challenge to her account. Nussbaum 
ultimately misinterprets the Bangladeshi perspective on why they tend not to educate 
their children despite its benefits. Because she believes Bangladeshi parents do not find 
value in education, she not only misunderstands their position, but she also fails to 
perceive that they face a tragic dilemma. This is especially problematic for Nussbaum 
since a goal of hers is to identify tragic dilemmas in hopes of alleviating them as quickly 
as possible. 
Second, Nussbaum uses the misinterpretation to discredit the Bangladeshi 
perspective as one not worth taking seriously as a potential challenge to her interpretation 
of certain capabilities. For example, one way in which they challenge Nussbaum’s list is 
through their commitment to different meanings of autonomy and self-respect. They do 
not believe the self is simply understood as an autonomous agent who places value on a 
capability based on whether one chooses to fulfill it. Rather, I follow Ackerly’s 
assessment that “adult rural Bangladeshi women are aware of the value of education, 
generally, but consider their own education irrelevant now that they have children” (107). 
A Bangladeshi woman then would not see her decision to pursue education as one that 
could be made on her own, but wrapped up in her family writ large. Because she 
understands her identity as constituted through her loved ones, she could not make the 
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determination to receive an education (despite her commitment to do so) without 
considering other factors, such as harming her children’s future. 
These are cornerstone values for Nussbaum, and even influence her account of 
education insofar as they constitute elements of literacy. However, Ackerly has shown 
that autonomy and self-respect mean something very different in Bangladesh than many 
Western contexts, and thus pose a challenge to Nussbaum’s account of literacy and 
subsequently education. I find this deeply problematic because it allows her to import her 
own values without being truly challenged. In other words, if all challenges to 
Nussbaum’s list are constructed by Nussbaum as misinformed or as lacking full 
appreciation for her central capabilities, then she has unilaterally asserted, almost in an a 
priori way, a universal endorsement of her list. 
Nussbaum is certainly aware of the concern that the influence of a person’s 
culture on her moral reasoning may impede her ability to generate a list of universal 
moral values. She criticizes Aristotle for being a victim of his own culture since he claims 
only citizens are entitled to specific opportunities as a matter of justice, and not all 
persons (women, for example) were considered citizens. Nussbaum attributes this to the 
strong “sexual prejudice” of his day (quoted in Ackerly 2000, 104). To address this 
problem, Nussbaum asks us to preserve Aristotle’s general method of internalist 
essentialism, while not being subject to cultural bias in the way he was influenced. 
Nussbaum seems fairly confident that we should be able to employ the method better 
than Aristotle did, in a way that is more critical of our own potential cultural biases.  
Ackerly contends that Nussbaum’s criticism of Aristotle is actually much deeper 
than Nussbaum maintains. We cannot simply ignore the cultural beliefs and practices that 
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we hold closest to us. It is the method itself that concerns Ackerly, not its poor use. 
Ackerly (2000) explains that “Nussbaum’s argument furthers her criticism of Aristotle’s 
application of his method, but goes no further toward restoring confidence in the method” 
(104). A missing step in Nussbaum’s methodology is a way to check our own biases, 
which is necessary in order to avoid claiming a value as universal and yet interpreting it 
so narrowly that it is merely representative of one’s own culture. So, just as Aristotle’s 
method imports values associated with only the lives of male citizens while supposedly 
seeking essentially human functions, Nussbaum’s method “allows her to import into her 
definition of an essential human life the liberal values of autonomy and independence 
that may be more culturally specific than she treats them” (Ackerly 2000, 105). 
As we have seen, Nussbaum uses internalist essentialism to justify the flourishing 
version of capabilities, but she has since abandoned this version in favor of the dignity 
version. One method Nussbaum offers to generate and defend her list for the dignity 
version is reflective equilibrium. However, as I will show, this problem of uncritically 
and covertly importing values that troubles her early method of justification also applies 
to this later method. 
 
1.2 Importing Values in Reflective Equilibrium 
 Nussbaum’s position of power as a Western academic and theorizer, in addition to 
the arbitrary manner in which she selects competing theories to shed light on her list, has 
allowed her to uncritically import liberal values into her dignity version of the 
capabilities and to avoid subjecting the theory to genuine scrutiny. Recall that reflective 
equilibrium for Nussbaum begins with an individual pondering what is implicit in the 
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notion of dignity. She then seeks to achieve equilibrium between her moral judgments on 
dignity, background assumptions, and theoretical commitments. Furthermore, since 
Nussbaum is committed to wide (rather than simply narrow) equilibrium, she must elicit 
challenges to better assure herself that the equilibrium is trustworthy. So in some sense 
her version of reflective equilibrium takes on a “dialogue”-like form. However, this 
“dialogue” is not really a dialogue where an individual discuses a subject with an actual 
interlocutor. Instead, Nussbaum claims to “engage” other worldviews (not any specific 
person). This is problematic since she never says what she in fact means by “engage other 
worldviews”. She might simply ponder from her armchair how others would respond to 
her list or research extensively on how they would challenge her perspective. Regardless, 
we are not afforded the details of her engagement. 
 As I noted earlier, Nussbaum argues that the items on her list offer everyone the 
power to challenge her perspective and give marginalized voices the opportunity to 
speak. To some extent, this is certainly true since the capabilities of bodily integrity, 
affiliation, and control over one’s environment, among others, are necessary 
preconditions for a person to have a genuine opportunity to share one’s worldview and 
challenge others—to speak and be heard. However, a deeper concern is that Nussbaum 
defends her list of capabilities as compatible with “our” intuitions of what it means to live 
a life compatible with human dignity, and yet presents virtually no serious challenges to 
any of the capabilities. 
 I am not wholeheartedly against her list of capabilities (in fact, I am quite 
sympathetic to many of them), and it is not obvious that any of the feminist critics from 
this chapter would deny the value of Nussbaum’s list, but if Nussbaum wants to achieve 
		
81	
cross-cultural support for her list then she must take her critics seriously. This will 
include critically engaging them at multiple levels. In terms of reflective equilibrium, she 
must engage more than simply her account of human dignity since other perspectives 
may yield a different list of capabilities or, perhaps, a different interpretation of a given 
capability from her own. I have already discussed the trouble with espousing the 
capability of education and its particular manifestation, however, there are certainly other 
capabilities that are subject to the same concern. For example, Nussbaum interprets the 
capability of bodily integrity to include an absolute prohibition on female genital 
circumcision (FGC). However, as I noted in Chapter 1, Theresa Tobin has argued that 
because FGC cannot be captured by a single procedure, event, or ceremony, but rather 
has multiple meanings in different communities, to simply assert that “this” practice is an 
obvious violation of bodily integrity from the outset fails to consider perspectives of 
women in communities who practice and themselves endorse some version of FGC. That 
is, Nussbaum automatically dismisses the views of women who might challenge the idea 
that bodily integrity and FGC are in some sense compatible in part because the theory 
yields an oversimplification of a set of practices that have different physical 
manifestations and different cultural and social meanings in different places. 
Furthermore, because Nussbaum’s version of reflective equilibrium is Socratic in 
nature, she must also engage others who do not share her worldview and then either show 
why her list is superior to competing versions or amend her list accordingly. If she 
continues to ignore other perspectives, then she is merely constructing a Nussbaumian 
ethic cloaked under the guise of a global ethic that pays special attention to the way in 
which marginalized voices (especially women) suffer injustice. Until a genuine effort is 
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made by Nussbaum to take critics seriously, then she will continue to suffer from the 
criticism that she imports liberal values into her theory (including her list) without 
adequate defense. 
 
2. Flaw #2: Arbitrary Selection of Others 
 
 Nussbaum’s covert importation of liberal values is not rooted in a failure to 
“consider” other perspectives, but a failure to provide any mechanism for taking other 
perspectives seriously as potentially offering a substantive challenge to her theory. A 
related problem has to do not only with how she engages, or fails adequately to engage 
others, but also with whom she engages. In her early works, Nussbaum draws on 
unfamiliar cultural myths and practices (that is, unfamiliar to “Western” liberal 
perspectives) to demonstrate that certain “experiences” are shared amongst different 
cultures. Her later works appeal to intuitions, including the intuitions of diversely situated 
others, about what constitutes a dignified human life. Regardless of Nussbaum’s method 
of justification, the way in which she selects others to confirm aspects of her theory 
appears rather arbitrary. That is, she offers no method for how to select perspectives to 
determine whether or not their position confirms her own values or challenges them; 
furthermore, if perspectives conflict with her own, Nussbaum offers no adjudicating 
method to show that her position is superior. This concern is not unique to a specific time 
period, but has plagued all four major methods of justification. 
 
2.1 Arbitrary Selection of Other Perspectives in Internalist Essentialism 
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Internalist essentialism evaluates what it means to be truly human by examining 
various cultural myths and stories. Nussbaum uses this method to identify capabilities 
shared amongst different cultures. One of the main features of this method demands 
checking our beliefs and practices against beliefs and practices of other cultures, although 
how she secures perspectives other than her own is highly questionable. If she is the sole 
interpreter of cultural myths and stories, including her own and others, and the sole 
arbiter of which stories are worth consulting, then it is not clear she has a reliable guide to 
establish that she has genuinely considered other perspectives. 
Nussbaum asserts that we need to be selective in the perspectives we seek out. We 
are not bound to consult all unfamiliar perspectives, and we are obligated not to consider 
those likely to be mistaken or corrupt. In fact, Nussbaum says that to build a theory on 
such perspectives would be putting the “political conception, and the liberties of citizens, 
on much too fragile of a foundation” (Nussbaum 2000b, 160). In other words, she fears 
that if the capabilities are formed on these views, then they will be unable to identify 
accurately how well one is living since corrupt intuitions may, for instance, find certain 
unjust sexist and racist beliefs and practices permissible. 
However, being too highly selective in regard to which views to consider for our 
theory is problematic for two reasons. First, high selectivity may lead to a bias “toward 
what is familiar to those doing the inquiry”, mistaking what is unfamiliar with what is 
corrupt or false (Ackerly 2000, 102). Nussbaum must provide a principled way to 
identify which intuitions are mistaken or corrupt from those that are merely unfamiliar; 
we cannot simply accept her word. Second, and more troubling, even if she had a non-
arbitrary method to identify corrupt views, there might be good reason to preserve aspects 
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of them anyway. Corrupt and mistaken desires may actually add to the discussion at 
hand. An individual may be mistaken about a given topic, but have insights either directly 
related to the discussion or on a related matter that are worth considering. 
Nussbaum is aware of the fact that, to some degree, we are all limited by our 
culture. This places her in a very difficult position. On the one hand, if she does not 
welcome all myths and stories as legitimate forms of information to shape her theory, 
then she runs the risk of being exclusionary to the point of merely reinforcing her own 
views. On the other, if she welcomes multiple perspectives, then she needs to offer some 
way to determine which values prevail when competing viewpoints clash. Nussbaum 
claims to address the above dilemma by paying sufficient attention to cultural beliefs and 
practices that are different from hers. She insists repeatedly that her list is highly abstract 
and general, which allows local communities to realize capabilities in their own way. She 
writes, “for sometimes what is a good way of promoting education in one part of the 
world will be completely ineffectual in another” (Nussbaum 1995b, 94). In other words, 
while the capability of education is a value for Nussbaum that should be promoted 
everywhere, how it is interpreted (e.g., compulsory or otherwise) and implemented can 
vary greatly.  
However, allowing various interpretations does not in fact answer Ackerly’s 
criticism, which is that Nussbaum fails to accept divergent perspectives to shape the 
content of the list and provide a process for selecting viewpoints other than her own to 
determine which capabilities are truly shared cross-culturally. The way in which 
particular capabilities are interpreted will greatly impact whether or not they truly 
represent a dignified life for all human beings, or simply a (privileged) few, which will 
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therefore bear on whether or not they are truly cross-culturally shared. Since Nussbaum’s 
interpretation of “education” necessarily entails literacy, she must answer the challenge 
that she is not simply importing her own conception of education. In other words, she 
must demonstrate that her account of education is not simply a Western construct being 
imposed across the globe, and if her interpretation of education as literacy is best, then 
the burden is on her to show why it is superior to other conceptions. 
To see the force behind this critique, let’s consider Nkiru Nzegwu’s criticism of 
education as a viable capability, particularly, its promotion of literacy. Nzegwu is writing 
as a post-colonial theorist, who argues in favor of indigenous women’s (not human) 
development. Arguing from the perspective of both pre- and post-colonial Igbo culture, 
she explains that a push for literacy was deeply connected with the advent of colonialism, 
which is why the concept of “education” needs to be situated within the “politics” and 
“power” surrounding its use. 
Following D.P. Pattanayak, Nzegwu explains that illiteracy is often associated 
with poverty, being uneducated, and being malnourished; meanwhile, literacy is often 
grouped with productivity and the advancement of civilization.21 On this view, literacy is 
the “panacea for successful development even as research shows that the correlation 
between literacy and the adoption of improved agricultural practices is insignificant” 
(Nzegwu 1995, 453).22 To accept literacy as an obvious good for resolving so-called third 
world “problems” runs the risk of also labeling indigenous peoples as “backwards” and 
duped by their cultures. One of the most troubling aspects of adopting this attitude is that 
																																																								
21 For an in-depth analysis of the way intersections between literacy, oppression, and colonialism, see 
Pattanayek (1991). 
22 Nzegwu cites Shanker (1979) for the research showing a lack of correlation between literacy and the 
adoption of improved agricultural practices. 
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the theorizer lacks epistemic humility, which is especially important when constructing a 
global ethic since we are limited by our geo-political position. So, given the colonial push 
for literacy, in addition to their continuing tendencies to evaluate so-called third world 
peoples’ lag in development as rooted in backward practices of indigenous cultures 
irrationally wed to traditional ways of life, and the empirical evidence calling the benefits 
of literacy to improve conditions of poverty into question, it is not unreasonable for 
someone to be suspicious of the capability of education depending on its context. 
Nzegwu is careful not to romanticize pre-colonial life, and acknowledges that in 
the current world literacy is often vital, but it must be placed in its proper context. For 
example, development practitioners need to account for “diverse character traits of 
different groups of women, and to be open and receptive to alterative models of 
experiences and organizational skills” (Nzegwu 1995, 453). This point is especially 
salient when considering the way in which literacy may ultimately harm the transmittal of 
knowledge. If a culture has traditionally transmitted knowledge through its long-standing 
oral history, but have that replaced in favor of literacy, then I would suspect that a great 
deal of knowledge would be lost in the transition. She is not calling for an end to literacy, 
however, or even an end to development projects in general, but is very cautious with 
regards to how such projects are undertaken. Taking Nzegwu’s challenge seriously would 
require Nussbaum to either reconsider the prominence of education or be willing to 
redefine it in a way that better accommodates local specification. 
A lesson that can be learned from these critiques of internalist essentialism is that 
if an individual theorizes merely by oneself, she can select others to challenge her theory 
in an arbitrary manner since no safeguards are in place to challenge the selection process. 
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Nussbaum is certainly aware of these concerns to some degree, and attempts to address 
them with her narrative approach. The hope is that by intervening with others who have a 
different worldview, she will be in a better position to understand the challenges of her 
list. 
 
2.2 Arbitrary Selection of Other Perspectives in the Narrative Approach 
 
 Recall that Nussbaum’s use of the narrative approach draws on the experiences of 
two Indian women, Vasanti and Jayamma, to show the “political importance of the 
imagination and the emotions” (Nussbaum 2000b, 15). Nussbaum draws on their 
experiences to stimulate her readers’ imaginations with unfamiliar ways of life by, for 
instance, having the Indian women discuss the challenges of their daily life such as being 
a member in a caste and possessing the same formal equality as men, and yet facing 
substantive inequality. The hope is that one’s imagination will spark emotions that 
identify certain domains of life as troubling because they are not compatible with living a 
dignified life. Furthermore, Nussbaum uses the narrative approach to show that those 
who do not share her worldview and who occupy different social strata can agree with 
her list. 
One should not confuse the narrative approach with Nussbaum’s use of the 
imaginative exercise. The imaginative exercise itself is merely used to spark emotions 
within a reader to ponder whether an individual who inhabits a radically different social 
world is afforded the opportunity to live a life compatible with dignity. Nussbaum draws 
on the narrative approach to show that her list, which is initially generated out of the 
imaginative exercise, has received cross-cultural support through discussions of the sort 
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that she had with Vasanti and Jayamma. Furthermore, Nussbaum says the narrative 
approach has the advantage of providing readers who do not have the same opportunity 
as her to interview people from different cultures a glimpse into their world. Her readers 
are then able to use their imaginations to better assess whether the interviewees have the 
chance to live a dignified life, and/or possibly present unique challenges to her list of 
capabilities that they would not have otherwise considered. 
 Susan Moller Okin has famously challenged the narrative approach as a legitimate 
method for demonstrating cross-cultural verification of Nussbaum’s list. First, she cites 
the noticeable paucity of these two women’s actual words which amount to one quotation 
from the two women in a three hundred page book.23 Nussbaum admits that Jayamma 
does not “seem interested” in talking, but if that is the case, then it raises other questions 
about the validity of the interview itself. Second, in light of the first point, nearly 
“everything Nussbaum says about the two women, their lives, and even their thoughts, 
perceptions and emotions is filtered through her, and much of it is prefaced by phrases 
like it seems or suppose’” (Okin 2003, 295). 
I share Okin’s concern that Nussbaum merely summarizes what she believes the 
Indian women are saying and then explains how their statements verify her list. The 
reader, then, is left in an uncomfortable state, since Nussbaum does not provide much 
evidence to give confidence that these women do, in fact, support her list. For instance, 
we are not afforded the details of how the Indian women responded to Nussbaum’s 
questions, much less how they would evaluate the capabilities from her list. 
																																																								
23 The only quotation Nussbaum provides of the women is Jayamma’s political explanation for why she is 
unwilling to become a domestic servant: “As a servant, your alliance is with a class that is your enemy” 
(Nussbaum 2000, 19). 
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Nussbaum abandons justificatory strategies of Aristotelian internalist essentialism 
and the narrative approach in her later development of capabilities in favor of reflective 
equilibrium and overlapping consensus. I aim to argue, however, that she never escapes 
the problems identified here; that is, she continues to arbitrarily select others in order to 
make the claim that the capabilities from her list have received cross-cultural validity. If 
one accepts that her early methods of justification are subject to this criticism, then I 
believe this gives reason to pause when discussing the validity of overlapping consensus 
given that it requires showing that competing worldviews that are incompatible in some 
ways can nonetheless be compatible with her list, as well as the validity of attaining 
reflective equilibrium which, for Nussbaum, requires imagining the ways in which other 
perspectives would challenge and support her list. 
 
2.3 Reflective Equilibrium 
 
Nussbaum advocates wide rather than narrow reflective equilibrium, which 
includes scrutinizing one conception of justice against other conceptions of justice. This 
form of equilibrium is meant to avoid the problem of simply establishing internal 
coherence because it actively seeks out competing theories of justice and uses them to 
challenge one’s own commitments. Nussbaum is unique in her conception of wide 
reflective equilibrium since for her it is not merely an individual endeavor. She likens her 
process to Rawls as one of a “multivocal character: justification is achieved not by 
individuals acting alone but by debate among Socratically deliberating individuals 
(Nussbaum 2011b, 77).” She continues, “I appeal to the interlocutor to ponder what is 
implicit in the notion of human dignity and a life in accordance with it. I ask the 
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interlocutor to consider that certain ways of life that human beings are forced to lead are 
not fully human, in the sense of being not worthy of the dignity of the human being” (78). 
 The fact that Nussbaum specifies the need to discuss the notion of human dignity 
with actual others shows a progression of thought. Critics such as Ackerly, Jaggar, and 
Okin have all argued that Nussbaum has justified her theory primarily based on what she 
believes others would say and not real discussions. Considering these feminist critics 
wrote their respective pieces before 2011, one could surmise that Nussbaum is 
responding to her critics. I find her attempt to incorporate actual dialogue in one of her 
justifications to be a promising step forward.  
Nonetheless, despite this development, Nussbaum never describes how these 
dialogues should occur and who should participate. Furthermore, she never explains how 
to adjudicate between competing claims of the theorizer performing the task of striving 
for reflective equilibrium and her discussions with her interlocutor. That is, it could be 
the case that her discussions conflict with her own pursuit of equilibrium;then Nussbaum 
is in position to be the ultimate arbiter in regard to whether or not she finds her 
interlocutor’s claims valid. I find this particularly troubling because it shows that her 
theory again allows her to run the risk of simply ignoring other worldviews that challenge 
her perspective. 
The point to take from Nussbaum’s discussion is that one cannot achieve 
equilibrium on this model without engaging an interlocutor to determine if her theoretical 
commitments can genuinely stand critical scrutiny. So a theorist cannot simply state what 
she believes constitutes another’s considered judgments based on the theorist’s 
imagination, but rather must actually speak to other people and secure their informed 
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desires and considered judgments as they state them. By “informed,” Nussbaum means 
desires that have been subject to scrutiny from multiple perspectives. Informed, as 
opposed to naïve desires, are those that have withstood rational scrutiny by others. 
It is important to note that for Nussbaum one need not consider all intuitions or 
viewpoints. She asks us to “consult not all actual desires, but only some of them, desires 
formed under appropriate conditions” (Nussbaum 2000b, 160). It is not clear what she 
means by “appropriate,” but given her commitment to liberalism, it’s fair to say that it 
would include an individual who has the opportunity to exercise her autonomy in regards 
to forming her desires and intuitions so that her desires are not the result of coercion. So 
despite Nussbaum’s understanding of reflective equilibrium as having a “multivocal 
character,” we must be highly discretionary when selecting desires in order to avoid 
incorporating harmful ones, which might corrupt our theory. Nussbaum’s version of 
reflective equilibrium then cannot be performed individually, but with other deliberating 
individuals. Here, a theorizer must engage in dialogue with others in order to subject her 
views to scrutiny, which then makes her desires informed. The advantage of dialoguing 
with an interlocutor is to minimize the risk of a theorizer merely gleaning information 
from other perspectives that she then subsumes under her own. 
 A further problem with Nussbaum’s version of reflective equilibrium, though, is 
that by not seeking all intuitions, she runs the risk of arbitrarily choosing intuitions that 
match her own. She does not give us an account of what constitutes “appropriate 
conditions” for desire formation, and we have no sense of her criteria for discerning 
among intuitions which makes it too easy for her to exclude as “uninformed” any 
intuitions that diverge from her own. Furthermore, because Nussbaum is a Western 
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academic who has much power and privilege, it is easy for her to ignore or exclude 
(however unintentionally) the perspectives of those less powerful without consequence. 
In order to avoid this charge, she needs to offer a method that shows she is not simply 
choosing to converse with those who share her worldview to confirm her fixed moral 
judgments. Moreover, in virtue of Nussbaum’s position of power, she is in charge of 
selecting informed from uninformed intuitions without any clear criteria. This, in turn, 
gives “additional worries about moral elitism and possibly neo-colonialism” (Jaggar 
2006, 316). 
Nkiru Nzegwu, for instance, contends that Nussbaum interprets indigenous 
cultures as “inert,” that is, as “obsolete and not thought to have any significant initiating 
or critical role to play in industrialization” (Nzegwu 1995, 460). In brief, if individuals 
within Igbo (or any other indigenous) culture were hesitant to adopt education as a central 
capability, Nussbaum would consider them “misinformed” or “lacking full information”. 
However, placing less value on literacy is not a matter of misunderstanding the nature of 
education (since Nussbaum conflates education with literacy), but a matter of situating 
the value of a certain kind of education within the socio-economic and historical context 
of a local region. 
 Furthermore, Nussbaum’s method of selecting intuitions lacks a feedback loop to 
check her own intuitions against non-arbitrary others. In other words, because she 
subjects her list to scrutiny from those who share her values, rather than those who 
disagree, there is no genuine opportunity for self-criticism. Instead, other viewpoints are 
used merely to reinforce the values espoused on the list. However, self-criticism is 
especially important to ensure we are not merely claiming to achieve equilibrium by 
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critically examining our intuitions and theories, while simultaneously not taking other 
worldviews seriously. In other words, theorists cannot claim to have reached equilibrium 
without discussing and challenging their own considered judgments by other actual 
people. Nussbaum’s decision not to consider all intuitions makes it too easy for her to 
import in and rationalize her own values free from critical scrutiny. 
David Clark (2013) summarizes the above concern succinctly in his review of 
Nussbaum’s 2011 book, Creating Capabilities: “there is no assurance that everyone’s 
intuitions will be consulted or that social inequalities…will not affect the pursuit of 
reflective equilibrium in ways that are hard to detect” (176). The process to attain full 
equilibrium, which Nussbaum admits may not be possible, includes engaging others who 
do not share one’s own commitments, and then deciding whether our theory of justice is 
able to withstand the criticisms. However, as I have argued, there is no way to show that 
other people who endorse comprehensive doctrines not shared with the theorizer have 
played a genuine role in Nussbaum’s pursuit of equilibrium. Furthermore, she has not 
provided a fair procedure to decide whether her theory of justice can withstand potential 
criticism. In sum, Nussbaum has not addressed two primary issues—first, how to select 
interlocutors and (2) who decides, and how do we decide, whether a theory can withstand 
robust criticism from divergent perspectives. 
The criticisms surrounding Nussbaum’s methods of selecting intuitions are not 
limited to reflective equilibrium, but also plague internalist essentialism and the narrative 
approach, and so remain throughout both the flourishing and dignity versions of the 
capabilities. This criticism calls into question the cross-cultural support Nussbaum claims 
for her list, which in turn raises skepticism about her final method of justification—
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overlapping consensus—since it demands appeal from a wide range of comprehensive 
doctrines. 
 
2.4 Overlapping Consensus 
 
Reflective equilibrium for Nussbaum establishes “which principles are just” and 
overlapping consensus determines “whether or not the conception of justice containing 
those principles is stable” (Stark 2009, 370). Overlapping consensus, in brief, seeks 
convergence amongst reasonable citizens on a political doctrine, which in this case is 
Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities. Convergence need not exist currently, however, a 
theorizer must show that “over time it is plausible to imagine that it might become a 
reality” (Nussbaum 2011b, 79). Reasonable citizens, as discussed in Chapter 1, are those 
who, based on liberal principles, accept that rights ought to be guaranteed to everyone, 
even if they choose not to exercise them. 
 In order for Nussbaum to claim that the capabilities approach, and her list more 
specifically,  is an object of overlapping consensus she must show that it at least has the 
potential for cross-cultural support. In 2000, she appeared rather confident that the list 
was gaining the support it needed. Nussbaum (2000b) claimed that because input from 
“other voices has shaped its content in many ways,” the list represented a “type of 
overlapping consensus on the part of people with otherwise very different views of 
human life” (76, her emphasis). She has not wavered from this belief as evidenced most 
recently in Creating Capabilities. Indeed, Nussbaum believes that her commitment to 
respecting religious and cultural diversity has made capabilities even more appealing. 
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The previous sections were meant to demonstrate that universal support for her 
list is far from being realized. However, as Nussbaum mentioned, her list needs only to 
be a plausible object of consensus. I fear this too is a bit far-fetched. I am in complete 
agreement with Clark when he says there are too “few references to the ways in which 
these ‘other voices’ have shaped the list” (Clark 2013, 176). To address this problem, 
Nussbaum must show that she has taken various criticisms of her list seriously and used 
them to revise her theory. If she cannot do this, then it will be even more difficult for 
Nussbaum to achieve the goal of her list becoming a plausible objective of overlapping 
consensus. 
Furthermore, other than noting that her “discussions” with people (especially, 
women) from India helped reveal the importance of property rights and bodily integrity, 
no other references are mentioned as contributing to the rest of the list. Since generating a 
new and more comprehensive list in 2000, she has not made a single modification to it in 
spite of many critiques, some of which I have made explicit here.24 Either Nussbaum 
believes the list is flawless as it stands, or she is not taking challenges to it seriously. 
Specifically, if she believes the list is acceptable as it stands then she needs to defend it 
against criticisms, and if Nussbaum takes criticisms to her list seriously she must either 
offer a new method of justification that accommodates concerns that she is arbitrarily 
selecting other viewpoints to reinforce her own values, or explain why such a move is 
unnecessary despite these criticisms. 
I am not convinced that simply because Nussbaum’s list may not become an 
object of overlapping consensus that all capabilities lists are subject to the same critique. 																																																								
24 For further criticisms of Nussbaum’s recent list, see Clark (2002), Jaggar (2006), Okin (2003), Sen 
(2005), and Robeyns (2003). 
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We could, in principle, envision a list of capabilities that best represents, from a cross-
cultural perspective, what it truly means for an individual to live a life compatible with 
dignity. The claim here is simply that Nussbaum has not provided adequate evidence to 
support her assertion that her list has received widespread agreement. Specifically, I am 
troubled by Nussbaum’s haphazard dismissal of worldviews and beliefs that do not match 
her own. Nussbaum is seeking to justify her list to all, and while we are all presumably 
subject to the list, only some of us have an opportunity to genuinely accept it insofar as it 
can be justified to us in a way that is acceptable. In order to gain the cross-cultural 
support she desires, Nussbaum must give a concerted effort to engage the critics, 
especially from those who are traditionally marginalized, and, at that point, a genuine 
convergence on her list will be possible. Until then, I would make the strong claim that 
her list does not have the potential to become an object of overlapping consensus. 
Stark raises another ambiguity in Nussbaum’s use of overlapping consensus, 
which raises further concerns, namely, the ambiguity surrounding whether overlapping 
consensus is really consensus of the list or consensus of the justification for the list. She 
states, 
If it turns out that legitimacy requires overlapping consensus on principles of 
justice and their justification, then establishing that the list of capabilities (or the 
principles derived from it) be the object of overlapping consensus cannot serve as 
a justification for the list, because the justification for the list must itself be the 
object of overlapping consensuses (Stark 2009, 375, her emphasis). 
 
Stark suggests that convergence on the actual items from the list do not demonstrate a 
genuine justification since they can be interpreted in many ways. She argues that 
Nussbaum should seek overlapping consensus on the justification for her list, that is, the 
reasons why those who are affected by the list should adopt them. The advantage to 
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demanding convergence on the justification (as opposed to the actual list) is that the items 
from the justification will be likely agreed upon since those affected by the list agreed to 
how the items are constructed and defended. Overlapping consensus on the justification 
for the list would then increase the likelihood that genuine consensus has been achieved. 
However, even if overlapping consensus provides the justification itself, there 
would be more unanswered questions, such as how the capabilities on the list were 
generated and defended. This raises the broader concern as to how Nussbaum generates 
and defends the list, and as we have seen thus far, at best she provides only a vague 
account of it. Stark’s criticism calls into question the validity of Nussbaum’s use of 
overlapping consensus. 
There is one further problem with Nussbaum’s attempt to make her list justifiable 
to all (or nearly all) through overlapping consensus. Keep in mind, as I noted in Chapter 
1, overlapping consensus seeks convergence among “reasonable persons”. This 
conception of the person precludes so-called unreasonable persons, such as those who are 
severely cognitively disabled, from participating in the political process. Thus, the 
interests of severely cognitively disabled individuals will not necessarily be represented 
unless by the graces of non-cognitively disabled persons. Nussbaum rejects Rawlsian 
contractarianism for this very reason, that is, its lack of inclusivity. However, she is 
subject to the very same criticism. Either Nussbaum must accept the contractarian’s ideal 
citizen, which excludes those who have a severely cognitive disability, or jettison 
overlapping consensus as a method for justifying her list to everyone. Her third option 
would be to revise her notion of reasonableness to be more inclusive. 
 
3. Flaw #3: Negligence of Power Dynamics 
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 It is widely recognized in the health sciences that power dynamics exist, including 
relations of power between researchers and the subjects in the contexts they study.25 The 
ways in which asymmetrical power relations can shape one’s theory may vary greatly. 
I’m interested here in ways that power operates which may not appear obvious. For 
instance, subjects may simply agree with the interviewer in order to placate him, or 
because if they do not answer in a way that an interviewer desires, they may fear that he 
will portray their culture in a way that perpetuates negative stereotypes. It is the latter of 
these two forms of abuse that I will argue Nussbaum is guilty of committing, especially 
in her narrative approach and her use of reflective equilibrium. 
 
3.1 Negligence of Power in Nussbaum’s Use of the Narrative Approach 
 
 I begin my discussion of neglecting power dynamics with the narrative approach 
since this method of justification is especially susceptible to this criticism. As a theorist 
from a very privileged social and global position, Nussbaum has the opportunity to 
discuss her worldview with as many or few people as she desires, and she is also able to 
determine whether (and to what extent) she wishes to incorporate others’ considered 
judgments into her theorizing. 
Susan Okin criticizes Nussbaum for her dismissal of the voices of poor people. 
She focuses exclusively on the empirically-driven two volume book by the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Voices of the Poor, which “broke new ground 
by asking poor people themselves about their poverty and its impact on their lives” (Okin 																																																								
25 In the health sciences, theorizers have discussed the ways in which science is biased against women. This 
is due in large part to the power disparities within research between men and women. For instance, see 
Dickson (1993), Figert (2005), and Messing (2014). Also, the social sciences have discussed the ways in 
power has shaped theory; see Smith (2014) and Zavella (1996). 
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2003, 304). This book reveals several discrepancies between the perspectives of poor 
people and Nussbaum’s elaboration of several key capabilities. For example, the poor are 
less concerned with using practical reason as Nussbaum defines it, that is, as forming a 
conception of the good and critically assessing it. Instead, the poor generally know what a 
good life is and simply want the ability to live it. Okin (2003), following the voices of the 
poor, argues that they merely seek work to “earn them a living and restore their self-
respect” (311). The ability to gain self-respect is on Nussbaum’s list. However, the poor 
are not concerned with having the opportunity to reflect on the good life (despite often 
doing so). 
Furthermore, Nussbaum claims that work itself must create the space for practical 
reason; that is, having the ability to form a conception of the good and critically reflect on 
it. However, Okin argues that the poor are not interested in using work as a space to 
develop practical reason, but rather as simply a means for earning a living. These 
examples illustrate that if Nussbaum had sought the perspectives of the poor, then she 
may have re-considered certain items on her list. For example, perhaps she would revise 
her account of practical reason and her understanding of the nature of work. 
In defense of Nussbaum, Rutger Claassen makes a distinction between a 
philosopher-hermit, who believes his theory has no practical relevance, and the 
philosopher-king, who believes his theory is best for society and thus does not seek 
compromise or to alter the theory, and the philosopher-citizen, who proposes his theory 
to be considered in the democratic process. Claassen uses these distinctions to argue that 
Nussbaum is defending a partial conception of justice that is merely used as a point of 
departure to be considered under democratic discourse. He argues that Nussbaum is a 
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"philosopher-citizen" since she clearly recommends “her theory to a democratic public, 
trying to persuade them, all the while respecting the consent of the people” (Claassen 
2011, 502). In other words, contrary to Okin, he believes Nussbaum has adequately 
situated herself as a philosopher who can present a universal list of capabilities because 
she has interacted with others from different social strata and differently situated geo-
politics, and as a result of these interactions presents the list as a humble and workable 
document. 
The problem with Claassen’s defense is that my criticism, following Okin’s, runs 
much deeper than simply being concerned with her having interactions with others or not. 
I concede that Nussbaum is considered a philosopher-citizen insofar as she believes her 
theory ought to be put into practice by both international governing bodies and state 
constitutions, and Nussbaum does claim that her list is in principle revisable. However, I 
am concerned that the interactions she has had with diverse others have lead her either to 
conclude without warrant that she has received further confirmation of her list, or to 
outright dismiss those who question the list. 
As Okin puts it, “their interpreter [Nussbaum] has allowed her own voice to 
dominate” (Okin 2003, 297). A primary concern for Okin is the fact that Nussbaum 
speaks on behalf of the Indian women she interviews. We have no real insight into their 
thoughts and perceptions of the world except those Nussbaum shares with us. We are not 
afforded the questions of the interview or their direct responses, making it possible for 
Nussbaum to selectively include data that supports her values and interpret what they say 
without accountability. This allows Nussbaum to make assertions such as “people who 
once learn and experience these capabilities don’t want to go back”, which she then uses 
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in order to turn interview data into evidence for her position (Nussbaum 2000b, 152-3). 
There is no way to verify this statement from the interviews, and in fact it could be the 
case that people may be hostile towards some of Nussbaum’s capabilities. We have no 
insight into possible challenges the women might have raised to the list, whether it be 
identifying values not included or criticizing items that are. Nussbaum is able to appear 
as though she has gained cross-cultural support for the list, and yet she presents no real 
challenge to it. In this sense she continues to import her values into the list, or at the very 
least, we have good reason to suspect that she has done so even if inadvertently. At the 
very least, she has not yet provided rational warrant for her assertions. Nonetheless, 
whether Nussbaum has or hasn’t, the main point is that she has not provided a reliable 
and accurate guide for interpreting and using the data she collects from her conversations. 
Thus my response to Claassen’s defense of Nussbaum is that he fails to pay attention to 
how she interacts with others in order to derive support for her list.  
Alison Jaggar also contends that Nussbaum does not consider the power 
inequalities between her and the Indian women she interviews. Nussbaum’s power, as a 
Western scholar, relative to the Indian women she interviews, may influence how Vasanti 
and Jayamma respond to her questions. If the respondents are trying to placate her, they 
might simply say what she wants to hear or respond in a way that best represents their 
culture to a Westerner. We have no evidence showing that Nussbaum’s respondents were 
given a genuine opportunity to raise concerns, which may be a result of the power 
inequalities between her and the Indian women. Nussbaum could easily have treated 
them merely as a source of information—someone whose subjectivity is stripped solely 
for the purpose of gathering information. 
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 One reason Vasanti and Jayamma may have been treated as mere objects from 
which to glean information rather than as subjects participating in genuine dialogue is for 
the purpose of using their input to “confirm” features of Nussbaum’s theory. I am not 
claiming Nussbaum intentionally does this, nor am I claiming that she has covertly 
sought to construct a theory that support her own worldview. The problem is that this 
method of justification lacks any form of feedback loop that requires a theorizer to 
critically engage her critics. The poor Indian women Nussbaum dialogues with “provide 
information about the particular details of their lives…but ‘we’ retain the authority to 
collect this information, assess the moral worth of the reported desires and aspirations, 
and generalize the results into a universal theory” (Jaggar 2006, 319). Thus, Nussbaum is 
able to proclaim the values she finds most praiseworthy as fully universal since “others” 
find her list plausible. 
 A goal of the narrative approach is to offer support for Nussbaum’s list from 
people who inhabit different geo-political positions and accept different comprehensive 
doctrines. This provides part of the cross-cultural verification Nussbaum seeks. However, 
this approach seems to be plagued by a problem of power asymmetries between the 
theorizer and her subjects, which allows Nussbaum to claim that capabilities from her list 
represent values shared by nearly everyone, and yet is only confirmed by her own 
authority. 
 
3.2 Nussbaum’s Response to Okin 
 
 The narrative approach is meant to reveal culturally informed preferences, but my 
concerns of the asymmetrical power imbalance between Nussbaum and the Indian 
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women she interviews calls the preferences she has elicited to support her view into 
question. Relying on the narrative approach as a justification allows the theorizer too 
much latitude in interpreting the responses and using respondent answers inappropriately.  
In a formal reply to Okin’s criticisms, Nussbaum (2004) argues that the narrative 
approach is “not a method of political justification” but one of “civic education” (202). 
That is, the narrative approach is primarily a “heuristic” device to assist readers in 
imagining what it would be like in foreign situations. For example, the stories of Vasanti 
and Jayamma reveal problems with being socially-situated in a particular caste, under 
harsh working conditions, lacking access to healthcare, and having their bodily integrity 
violated. The hope is that their stories will reveal insights about values otherwise 
unknown or too easily taken for granted to readers, or bring greater attention to values 
that have been previously ignored. 
Nussbaum recounts stories from Vasanti and Jayamma who told her that they do 
not desire education. Despite their views on education, Nussbaum remains steadfast in 
her commitment to it. She writes, “the fact that neither of these illiterate women 
expresses a desire for education does not undermine my confidence that education is a 
very crucial goal for women and girls in India” (Nussbaum 2004, 203-4, emphasis 
added). This quote again reveals Nussbaum’s conflation of literacy and education. It is no 
surprise that Nussbaum would dismiss an illiterate person’s rejection of education as a 
central capability since Nussbaum automatically rules from the outset that their 
preferences regarding education are mistaken. 
The narrative approach allows us to have a glimpse into the ways of life 
unfamiliar to our own. Nussbaum concludes that this method of justification is valuable 
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insofar as it provides insights into ways of life otherwise unknown. For instance, she says 
her interactions with the Indian women helped her connect central capabilities to one 
another from her list, namely, control over one’s environment and bodily integrity. This 
connection has led her to place greater emphasis on the need for women to have access to 
loans and private property since this, in turn, helps provide greater protection for women 
over their bodies. 
Despite the narrative approach’s benefit of connecting central capabilities, we 
may still question whether and how this functions to justify her list. To be fair, Nussbaum 
admits that the narrative approach is not her primary justification (which for her is 
reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus). Nonetheless, the narrative approach 
still provides ancillary support for her list insofar as it shows that the experience of 
people who inhabit different social strata still share many of the same values as 
Nussbaum espouses on her list. 
However, I am troubled with Nussbaum’s implementation of the narrative 
approach since she has the ability to exacerbate the educational (and power) disparities 
between herself and the Indian women. For instance, Nussbaum did not need to note that 
the Indian women are “uneducated,” at least by her own standards. This is troubling 
because Nussbaum is able to claim that the respondents’ lack enthusiasm for education is 
simply a result of their unfamiliarity with it. Whether or not this claim is true, the deeper 
concern is that no safeguard is in place to guard against the possibility of Nussbaum, who 
is in a position of power, exploiting those who lack her status and position of authority. 
One might argue that Nussbaum would deem the poors’ intuitions as unreliable 
and untrustworthy since they have been formed under oppressive conditions. Nussbaum, 
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in fact, considers very few people’s intuitions. She considers only those that have been 
developed under conditions where most capabilities from her list have already been 
realized, since as she argues it is under these conditions that people have the opportunity 
to critically scrutinize their beliefs. Critical assessment of capabilities, at minimum, 
requires possessing them for a period of time. If an individual inhabits a community that 
is unable to provide these capabilities or rejects them for whatever reason (especially 
education), then Nussbaum seems to dismiss their worldview or perspective out of hand. 
Power disparities between Nussbaum and her respondents are very apparent in the 
narrative approach. However, this is not the only method of justification that is subject to 
this criticism. Because Nussbaum’s version of reflective equilibrium requires the 
theorizer to engage in dialogue with others, this method is also vulnerable to a theorizer 
abusing her position of power. 
 
3.3 My Defense of Okin’s Criticism: Neglecting Power Dynamics in Reflective 
Equilibrium 
 
 
 The process of reflective equilibrium for Nussbaum is “Socratic”. That is, it 
begins with an individual dialoguing with interlocutors while seeking equilibrium 
between an individual’s considered moral judgments, set of theoretical principles, and 
background assumptions. As Nussbaum uses this method, individuals ponder and discuss 
which aspects of life are intuitively compatible with dignity. She believes that people’s 
intuitions will reveal that the most important aspects of living a dignified life will include 
the capabilities from her list. 
 One may question how the above process protects marginalized voices, such as 
women in less privileged social positions than Nussbaum’s and the poor. To this, 
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Nussbaum (2004) argues that “many of the capabilities are prerequisites for those voices 
to be heard” (199). For instance, she argues that the capability of control over one’s 
environment includes the basic good of free press. Despite the fact that many poor 
women do not ask for free press, according to Nussbaum, it may ultimately be necessary 
for the fulfillment of their goals. Furthermore, Nussbaum claims that a further safeguard 
in place to ensure marginalized voices are not ignored is to require political conceptions 
(such as the capabilities list) to be implemented within a nation. Nussbaum (2004) 
believes then that the political principles will “only be implemented if the voices of those 
involved actually sign on to it” (199). An organization outside a given nation cannot 
determine how to interpret, and subsequently, manifest aspects of the political conception 
under discussion. Thus her list protects those who are marginalized insofar as the central 
capabilities are prerequisites for the marginalized to be heard. 
 Yet Nussbaum’s response does not directly address how reflective equilibrium 
ensures that marginalized peoples are protected. Recall her argument for her central list 
of capabilities based on reflective equilibrium. She argues that upon seeking coherence 
between our intuitions on what it means to live a life compatible with dignity, our 
theoretical principles, and background assumptions, we will arrive at a list of capabilities 
like her list. The theorizer until now has only reached narrow reflective equilibrium, but 
Nussbaum’s goal is to achieve equilibrium in the wide sense, which requires challenging 
her list from other perspectives. So the theorizer challenges her intuitions and theoretical 
commitments against perspectives and worldviews she does not share.  
 There are several problems with claiming that reflective equilibrium, as 
articulated by Nussbaum, will actually provide a voice to traditionally non-dominant 
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group members. First, Nussbaum, as the theorizer, has the power to decide which 
capabilities are “prerequisites” for the voices of the marginalized to be heard and so also 
which voices are excluded on grounds that they are ill-formed because they are formed 
under oppressive conditions. She makes the initial decision that her list of central 
capabilities will provide adequate power for women, the poor, and other marginalized 
groups to be heard. I do not doubt that having bodily integrity or free speech, for 
instance, are crucial features for anyone, especially women, to express themselves. 
However, how does Nussbaum know what is best for a particular group of people to be 
heard in their context if she does not take their challenges seriously? She may argue that 
the general capability of free speech or bodily integrity can be interpreted differently, 
which allows different contexts to manifest a capability in its own way. This too is 
unsatisfying since a particular capability may be interpreted so differently that she would 
not endorse it as a legitimate interpretation of that capability. For instance, Nussbaum 
would reject a community’s interpretation of education without a literacy component as 
not in fact advancing the capability of education. The general problem, then, is that 
Nussbaum claims her list is revisable while ruling out in advance the critical potential for 
revising the list of any voices of the most marginalized groups. 
 I do not believe that being in a position of power necessarily negates all the 
results produced by that the powerful group or individuals. But social power relations are 
ubiquitous and anyone purporting to develop a global moral theory must attend to how 
these power dynamics may be influencing the process of theory construction and defense. 
I have argued in this section that power imbalances have shaped Nussbaum’s theory in a 
harmful manner as she has summarily dismissed viewpoints from marginalized groups 
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without any major repercussions and without any sound justification for so doing. My 
hope in this section is to call attention to the need for safeguards against a theorizer 
abusing their position of power. 
 
4. Methodological Considerations 
 
 In this final section of Chapter 2, I argue that one significant reason why 
Nussbaum’s methods of justifications are subject to the above three flaws of arbitrarily 
selecting others, neglecting power relations, and uncritically importing values, is a 
methodological commitment to monological moral reasoning. The problem here with 
reasoning monologically is that Nussbaum is the sole arbiter who sorts through the 
information, decides what merits attention, and what is illicit and worthy of 
consideration. This form of moral reasoning renders us more prone to harmful biases and 
errors. I will suggest that a possible way to address this concern is by replacing 
monological moral reasoning with a dialogical version. 
 
4.1 Monological Moral Reasoning 
 
A theorizer who engages in moral reasoning without having a procedure in her 
theory that emphasizes the need to adjust her theory in light of interactions with others is 
reasoning monologically. Jari Ilmari Niemi (2008) describes this account of moral 
reasoning as a justification “addressed to oneself” (257). In a similar manner, Angelika 
Krebs (1997) explains that monologism requires a theorizer to reflect “all by oneself” 
(271). 
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Nussbaum’s methodology is monological to the extent that, as the theorizer, she 
does not have to critically engage in dialogue with her interlocutors in order to raise 
challenges and justify her version of capabilities. A commitment to monologism seems to 
have been fundamental to both her early and later justifications. For instance, Aristotelian 
internalist essentialism does not ask the theorizer to engage in meaningful discussions 
with people from other cultures as she attempts to find overlapping “spheres of 
experience”. Instead, she reads stories and myths from her own culture and other cultures, 
interprets other cultural myths on her own, and then from these interpretations makes her 
best judgment as to which capabilities best represent a truly human life. 
Furthermore, based on Nussbaum’s primary justification of her later works, 
namely, reflective equilibrium, a theorizer herself can perform all the necessary steps to 
justify the capabilities approach. Despite Nussbaum’s use of reflective equilibrium, 
which may appear to be dialogical insofar as she calls for Socratic (imaginative) 
dialogue, as I have shown her interlocutors are merely imaginative. Even so, the problem 
isn’t just that one imagines interlocutors; it’s that the imagined interlocutors are given no 
real epistemic authority to potentially alter the outcome. So Nussbaum remains the sole 
arbiter of which intuitions she chooses to challenge her own, and if others’ beliefs and 
practices conflict with hers she has the power to ignore them, which she does. 
 
4.2 The Concern of Implicit Bias 
 
 One problem with monologism is that it too easily allows implicit biases to 
influence one’s reasoning. We are extremely vulnerable to cognitive distortions when 
reasoning privately. A concern with private moral reasoning is the myriad of ways it can 
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cloud a theorizer’s judgment. This is especially concerning when such judgments may 
arise in a way that is not even cognizant to the agent, which is what happens in the case 
of implicit biases. Here, an 
Individual harbors an implicit bias against some stigmatized group (G), when she 
has automatic cognitive or effective associations between (her concept of) G and 
some negative property (P) or stereotypic trait (T), which are accessible and can 
be operative in influencing judgment and behavior without the conscious 
awareness of the agent (Holroyd 2012, 275). 
 
Jules Holroyd discerns three key features of implicit bias. First, the implicit feature of the 
bias does not denote the concepts held, but the association between the negative 
stereotype and the group it represents. For instance, if a person holds an implicit bias that 
black people are dangerous, then the implicitness refers to his association between the 
negative stereotype of being dangerous and black people. Second, we have to distinguish 
between having the bias and the way in which (or whether) the bias influences our 
behavior. In other words, one may have an implicit bias, but not let it influence one’s 
behavior. Finally, the associations are not reached through reasoning, but are an 
automatic response. 
Cognitive psychologists often determine whether a person has an implicit bias 
through the Implicit Association Test (IAT). The IAT is less concerned with how a 
person feels about a particular group, but their immediate response. It is difficult to 
uncover these responses since they are not very accessible. So, in order to reveal them, 
psychologists give respondents a group of concepts and they are asked to match them 
with another set of concepts. For instance, they might be asked to match positive terms 
(e.g., good and bright) with white people first and then black people afterwards. If an 
implicit bias exists, the respondent will take longer to match the positive terms with black 
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people than white people. Regardless of her conscious belief that states she is not afraid 
of black people, the IAT will measure unreflective feelings toward groups under 
question. That is, the test will reveal that she is, in fact, really afraid of black people but 
that the feeling manifests unconsciously. Cognitive psychologists have used the IAT to 
measure implicit biases in many professions and across gender, social, and economic 
borders.26 Implicit bias is very common, and depending on the bias can easily influence 
our moral reasoning. Thus we ought to be wary of monological methods of moral 
reasoning, especially those that purport to generate norms that are supposed to be 
universally valid precisely because they have allegedly been well-vetted and are claimed 
to be unbiased. 
One may argue that since these biases are implicit, there is no genuine way to 
uncover them, and thus no way to address the problem. In response, Peggy DesAutels 
(2012) notes, following research by neuroscientists, that our “brains are able, to some 
degree, to correct our perceptions when our predictions fail to match up with sensory 
inputs” (342). In other words, uncovering implicit biases is not impossible, and they are 
also not impossible to correct.  
Jennifer Saul offers seven potential solutions to address implicit bias. However, 
for our purposes, the most relevant of these is a demand that the agent “justify” and 
“reflect” on the “potential for stereotypes to play a role” in one’s cognition (Saul 2012, 
259). Saul argues correctly that part of justifying one’s position involves at the very least 
having an “explicit discussion” with relevant others, that is, those who one is 																																																								
26 Some of these studies have revealed biases in white basketball referees calling slightly higher fouls on 
black players and black referees calling slightly more fouls on white players (Price and Wolfers 2010). 
Furthermore, IAT has also explained why resumes with white names have received greater callbacks than 
black names despite some companies claiming to be an “Equal Opportunity Employer” (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2004). 
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recommending to accept the view she puts forward. The hope is that such discussions 
will call attention to any possible negative stereotypes that were previously unknown to 
the agent. 
We are now in better position to understand why the feminist critics charge that 
Nussbaum’s justification of the capabilities is vulnerable to charges of being sexist, neo-
colonial, and imperialist. Their criticisms are not in regards to whether Nussbaum in fact 
manifests behaviors resembling neo-colonial or imperial attitudes since most people 
(including Nussbaum) would condemn behavior associated with these biases, despite 
possibly possessing them. These critics reveal a monological pattern in Nussbaum’s 
moral reasoning that insulates her from the kind of critical scrutiny that might expose the 
influence of cognitive limitations engendered by implicit bias on her theory. Krebs and 
Niemi explain that Nussbaum engages in monological moral reasoning insofar as her 
justifications are addressed “to herself” and performed “alone”. Despite Nussbaum’s 
claim that she has rigorously challenged her theory (and specifically, the list) from 
different perspectives, it is difficult to see the ways in which she has either incorporated 
different worldviews or shown why her position is superior to others. For example, she 
does not discuss why her list could include other capabilities. Without the proper checks 
against her theory, Nussbaum is likely to produce results that mirror the colonial project, 
albeit unintentionally, especially because she is a Western theorist claiming to make 
moral norms that are globally valid and that ought to be used to judge and criticize 
quality of life in parts of the world that “the West” has historically ravaged. This is 
especially troubling for Nussbaum, though, since she claims to be actively striving to 
avoid imposing a set of values on a group of people. 
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The studies on implicit bias suggest that we are all prone to these attitudes. 
Regardless of how much we may vehemently reject attitudes and behaviors that represent 
negative stereotypes to certain groups, suffering from an implicit bias is a real possibility. 
Because Nussbaum does not consider the ways in which possible biases may influence 
her justificatory strategies (and subsequently, her theory), she runs an even greater risk of 
such attitudes influencing her theory. Nussbaum’s feminist critics do not mention implicit 
bias as a concern, although their criticisms of defending a theory that is laden with 
Western, and even sexist, biases reveal why theorists need measures to guard against the 
impact of implicit bias. 
I am not trying to overstate the interconnection between monological moral 
reasoning and implicit bias. In fact, dialogue is also an insufficient corrective for implicit 
bias and other epistemic prejudices, but it may be necessary or, at the very least, we have 
good reason to believe that it is better than monologue. Implicit bias can lead us to 
underestimate the “trustworthiness of people who belong to ‘suspect’ social groups” and 
in so doing we run the risk not only of reinforcing forms of epistemic injustice, but also 
of cutting ourselves off from the possibility of learning from these groups (323). 
Nussbaum’s dismissive attitude towards Bangladeshi and Indian women who hesitate to 
wholeheartedly endorse education as a crucial capability seems to do just this. I hope to 
have made the case that if one is wedded to monological moral reasoning, then one is in a 
worse position to correct for potentially implicit racist and sexist biases, since no 
feedback loops are in place to guard against those biases from infiltrating one’s theory 
and thus advancing a moral theory that might itself rationalize racism and sexism. Such 
theories harm a lot of people and are not  well-suited to expose these influences. 
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4.3 One Possible Way Forward 
 
 Concerns surrounding implicit bias point to the need for an alternative 
methodology. I will suggest dialogical, as opposed to monological, methods of moral 
reasoning and justification will have better safeguards in place to avoid harmful biases 
and prejudicial results. A theorizer who adopts a dialogical methodology must critically 
engage others and use their feedback to adjust their own position. One cannot simply 
appeal to others, as we have seen in Nussbaum’s use of internalist essentialism and 
reflective equilibrium, but rather must seriously dialogue with others in such a way that 
the conversation between the theorizer and others yields a collective result. 
To be clear, a person who endorses monological moral reasoning may also 
“converse” with others. Nussbaum believes her version of reflective equilibrium demands 
some form of interaction with concrete others. Maeve Cooke (2000) sums up 
Nussbaum’s version of monological moral reasoning as a “private process in which 
citizens work out for themselves whether the advocated political principles are reasonable 
in the sense of capable of being reasonably accepted by all” (958, her emphasis). In other 
words, even reflective equilibrium, to some degree, must consider other perspectives.  
Nonetheless, the problem for reflective equilibrium still remains; that is, what is 
acceptable by all still remains determined by the individual theorizer. 
However, merely considering other perspectives does not suffice for dialogical 
moral reasoning. Nussbaum claims that the theorizer must engage in a Socratic dialogue, 
but she never states the extent to which we must actively converse with other human 
beings, or gives any sense of the conditions that need to be met for a genuine dialogue to 
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occur. Moreover, dialogical moral reasoning does not simply require that we talk with 
others, since that may occur monologically too. For instance, a teacher that is 
uninterested in receiving feedback may simply lecture during the duration of his class and 
any questions he receives may be dismissed as sophomoric. In this case, there is some 
“dialogue” occurring, but not the kind required for it to be considered dialogic. Simply 
put, dialogical moral reasoning is not simply two or more people conversing. Instead, the 
theorizer must specify how discussion between discursive participants should occur, and 
the goal of the discussion. It seems like her commitment to reflective equilibrium allows 
us to simply learn about other worldviews and use them to challenge our own intuitions 
in a Socratic-like form. In this way we can imagine how others would criticize our views 
and adjust our own theory accordingly. 
One might argue that Nussbaum has already advocated for an account of moral 
reasoning that is dialogical, namely, the narrative approach, because on this approach 
Nussbaum does talk with actual other people. Yet genuine dialogue, as I will defend it, 
differs from what Nussbaum does in the narrative in at least two ways. First, Nussbaum 
never has a genuine conversation with the Indian women. Instead, she inquires about 
their daily routines, including their political commitments, and then draws a number of 
conclusions in order to determine which aspects of her list they endorse (e.g., bodily 
integrity) and reject (e.g., education). Second, as I have shown in Sections 1.2 and 2.1, 
Nussbaum never truly seeks their feedback. For instance, she dismisses their lack of 
enthusiasm for education as a problem with possessing adaptive preferences rather than 
pursuing their reasons for this seeming lack of enthusiasm.27 So Nussbaum asserts that 
																																																								
27 For a comprehensive discussion on the nature of adaptive preferences, see Khader (2011). 
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Vasanti and Jayamma have adapted the preference of not valuing education because they 
do not understand its benefits. 
This example illustrates Nussbaum’s lack of genuine dialogical engagement with 
those who challenge her perspective, and thus we cannot claim she is engaged in 
dialogical moral reasoning simply because she finds some value in the narrative 
approach. Dialogue is not the same thing as talking with others. Furthermore, it points to 
the need for a dialogical approach to moral reasoning since it would reduce the possibility 
of Nussbaum dismissing views that run contrary to her beliefs. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 There is an array of problems associated with monological moral reasoning, 
especially as it serves to defend a method of justification. I posit that a concern with 
Nussbaum is that her commitment to monologism leads her to rely on methods of 
justification that are prone to harmful biases and prejudices. The same types of challenges 
that were presented to Nussbaum in her early works are also found in her most recent 
works. Brooke Ackerly, for instance, criticizes Nussbaum’s justificatory strategy of 
internalist essentialism for not having safeguards against smuggling her own values into 
her theory; likewise, Alison Jaggar has criticized Nussbaum’s use of reflective 
equilibrium for also allowing her to import values. However, as I argued, a theorizer is 
not forced to accept monological moral reasoning for constructing and defending her 
outcomes. 
 I will suggest a different justificatory strategy in the following chapter, one that is 
consistent with dialogical moral reasoning, namely, discourse ethics. Simply put, 
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discourse ethics claims that a norm is justified if all free and equal participants who are 
affected by the decision can agree upon it, and it specifies discursive conditions that must 
be met in order for a dialogue to occur. The following chapter will present a traditional 
version of discourse ethics articulated and defended by its founders, Karl-Otto Apel and 
Jürgen Habermas. I will then show how it has been modified by Seyla Benhabib to 
accommodate moral and religious pluralism. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DISCOURSE ETHICS: DISCERNING 
METHODOLOGICAL CRITERIA 
 
 
 Martha Nussbaum argues that her capabilities has gained cross-cultural support, 
or at least has the potential to do so. She uses reflective equilibrium to construct a list that 
is consistent with her intuitions about dignity and corresponding principles of justice, and 
then demonstrates how this list has the potential to be a basis for international documents 
by becoming an object of overlapping consensus. However, drawing on various feminist 
critics, I have shown that Nussbaum’s list has not received the universal validity she 
claims and is not able to assist us in identifying many instances of gender injustice. 
I share Nussbaum’s methodological goal that a good method of justification for a 
list of capabilities will be a method that can generate wide cross-cultural (perhaps, 
universal) support for the list. However, we part ways insofar as I believe that 
justification to achieve this goal requires dialogical methods as opposed to monological 
ones. I examine the dialogical method of moral justification offered by discourse ethics as 
a potentially better method for justifying the capabilities. 
Specifically, this chapter considers discourse ethics as a possible alternative 
method for justifying the capabilities given the problems I raised in the previous chapter 
with Nussbaum’s methods of justification. My discussion of discourse ethics will begin 
with its founders, Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel. I will then show how Seyla 
Benhabib later revised their accounts to better accommodate moral and religious 
pluralism. Although discourse ethics is more promising than reflective equilibrium and 
overlapping consensus for securing broad cross-cultural justification for the capabilities, 
it is actually still susceptible to many of the same criticisms as these other methods. 
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Despite the advantages of discourse ethics as it has been traditionally conceived, I will 
show the ways in which feminist critics of Nussbaum and the critics of traditional 
versions of discourse converge on many of the same problems. I suggest that a feminist 
inspired version of discourse ethics, aspects of which have been articulated by various 
philosophers over the past twenty years, offers a version of dialogical justification that 
may be more capable of justifying the capabilities for a diverse and unequal world. I 
outline this theory of feminist practical dialogue in chapter four. 
 
1. The Origins of Discourse Ethics 
 
 Discourse ethics originated in the work of Jürgen Habermas (1990) and Karl Otto 
Apel (2001). It is not a normative theory in the same way as consequentialism and 
deontology are moral theories, insofar as the latter theories determine the rightness of an 
action based on whether it is consistent with its core principles—for example, producing 
the best consequences and performing the correct duty, respectively. Instead, discourse 
ethics is a meta-ethical theory that evaluates moral claims “not directly by reference to 
their content but instead by reference to the reasoning through which they are justified” 
(Jaggar and Tobin 2013, 391). So, it could be the case that one engages in either strictly 
consequentialist or deontological moral reasoning to reach a belief, and then uses 
discourse ethics to assess the moral validity of the claim. 
 
1.1 Discourse Ethics Methodology 
 
Habermas’s version of discourse ethics has Kantian roots. He highlights the close 
relationship between himself and Kant when he says that discourse ethics “replaces the 
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Kantian categorical imperatives by a procedure of moral argumentation” (Habermas 
1990, 197).28 Kantian and discourse ethics’ methodologies are very similar insofar as 
both draw on contradictions to generate norms. The former generates duties to which all 
rational beings are bound. The latter seeks conditions for the possibility of genuine 
discourse, and if these conditions are satisfied, the norms generated out of them are valid. 
Habermas and Apel are committed to a Kantian-like methodology that yields a 
contradiction to determine the necessary “pragmatic presuppositions” of discourse, or 
what we might call necessary discursive conditions. 
 Habermas and Apel search for what must be presupposed in order for discourse to 
occur, and they use the idea of a performative contradiction to identify those 
presuppositions. Habermas, following Apel, explains that a “performative contradiction 
occurs when a constative speech act k(p) rests on noncontingent presuppositions whose 
propositional content contradicts the asserted proposition p” (Habermas 1990, 80). 
Consider an ethical skeptic who denies that we can make true or false moral claims. Apel 
suggests that in putting forth his position, the skeptic “necessarily assumes the validity of 
at least those logical rules that are irreplaceable if we are to understand his argument as a 
refutation” of grounding moral principles (cited in Habermas 1990, 81). In other words, 
the skeptic is guilty of putting forth a performative contradiction because he holds 
steadfast to the truth of his agnosticism towards the validity of moral statements, yet 
simultaneously rejects the ability to make true or false statements about morality. This is 
considered a performative contradiction insofar as holding onto the truth or falsity of a 
moral belief contradicts the charge to refrain from holding any beliefs about morality. 																																																								
28 It is beyond this project to engage in a thorough historical analysis of Kant’s influence on Habermas and 
Apel. For a further discussion on the ways in which Apel appropriates (and distances) himself from Kant, 
see Apel (2001, 53-64). 
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 Habermas’s method of moral reasoning to uncover the rules of discourse is 
monological; these rules are not discovered through intersubjective discourse, but rather 
by identifying the formally necessary conditions that must be satisfied for discourse. In 
other words, the idea of a performative contradiction itself does not require dialogue with 
others, but is the result of monological reasoning and shares in the Kantian idea of a 
transcendental justification. One might ask if Habermas is simply begging the question 
because he does not use discourse in order to determine and justify the conditions of 
discourse. Habermas and Apel’s (2001) example comes from Descartes, noting that one 
could not say: “I hereby think that I (now) don’t exist” since such a statement would be 
an example of a performative self-contradiction (45). It is a contradiction insofar as 
thinking that one does not exist necessarily entails one’s existence. Habermas cites this 
example to show that Apel “revives the transcendental mode of justification using the 
tools of a pragmatics of language” (80). In other words, the rules of discourse are not 
arbitrarily created, but are generated as necessary conditions given the pragmatic of 
language that must be satisfied in order to have a genuine discussion that can yield a fair 
outcome to occur. Once the following rules are established based on the idea of a 
performative contradiction, then actual dialogue constrained by these rules is used to seek 
rational justification to pursue the agreed upon action. 
 
1.2 Rules of Discourse 
 
From the idea of a performative contradiction, Habermas generates three levels of 
rules (or “pragmatic presuppositions”) that are necessary in order to have genuine 
discourse. The first set of rules are logical and semantic, such as “no speaker should 
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contradict herself”. Habermas believes these rules are void of ethical content, but they are 
the foundation for discourse ethics since genuine dialogue cannot exist without a few 
shared assumptions, including one’s commitment to not contradict oneself. 
At the second level are procedural norms that express all the rules necessary by 
assuming a “hypothetical attitude and being relieved of the pressures of action and 
experience…for a search for truth organized in the form of a competition” (Habermas 
1990, 87). Here, the dialoguers place themselves in ideal speech situations where they 
test the validity of each other’s claims. For example, the principle of accountability says a 
discursive participant must provide reasons for her position, or, if she chooses not to 
provide a justification, she must explain why she is withholding reasons. Habermas 
requires people to provide explanations for why they believe what they do since 
discourse by definition implies putting forth reasons and responding to them. A further 
procedural norm includes the principle of sincerity; here, a dialoguer is asked only to 
assert what she truly believes. To understand the significance of procedural norms this 
principle of sincerity derives from the fact that it would be contradictory to put forth a 
belief as a person’s own and yet maintain that this belief is not hers. This would be 
tantamount to claiming “I am committed to X, but don’t really believe it”.  
Finally at the third level are rhetorical rules, which are used to achieve the ideal 
conditions of speech, and which include immunity from repression and coercion. 
Habermas is adamant that participants cannot be coerced or forced into saying something 
they do not endorse or assimilate to a position which they do not accept. In other words, 
ideal speech conditions are distinguished from actual speech conditions in part by the fact 
that the former are free from biases that stem from self-interest or coercive influences 
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such as suppressing certain voices (external coercion) or making those who desire to 
speak too uncomfortable to do so (internal coercion). Habermas argues further that rules 
of rhetoric demand that everyone has an equal opportunity to speak. If a person desires to 
do so, then she should be given as much of an opportunity to speak as anyone else. A 
contradiction would arise if we did not allow others to speak in discourse since then it 
would be a “dialogue” with oneself, and thus no longer a dialogue at all but a monologue. 
However, one should not mistake the meaning behind this claim. That is, dialogue not 
only requires at least two people, but also that the people present are allowed to speak. 
In brief, speaking logically, sincerely, and freely are all necessary conditions for 
genuine discourse. However, in order to have good dialogue, one need not be fully aware 
of these rules. As Gordon Finlayson (2005) explains, the rules of discourse are not 
written down explicitly, such as in chess, but are more like the “syntactical rules of 
language” (43). In other words, a discursive participant could follow these rules well, and 
thus be engaging in discourse, without being aware of the fact that she is doing so. 
If we grant Habermas’s formal process to set the rules of discourse, then he is in a 
position to defend the two principles for discursively testing the validity or justification 
of moral norms. First, his “universalization principle” (Principle (U)) states: All affected 
by the discourse can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance 
can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (Habermas 1990, 
65). The principle of universalizability is a normative principle that tests the validity of 
moral norms by determining whether all affected by the discursive community can accept 
the norm and its foreseeable consequences. Very few moral norms will actually achieve 
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universal consensus. Nonetheless, if some were possible, we can imagine moral norms 
such as “do not murder” and “do not steal”. 
 Habermas (1990) warns us not to confuse Principle (U) with his other principle—
Principle (D)—which says “Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could 
meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical 
discourse” (66, his emphasis). This principle is meta-ethical, and it is the foundation for 
Habermasian discourse ethics. It states one cannot declare universal validity of a norm 
through reasoning by oneself, but must gain widespread agreement through discourse. 
For example, one may argue that “pornography is immoral” and have very good reasons 
for this position. Yet, if it cannot gain the assent of others as Principle (D) demands, then 
this person’s belief cannot become a binding norm, one that justifies a prohibition on 
pornography for all of us and not just for oneself. Again, like Principle (U), there is a 
strict requirement that “all affected” must agree to the norm for it to be binding. Given 
the fact of globalization, which means nearly all people around the world will in some 
sense be affected by many moral and political policies or interventions, coupled with the 
fact that the world has a wide range of conceptions of the good, it appears that reaching 
consensus is nearly impossible. Additionally, the norms that achieve such agreement will 
likely be rather obvious, for instance, prohibitions against murder. 
 
1.3 Building on Habermas and Apel 
 
Seyla Benhabib discerns two ethical assumptions made by Habermas in his 
articulation of the formal conditions for discourse and the justificatory principles they 
yield—what she calls the “principle of universal moral respect” and the “principle of 
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egalitarian reciprocity”. These two principles are a development from Habermas’s rules 
of discourse, and any genuine discourse must be constrained by these ethical principles. 
Unlike Habermas, who uses these two principles as abstract formal requirements of 
discourse, Benhabib employs them as substantive constraints on the dialogue. The 
principle of universal moral respect demands all competent speakers be given the 
opportunity to participate in the dialogue, and the principle of egalitarian reciprocity 
indicates that all those who have a chance to speak should be equally capable of raising 
new issues and criticizing positions.  
Benhabib adopts and defends these two principles—universal respect and 
egalitarian reciprocity. One may argue that her interpretation of these ethical principles is 
biased in favor of a liberal understanding of respect and egalitarianism. In anticipation of 
this concern, Benhabib explains that these ethical principles are multiply realizable when 
implemented in different contexts. The way in which a person is shown respect in one 
context may differ from another. For instance, how we greet one another will be shaped 
largely by our social situation. The advantage of multiply realizing these principles is that 
they will then better accommodate moral and religious pluralism because people can 
display reciprocity in a way consistent with their moral or religious commitments without 
dictating how others should do so. Further, because “reciprocity” can only be understood 
between concrete others (and not abstract rational beings), these principles entail the 
commitment that “we are treated by others equally insofar as we are a member of a 
particular human group” (Benhabib 1992, 31). 
However, Benhabib has far from fully endorsed Habermas’s version of discourse 
ethics. She argues that Principle U—which asks us to consider the foreseeable 
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consequences of our actions in trying to reach consensus—is subject to the “kinds of 
arguments that deontological rights theorists have always successfully brought against 
utilitarians” (Benhabib 1992, 35). She asks us to imagine a community that takes up the 
question of whether to “inflict unnecessary suffering”. The problem with Habermas’s 
version of discourse is that he cannot guarantee human rights will not be violated. 
Ultimately, Benhabib (1992) argues that we need “some stronger constraints about how 
we interpret ‘U’ for fear of regressing behind the achievements of Kant’s moral 
philosophy” (35). By achievements, she is referring to Kant’s commitment that human 
beings should not have their rights violated. The advantage of creating substantive 
constraints on the dialogue is that they help to generate norms that are not counter-
intuitive, such as inflicting unnecessary pain. 
Benhabib further argues that the problem with Habermas’s version of discourse 
ethics is that he appeals to abstract reasoners rather than concrete, particular reasoners. 
She likens Habermas’s discursive participants to Rawls’s agents behind the veil of 
ignorance, even though Habermas deliberately contrasts himself with Rawls.29 Behind the 
veil, individuals are epistemologically and metaphysically prior to what makes them 
uniquely human. Agents ignore their particularities, which results in a homogenous 
human being, namely, one who is rational and self-interested. Benhabib argues that 
Habermas, like Rawls, employs the “ideal of impartiality” (1992, 169). She claims that 
Habermas’s version of discourse ethics assumes human beings are completely 
disinterested and impartial spectators, that is, individuals who jettison their emotions and 
biases in favor of the best argument. 																																																								
29 Habermas (1990) criticizes Rawls’s original position as unnecessary since “Practical discourse can also 
be viewed as a communicative process simultaneously exhorting all participants to ideal role taking…into a 
public affair, practiced intersubjectively by all involved” (198, his emphasis). 
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Following Habermas, Benhabib criticizes Rawls for engaging in a “hypothetical 
thought process, carried out singly by the moral agent or by the moral philosopher 
[instead of] an actual dialogue situation in which moral agents communicate with one 
another” (Benhabib 1992, 169, her emphasis). The human beings who are engaged in 
seeking moral justification are not ahistorical and apolitical, but rather embedded in 
particular social, political, and economic situations. Benhabib agrees with Habermas that 
a kind of reciprocity is required for genuine discourse, but she argues that “reciprocity” 
can only be understood between concrete others (and not abstract rational beings). These 
principles entail the commitment that “we are treated by others equally insofar as we are 
a member of a particular human group” (Benhabib 1992, 31). For Benhabib this means 
that Habermas’s two discursive principles—respect and reciprocity—need to be 
interpreted in light of particular worldviews, all of which may not support a liberal 
understanding of equality, for example. She often emphasizes the need to take an 
individual’s social and cultural situatedness seriously. That is, we ought not bracket the 
features that make us unique, including our religious commitments, gender, class, race 
and so forth; instead, these aspects shape who we are and the goals we strive to achieve. 
Second, because Benhabib is not as overly ambitious to seek consensus as 
Habermas is, she is in a better position to localize norms. Drawing on Michael Walzer’s 
strong contextualism, she explains that within discourse “all meaning must first be 
interpreted and understood from the standpoint of its producers” (Benhabib 2002, 39). 
This points to the need for localized interpretations. The benefit of localized 
interpretations is to avoid a single definition of her ethical principles being imposed on 
those who find certain (often dominant) interpretations implausible, impractical, or 
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unhelpful. Benhabib advocates for substantive limits on the procedure by arguing, for 
example, that formally hierarchal worldviews that would grant some people (such as 
religious leaders) global epistemic authority. Ultimately, this could only be entertained 
temporarily because genuine moral discourse must allow all affected an equal 
opportunity to speak and to be heard as credible discursive participants. 
I find Benhabib’s account to be superior to Habermas’s version of discourse 
ethics for three reasons. First, she argues that we need to place substantive constraints on 
the dialogue in order to mitigate the risk of generating counter intuitive norms, such as 
inflicting unnecessary suffering. Second, she attempts to offer a version of discourse 
ethics that makes the rules of discourse more contextual. As she says correctly, the 
principle of universal moral respect must be flexible enough to be interpreted in a way 
that can adapt to a given culture. Third, she is not overly committed to the value of 
consensus, but rather emphasizes the need to attain the right procedure to achieve a fair 
outcome. However, I am not fully convinced that Benhabib’s account is the strongest 
possible version of discourse ethics. In the following section I will offer a number of 
challenges to discourse ethics as Apel, Habermas, and Benhabib have constructed it. 
 
2. Challenges to Discourse Ethics 
 
 Discourse ethics has been charged with more criticisms than could be investigated 
here, but I would like to examine five of them closely: (1) an outcome cannot be 
trustworthy simply on the basis of the procedure used to produce it, (2) the charge of 
empty formalism, (3) various activist challenges, (4) that it is unable to offer substantive 
guidance, and (5) the charge that it is invidiously idealized. These criticisms are not 
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meant to completely undermine discourse ethics as a method of justification. Rather, I 
explore them in order to discern methodological desiderata that we ought to consider 
when articulating and defending a version of discourse ethics. 
 
2.1 The Concern of Proceduralism 
 
Discourse ethics is a procedural method of moral justification, which means that 
if the correct procedure is in place, then the recommended course of action generated by 
that procedure is morally justified. Martha Nussbaum argues that proceduralism cannot 
guarantee to generate good guidance since a procedure could in principle produce nearly 
any outcome imaginable. The primary target of her criticism is Rawlsian procedural 
justice, but the same criticism emerges for discourse ethicists given that they too argue 
the need to focus on generating the right discursive conditions, which in turn will 
generate norms that can be justified for all affected parties. 
Nussbaum is concerned that despite how well a procedure is constructed, 
somewhere in the process it may go awry; thus, generating less than satisfactory 
outcomes. She argues that proceduralism does not offer us enough content to truly 
determine the justness of an action without a more substantive starting point. By contrast, 
her list of central capabilities at least says something about injustice and exploitation at 
the outset. 
Nussbaum uses the example of a pasta maker to better understand the strength of 
her criticism. She asks us to imagine a pasta maker that has a flawless design and is built 
with the most pristine materials. It seems that it would guarantee to create the best pasta 
anyone has tried, assuming one had all the right ingredients. In fact, the host guarantees 
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her guests that it will be the best pasta they have ever tasted. She is confident in her 
assertion because all the necessary features to make the best pasta are included in her 
pasta maker. However, as Nussbaum (2006) says, surely the “guests want to taste the 
pasta and see for themselves. They will be inclined to decide for or against the machine 
on the basis of the pasta it produces” (83). In other words, it may be the case that the 
pasta will not meet the high expectations of her guests. There is no way to guarantee that 
her pasta maker will, in fact, make the greatest pasta. A guest would need to try the pasta 
first in order to draw that conclusion. The deeper point is that we judge the value of the 
machine on the basis of the quality of the product, so we already have an idea of good 
quality—a substantive standard—against which we judge the machine. Of course, 
constraints on the discourse might be so substantive that its outcome is nearly certain to 
produce the right norms, which then makes the proceduralist vulnerable to charges of 
begging the question by building substantive outcomes covertly into the procedure. 
However, as the pasta-maker example illustrates, those affected by the outcome of the 
procedure will determine whether or not the norms are successful after a decision has 
been made. Thus Nussbaum argues that the outcome, not the procedure, is the final 
arbiter to determine the justness of an action. 
In sum, most versions of proceduralism attempt to identify the right constraints on 
the dialogue in hopes of achieving a just outcome. Nussbaum argues that ultimately we 
care about outcomes and will test them by independent criteria. So, we cannot, and 
indeed do not tend to, trust that an outcome is based simply on the procedure which 
generated it. 
 
2.2 Empty Formalism 
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A second line of criticism is the charge that discourse ethics amounts to an empty 
formalism. There are two ways to understand the concept of “empty formalism” as it 
applies to discourse: what I call the Individual Abstraction Objection and the Utopianism 
Objection. On the one hand, the Individual Abstraction Objection, which is inspired by 
Hegel’s criticism of Kantian empty formalism, says that discourse ethics assumes an 
account of human beings as purely rational agents, and thus ignores particularities—that 
is, socio-economic factors, along with other individuating features such as one’s able-
bodiedness and religious commitments that constitute an individual’s identity. Simply 
put, these assumptions about human beings lead to charges of empty formalism because 
meaningful guidance cannot be provided without first knowing one’s moral and religious 
commitments. 
The Utopianism Objection, on the other hand, as formulated by Agnes Heller 
(1985), says this: 
We cannot obtain any positive guidance from the Habermasian version of the 
categorical imperative. Rather, what we could get is a substantive limitation 
placed on our intellectual intuitions: we should only claim universal validity for 
those moral norms which we can assume would be accepted by everyone as valid 
in an ideal situation of symmetric reciprocity (7, her emphasis).30 
 
Heller is questioning the role of consensus used in Habermas’s model. In brief, Heller 
argues that Habermas fails to achieve universal validity on any moral norm. Heller (1985) 
concludes that if moral norms require that everyone affected by the outcome accepts 
them and their consequences, then “no norm could ever be universalized” (8). This 
criticism calls Habermas’s Principle (U) into question. That is, Habermas emphasizes 
consensus as the basis for moral justification, but as Heller argues, Habermas never 																																																								
30 Others have made a similar critique, see Wellmer (1991, 154-5) and Höffe (1990). 
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actually establishes a universal norm since genuine universal consensus cannot be 
achieved. To that extent, Habermas’s model of discourse is utopian. 
 In order to address the Utopianism Objection, discourse ethicists must offer an 
account of discourse that does not rely so heavily on consensus. Benhabib (1992), for 
instance, argues that consensus cannot be a criterion of anything—truth or moral 
validity—rather it is “always the rationality of the procedure for attaining agreement 
which is of philosophical interest” (37). Unlike Habermas, who demands through 
Principle (U) that we reach a consensus on not only the norm itself but also its 
consequences, Benhabib argues that we need to place greater emphasis on the procedure. 
Shifting the focus from consensus as an end-goal to the procedure may be 
unsettling for some, like Nussbaum. Emphasis now is no longer placed on “rational 
agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships 
within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue” (Benhabib 
1992, 38, her emphasis). This is not to reject the moral and political importance of 
achieving consensus. Instead, it redirects our attention such that the procedure is no 
longer fixated solely on achieving consensus, but rather on maintaining an on-going 
process of practical discourse that hopes to achieve some mutual understanding between 
discursive participants. 
One should not mistake Benhabib’s position as advocating for an endless dialogue 
in order to cultivate democratic abilities. There is a great deal of latitude between seeking 
mere consensus and discussing for discussion’s sake. Benhabib advocates for neither of 
these positions. Instead, she calls for a reorientation of discourse whereby the participants 
are not fixated on achieving mere consensus, otherwise there is a fear that discussion will 
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end simply because that goal could not be achieved. Furthermore, because Benhabib 
recognizes the importance of developing discursive skills, they become a by-product of 
the discussion and not an end in itself. 
I agree with Heller’s criticism of Habermas’s emphasis on consensus, and yet I 
am not fully convinced that Benhabib’s position toward consensus allows her to escape 
the Utopianism Objection. Despite moving in the right direction by not demanding 
consensus, Benhabib provides no indication that she constructs a version of discourse that 
adequately addresses power inequities between dialoguers. It is likely, then, that her 
principles will be interpreted through dominant perspectives. Her view yields a different 
kind of utopian problem, namely, one that is an overly idealistic account of discourse that 
fails to adequately address power inequalities. 
 To avoid the charge of being utopian, we need a version of discourse ethics that 
not only abandons unrealistic expectations of universal consensus, but also provides 
substantive constraints to mitigate dominant perspectives from determining the outcome 
before the discussion. If there are no feedback loops and checks against those in positions 
of power, then those in marginalized groups will have no real voice. Benhabib’s account 
of discourse, then, is incomplete since it is not clear that non-dominant perspectives are 
unable to shape the outcome of the debate. 
 
2.3 Hegemonic Challenge 
 
 A third criticism of traditional versions of discourse ethics can be found in Iris 
Marion Young’s challenge that activists would pose not only to Habermas’s but also to 
Benhabib’s version of discourse ethics. The central theme around these criticisms is that 
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the proposed deliberative procedures are exclusionary since the institutions that make 
policy decisions often preclude non-dominant voices from the decision-making process. 
Young cites the World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in the streets of Seattle in 
December 1999 as an example of people frustrated with being excluded from the greater 
democratic process. If one wants to save discourse ethics from the charge of exclusion, 
the institutions setting the agenda must be transparent with their discussions and be held 
accountable for their decisions. 
 However, the criticism of exclusivity cannot be about participation per se since 
discourse ethicists have the resources to address this concern. Habermas, for instance, 
argues that no consensus is genuine unless all those affected by the decision have an 
opportunity to shape the outcome, which includes questioning who should be allowed to 
participate, criticizing results, and raising new topics worthy of discussion. If everyone 
affected by the outcome is given a real opportunity to be a discursive participant, then 
one might wonder the extent to which Young’s activist criticism is valid. Or, at least, that 
Habermas and Benhabib would agree with the claim that actual political institutions fail 
to satisfy the discursive rules, and thus both have resources to criticize these institutions 
for failing to yield warranted outcomes. 
However, Young’s criticism runs deeper. I call this criticism the Hegemonic 
Discourse Objection, to remain consistent with Young’s language. The Hegemonic 
Discourse Objection states that even if true formal inclusion is achieved, a concern 
remains that the “majority of participants in such a reflective deliberative setting will be 
influenced by a common discourse that itself is a complex product of structural 
inequality” (Young 2001, 685). By “common discourse,” Young is referring to cultural 
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stories, stereotypes, and generalizations about those who live in a given society. And, if 
that society is layered with structural inequalities, then these discourses become 
hegemonic; that is, people “think about their social relations in these terms, whatever 
their location in the structural inequalities” (Young 2001, 685). If marginalized peoples 
accept hegemonic narratives, then regardless of how many people from marginalized 
groups are allowed to participate, a deeper problem still exists for those people who think 
about themselves in a way that is less than those in positions of power. 
Let’s consider an example from Young on hegemonic discourse that yields false 
consensus. She asks us to consider the discussion around poverty, which currently has 
received widespread agreement that it is the “failure of individuals to develop various 
skills and capacities necessary for inclusion in modern labor markets” (Young 2001, 
686). This is especially troubling for Young since, regardless of whether the burden is on 
individuals or institutions for poverty, there is “no other way to think about poverty 
policy than as a labor market policy” (Young 2001, 687). So, everyone is permitted to 
participate in anti-poverty discussions, however, activists who want to challenge the 
hegemonic discourse that anti-poverty legislation must fit into wage employment will 
dismissed immediately for being “irrational”. 
In a commentary on Benhabib’s version of discourse ethics, Young discusses the 
implications of discursive participants deviating from dominant norms. She explains that 
hegemonic discourses assume a certain set of ruling norms, and if a person does not 
conform to them she is subject to harsh consequences, including marginalization or 
forced assimilation—that is, the inability to speak in a way such that she can be heard by 
others and taken seriously. Ruling norms for instance, according to Young,  demand 
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“good workers are available to be on the job by 8:00 a.m. and can stay at work until 5:00 
or 6:00…and they assume that political participants can be confident that when they 
speak their issues and idioms will be understood, if not always receive agreement” (1999, 
416). Of course, this is deeply troubling considering it is more difficult for certain people 
to meet these demands than others. Because mothers have a greater burden of childcare 
responsibilities, they will likely have greater difficulties meeting ruling norms of the 
workplace than men, and more relevant people from marginalized groups may have their 
confidence undermined and so not present themselves persuasively. 
Young’s quote above also reveals a further difficulty with ruling norms, namely, 
their lack of inclusivity. If a person deviates from a ruling norm, for instance in the way 
she dresses, speaks, or even expresses her spirituality, she will often be “disadvantaged in 
the competition for offices and positions, distributive benefits, or public attention and 
respect” (Young 1999, 416). So, even if all affected by a decision have an equal 
opportunity to formally participate, their position may not be deemed as credible because 
their way of life strays from the dominant norm. Stereotypes about certain social groups 
that emerge from larger structural inequalities have a direct impact on discourses like the 
ones Habermas and Benhabib advocate. For instance, manner of dress, lifestyle, and 
speech implicate people in credibility judgments and so impact their substantive inclusion 
in dialogue even if they are granted formal inclusion. Specifically, stereotypes often view 
women as overly-emotional and thus likely to overreact to a situation, and racist 
stereotypes work to the disadvantage of people of color insofar as they must “prove” they 
meet intellectual standards to be heard. So we can imagine a person of color who dresses 
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in a particular way, and despite the fact that he has been given the opportunity to 
participate in the dialogue, is not taken seriously by virtue of his appearance. 
To address the above concerns, discourse ethics cannot simply call for everyone 
to have an equal opportunity to speak. Habermas is subject to this criticism because he 
emphasizes only the purely formal rules of discourse, such as ensuring free and equal 
participation. Benhabib also falls prey to this charge because, despite her commitment to 
concrete agents, she does not understand our concreteness in terms of social and 
structural power relations, nor does she consider the impact power relations have on 
discourse. 
Discursive participants must be given a genuine opportunity to not only shape the 
outcome of the discussion, but also the norms that manage society and govern the rules of 
discourse. If the dominant ideology sets the rules of discourse just as they have for 
society, then of course we can expect that the same disadvantages in society will plague 
marginalized group members in the discursive arena. This criticism really points to the 
problems of Habermas’s and Benhabib’s version of discourse—that is, they generate 
discursive rules (based on respect and equality) that are biased toward those with the 
most epistemic power, and so substantively generate norms in favor of those in positions 
of power. This is not done intentionally, but rather due to the fact that their discursive 
methods do not account for how to correct for the impact of social inequality on 
discursive inequality. 
The Hegemonic Objection is also intimately connected to the following 
Invidiously Idealized objection,  insofar as the point of the former highlights that real 
world discourse is structured by social inequality as the norm and not as an exception. To 
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ignore this reality would be a way of creating an invidiously idealized speech situation by 
failing to generate discursive conditions that achieve substantive inclusion. 
 
2.4 Invidiously Idealized Objection 
 
 A final criticism of discourse ethics is based on Alison Jaggar and Theresa 
Tobin’s recent work on moral methodology. They argue that discourse ethics, as 
espoused by Habermas, is idealized. Onora O’Neill says a theory or assumption is 
idealized when it 
ascribes predicates…that are false of the case in hand, and so denies predicates 
that are true of that case. For example, if human beings are assumed to have 
capacities and capabilities for rational choice or self-sufficiency or independence 
from others that are evidently not achieved by many or even by any actual human 
beings, the result is not mere abstraction; it is idealization (quoted in Jaggar and 
Tobin, 402-3). 
 
Abstraction, according to O’Neill is a “matter of bracketing, but not of denying, 
predicates” (O’Neill 1996, 40, her emphasis). In other words, abstraction is a necessary 
part of theory construction whereas invidious idealization is more prone to running awry 
because it does not merely bracket features of human beings, but assumes a falsely 
idealized version of persons.31 
Idealizations are not harmful categorically, especially for philosophers who are 
discussing essential features of a society in order for it to be considered just. However, 
not all idealizations are helpful, and, in fact, some may be quite dangerous. Jaggar and 
Tobin argue that classic discourse ethicists advocate an invidiously idealized strategy for 
moral justification. That is, because discourse ethics postulates egalitarian and 
																																																								
31 For a discussion of the ethical implications between “abstraction” and “idealization,” see O’Neill (1987).  
		
139	
domination-free dialogue, it effectively brackets real-world diversity and inequality. This 
is problematic for three reasons.  
First, they note that discourse ethics “rules out the epistemic hierarchies of some 
communities, such as elder wisdom and moral hierarchy of some religions” (Jaggar and 
Tobin 2013, 396). The trouble for discourse ethics is not simply in societies where its 
members accept the hierarchy, but also in societies that claim their citizens are all equal. 
Since discourse ethics assumes formal equality(that is, assume that all participants have 
an equal opportunity to criticize arguments and conclusions and raise new topics of 
discussion), it is not clear how it is applicable in situations of social inequality. I find this 
criticism to be especially concerning since, despite the fact that many communities 
espouse values of fairness and equality, upon further investigation we are able to identify 
groups who experience marginalization and oppression. 
Maria Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman explain the trouble surrounding a nation’s 
claim to formal equality from a Chicana perspective writing to white/Anglo women. 
They explain, “We and you do not talk the same language. When we talk to you we use 
your language…But since your language and your theories are inadequate in expressing 
our experiences, we only succeed in communicating our experience of exclusion” 
(Lugones and Spelman 1983, 478). Language, as stated by Jaggar and Tobin, is a “public 
construct,” and yet it should not be forgotten that its absence is also publically generated. 
For example, if an individual does not have the language to articulate her concerns to 
members of her discursive community, then she will be unable to participate fully in the 
dialogue. 
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Second, Habermas, Benhabib, and other discourse ethicists acknowledge the 
pervasiveness of domination in discourse, but inequalities for them present a unique 
challenge. The outcomes generated by the discourse are valid only if the participants are 
able to speak freely and equally. If certain groups of participants are not given the 
genuine opportunity to be full dialogue members, then the outcomes produced are 
invalid. However, power abuses in discourse are ubiquitous, and so we need rules of 
discourse that can detect and correct for these, rather than rules that simply assert that 
discourse should be equal. Discourse ethicists then should seek discursive constraints to 
help achieve outcomes that give all participants a genuine, substantive opportunity to 
shape the outcome. 
A final problem for discourse ethics, according to Jaggar and Tobin, is that it fails 
to recognize that hearing others is not an all-or-nothing affair, that is, either we listen well 
or fail in our attempt. Instead, they are argue correctly that many times we listen with 
some success, yet fail to fully grasp what the speaker is saying. Because discourse ethics 
first demands its participants express their arguments, and then others choose to accept, 
reject, or question them, it assumes that participants are simply able to take on the 
viewpoints of others. This reveals a deep problem with discourse ethics, namely, that 
there is no discussion around how a speaker should be heard. This concern is exacerbated 
in relationships of inequalities where reversibility between the speaker and hearer is very 
troubling. As Iris Marion Young explains: “If you think you already know how the other 
people feel and judge because you have imaginatively represented their perspective to 
yourself, then you may not listen to their expression of their perspective very openly” 
(1997, 48-9). Thus it is all the more important for dialoguers to listen carefully and 
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attempt to understand what others are saying without projecting their own preconceived 
understandings on them. 
In brief, Jaggar and Tobin suggest three criticisms of discourse ethics under the 
general concern of being invidiously idealized. First, classic discourse ethics with its 
strict requirement for epistemic equality dismisses the importance of epistemic 
hierarchies, which are integral parts of communities who draw, for instance, on elder 
wisdom and the importance of epistemic deference to members of epistemically 
marginalized groups. Second, domination and inequalities are ubiquitous in dialogue, and 
should not in themselves dismiss all discursive outcomes. We need discursive constraints 
that help us identify these and determine when they are influencing an outcome 
inappropriately. Finally, Jaggar and Tobin explain that listeners often do not just accept 
or reject another’s argument, but understand parts of it and fail to realize others. This 
final point is significant because it recognizes that we often cannot simply take on the 
viewpoints of others, a situation which is heightened between interlocutors from different 
social strata, let alone diverse cultural backgrounds. Given the version of discourse ethics 
they address (viz., Habermas and Benhabib), I am in full agreement with their criticisms. 
I believe any theory of discourse ethics must be able to address Jaggar and Tobin’s 
challenges, along with the others presented here. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Chapter 3 considers discourse ethics as a possible alternative method for 
justifying the capabilities given the problems identified in the previous chapter with the 
methods Nussbaum employs. I began with a brief historical overview that traced 
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discourse ethics from its originators, Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel, to its 
contemporary advocate, Seyla Benhabib. I attempted to show the ways in which 
Benhabib and Habermas parallel and contrast one another. I then offer the following five 
criticisms of discourse ethics in Section 2: the dialogue cannot (1) produce a trustworthy 
outcome simply on the basis of the procedure used to produce it, (2) offer substantive 
guidance, (3) address structural biases and stereotypes, (4) offer substantive guidance, 
and (5) adequately accommodate diversity and inequality. I am sympathetic to each of 
these criticisms as they apply to traditional versions of discourse ethics. However, I am 
not convinced they apply to all versions of discourse. 
The feminist critics of Nussbaum and the critics of traditional versions of 
discourse ethics converge on many of the same problems, including arbitrarily selecting 
others to generate norms, importing values that either do not provide substantive 
guidance or merely reflect those in social positions of power, and neglecting power 
dynamics and social inequalities that influence the discussion. This has led me to 
propose, as I will articulate the Chapter 4, the following set of four desiderata that a 
method for justifying capabilities should satisfy: (1) being cognizant of power dynamics, 
(2) remaining self-critical, (3) having a mechanism to revise one’s list or theory, and (4) 
setting modest goals. These four desiderata are not meant to be exhaustive, but will shape 
my version of discourse ethics, and are used to evaluate the method of justification for a 
list of capabilities. I also believe that discourse ethics can be revised to better satisfy these 
desiderata than the method Nussbaum employs. In Chapter 5, I present Feminist 
Discourse Ethics as a more promising version of discourse. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGICAL CRITERIA FOR A METHOD OF 
JUSTIFICATION 
 
 
 I am sympathetic to the central tenets of discourse ethics as espoused in the 
previous chapter; that is, as a procedure to justify (provide rational warrant for) a course 
of action to be followed by all those affected by the outcome. I also endorse the criticisms 
of discourse ethics in the previous chapter, and I believe that traditional prevailing 
versions of discourse ethics do not avoid many of the same criticisms I launched against 
Nussbaum’s primary justificatory methods of reflective equilibrium and overlapping 
consensus. For instance, I argue that both Nussbaum’s methods of justification and 
traditional versions of discourse ethics lack a mechanism to safeguard or mitigate 
concerns about the epistemic impact of asymmetrical power relations between 
interlocutors and neither adequately accommodates diversity. 
The methodological criteria in this chapter are generated out of my criticisms of 
both Nussbaum and discourse ethics. I suggest the following methodological desiderata 
for evaluating a method of justification that can support the cross-cultural validity of a 
list: (1) How well does the method of justification direct people to be cognizant of power 
dynamics? A good method of moral justification should reveal, rather than conceal, 
potential abuses of power and not rationalize them. (2) Does the method have a 
mechanism to facilitate genuine revisions of one’s list or theory? A good method of 
moral justification should encourage responsiveness to worthy reasons in an ongoing way 
that encourages revisions when demanded. (3) Does the method encourage people to 
remain self-critical, and, when warranted, to have an appropriate sense of epistemic 
humility about their own perspectives and reasons? A good method of moral justification 
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should have some way of helping people check their own epistemic and moral biases. 
And (4) does the method aspire to reasonable, modest justificatory goals? This fourth 
desiderata encompasses the scope of justification and whether a method purports to 
justify moral claims for all times, in all places, or for a justification that is more 
historically and socially situated. These four criteria are inspired by feminist criticisms of 
Nussbaum in chapter 2 and the shortcomings of discourse ethics from the previous 
chapter. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but a good, minimal starting point for 
further discussion about the kinds of justificatory methods best able to achieve moral 
warrant under the conditions of diversity and social inequality that are the rule and not 
the exception in real-world situations of moral discourse. In fact, if the above desiderata 
are truly praiseworthy, then realizing them will require doing so under continuous 
scrutiny since their interpretations are never fixed, but always subject to revision. 
 
1. Moral Justification 
 
 Moral justification provides rational warrant for a view or set of norms to a 
particular audience. The process of moral justification requires individuals to defend or 
supply reasons for their views, either through traditional premise-conclusion argument or 
other non-traditional forms of argumentation such as story-telling, narrative, and 
rhetoric.32 The goal is to show that the reasons in support of the claims being advanced 
are good reasons, and that they have the potential to be acceptable to, and should be 
accepted by, those who the view or norms under question effect (or who are being asked 
to accept the view or norm). A difficult task with justifying moral claims in a globally 
diverse world is actually providing compelling reasons that people who seem to share 																																																								
32 For further discussion on non-traditional forms of argument, see Jaggar (1989) and Young (2000). 
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very little religious and cultural commitments, and who inhabit radically unequal social 
strata, can accept. 
Martha Nussbaum claims that her list of central capabilities is global in this sense. 
She uses the methods of reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus to argue that 
her reasons in support of the list are good reasons and are (or can be) compelling to 
diverse and unequally situated people. Her list is of particular importance since she 
attempts to justify it as a set of norms that are applicable to everyone, and in that sense, 
are said to be universal. She recognizes that people accept many different comprehensive 
conceptions of the good, and that people stand in relations of unequal social power. To 
address the concerns of different starting points and unequal social relations, Nussbaum 
justifies her list of capabilities through overlapping consensus and wide reflective 
equilibrium.  
However, as I discussed in Chapter 2, I agree with feminist critics that Nussbaum 
fails to establish a truly universal validity of her list because she (1) imports her own 
values into her theory without having a procedure in place that either prevents this from 
occurring or enables her to recognize when it happens, (2) arbitrarily selects the intuitions 
and perspectives of others to “confirm” aspects of her theory, and (3) neglects significant 
epistemic consequences of the power dynamics that influence her interactions with 
others. In chapter 3, I have shown that traditional versions of discourse ethics, which 
ostensibly may improve on these problems, are in fact vulnerable to these same 
criticisms. 
 I argue that Nussbaum and traditional versions of discourse ethics go awry 
because they do not properly address the concern of interlocutors being situated in 
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unequal power relations, does not have a mechanism to continuously revise one’s views, 
does not have sufficient guidance for being self-critical and epistemically humble, and 
they do not set modest enough justificatory goals; instead, expecting a theory to be all-
encompassing or applicable to all people. I would like to highlight two significant points 
to keep in mind with these four desiderata. First, the above desiderata are subject to 
interpretation. This is a significant point because despite the fact that Nussbaum claims to 
address many of these desiderata, her understanding of them is inadequate, and we need 
alternative interpretations and more substantive ways of satisfying them. Furthermore, it 
could be the case that one or more of the above desiderata are not worth preserving, and 
perhaps others should be added. Second, in what follows I will elaborate on each of these 
desiderata, showing their inter-relatedness, for instance, revisability cannot be fully 
satisfied without proper attention to power dynamics. 
 
2. Power Dynamics 
  
This section will not discuss power per se, but a particular kind of power, namely 
power relations based on social identity. This kind of power relation has an epistemic 
impact on the process of moral justification—for instance, who is given authority to 
provide reasons, whose intuitions and reasons we see as credible, and who determines 
which intuitions or reasons are worthy and which ones we perceive as underdeveloped or 
corrupt. The concern surrounding power relations is especially important for our 
discussion since, as I have discussed at length, Nussbaum’s social identity as a white, 
upper-class member of the privileged academic elite from a global superpower gives her 
a significant amount of power over most other potential interlocutors. She takes herself to 
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have properly formed intuitions and to be self-developed, thus when seeking out other 
peoples’ perspectives she retains exclusive authority to identify which intuitions are 
worth preserving and to jettison those she believes are underdeveloped. Likewise, in 
regards to traditional versions of discourse ethics, some discursive participants have the 
ability to dictate a discussion simply given their power in regard to social standing. 
“Social power relations” refers to power distributed on the basis of gender, race, 
class, sexuality, geo-political positioning, and other social categories, as well as their 
respective intersections.33 Consider the following race-based example from Peggy 
McIntosh’s famous article, “White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Backpack”. 
McIntosh explains that while much of the feminist literature to date (1988) had focused 
on male privilege, she noticed a serious gap with white privilege. She compares white 
privilege to an “invisible weightless backpack of special provisions, maps, passports, 
codebooks, visas, clothes, tools and blank checks”. In other words, those in positions of 
privilege and power are often unaware of the fact that they are afforded many advantages, 
and in that sense, the privileges are “invisible”. McIntosh offers a list of examples to 
highlight this phenomenon. For instance, a white person can go shopping without fear of 
being followed or harassed, be assured that her skin color will not work against her when 
she applies for credit, and that she can accept a job offer at an affirmative action 
employer without fear of having her co-workers suspect that that she got the job simply 
on the basis of her race. The point of these examples is that white folks do not have to 
think about these issues as they move about their daily lives. 
																																																								
33 See Crenshaw (1991), Townsend-Bell (2011), and Collins (1986) for further discussion on the 
intersectionality (specifically of gender and race) between domination and oppression. 
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 The above examples illustrates that, for white people, power and privilege can be 
manifested invisibly since whites are in positions of power and often do not recognize 
their status. Nussbaum seems vulnerable to this kind of epistemic blindness. For instance, 
she seems blind to certain aspects of the power relations that structure her interactions 
with her interlocutors, or at least fails to offer any substantively corrective measures to 
mitigate her potential abuse of power influences. She is geo-politically and academically 
more powerful than most of her audience, and as McIntosh’s examples illustrate, being in 
a position of power accounts for the ways in which she may not realize how she 
dismisses views unlike her own. Nussbaum, on the contrary, argues adamantly that she is 
aware of the diverse backgrounds of her subjects, such as the Indian women. However, as 
I have argued, she has no mechanism in place to show how she mitigates potential power 
abuses between her and the Indian women. In fact, Nussbaum’s way of proceeding in 
which she extracts quotes from them out of context to show how they support her list, 
and how she selectively decides which parts of her conversations with these women to 
share, indicates that the women she is interviewing are effectively silent interlocutors. 
Nussbaum gleans the information she wants from them, but we never really hear them. 
Consider a different example. A student may desire to raise questions over her 
low grade to her professor. Regardless of how well the student justifies her grade, she is 
likely to accept the grade in fear that if she does not, the instructor may grade even 
harsher on future assignments or negatively affect her grade in some manner. So, in 
virtue of the instructor’s position of power (not to mention other potential factors that 
may exacerbate their power dynamics), he is able to dictate the discussion in a way that 
may force the student to agree with him even if she has salient points to dispute her 
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grade. To be clear, I am not claiming that instructors should always and uncritically 
change the students’ grades simply because they ask for it. The instructor has a level of 
expertise that ought to be respected, but he is certainly not infallible. Paying attention to 
power dynamics then includes the recognition of how the instructor is able to not only 
have an immediate impact on the student’s grade, but also long term effects insofar as 
how he grades future assignments, treats her for the remainder of the term, and how his 
actions influence her participation in the class. 
Like the instructor, if a development practitioner is discussing what is most 
central to the lives of people who are geo-politically disadvantaged, then an even greater 
burden has been placed on the practitioner to mitigate the inequalities between herself 
and those she is helping in order to receive more genuine feedback. She must ask 
questions in a way that will hopefully receive honest answers, and, just as importantly, be 
open to responses that challenge her position. A theorist may then seek cross-cultural 
support for her list of capabilities, for instance, through discussions with others that do 
not share her worldview. Specifically, Nussbaum has had conversations with people from 
India, including interviews with Vasanti and Jayamma; but again, Nussbaum did not 
address (or even acknowledge) the power inequalities between herself and the Indian 
women and the potentially distorting epistemic impact these power inequalities may have 
on the “evidence” Nussbaum claims to get from these conversations. 
Alison Jaggar explains that the problem with ignoring power differentials for 
Nussbaum is that it undermines her very goal of having discussions that are “designed to 
exemplify certain values of equal dignity, non-hierarchy, and non-intimidation” (quoted 
in Jaggar 2006, 313). If Nussbaum wished to realize her own goals, then she should have 
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shown the ways in which she has attempted to mitigate power disparities, and then we (as 
readers) would be in a better position to accept the claim that her discussions with Indian 
women have supposedly “confirmed” most items on her list. 
 Social inequalities not only influence discussions between discursive participants, 
but also between theorizers. In the pursuit of reflective equilibrium, which is Nussbaum’s 
primary method of justification, a theorizer must consider other theories that challenge 
one’s own conception of justice. If a person is a dominant group member, then it is likely 
that many domains of his life have been unchallenged, and so one may not consider all 
genuine alternative theories of justice. As Elizabeth Anderson (1993) argues, wide 
reflective equilibrium often fails to “think through the implications of the social character 
of justification. […] A person may be in personal wide reflective equilibrium but know 
that his attitudes are poorly developed as a result of inexperience, defective character, 
neuroses, or other problems” (111). In other words, it is possible for an individual to 
achieve wide reflective equilibrium, but that in itself does not demonstrate that his 
intuitions are rationally warranted. For instance, he may endorse racist beliefs and 
practices, and even challenge them against critics, but do so in a way that ultimately 
preserves his harmful intuitions. 
Nussbaum attempts to mitigate Anderson’s concern by claiming that we should 
only consult the most “developed” intuitions as we strive for equilibrium. Individuals 
who have the most developed intuitions are those who have subjected them to great 
scrutiny and, in light of criticism, have refined them over time. I am not convinced this 
addresses Anderson’s critique. Instead, it raises new concerns over the exclusionary 
practices of the theorizer. If she labels certain intuitions as “corrupt” or “mistaken,” to 
		
151	
borrow Nussbaum’s terms, then these intuitions can be easily dismissed despite their 
potential value. Furthermore, even if they are corrupt intuitions, there may be value in 
interrogating them. What is needed is not an additional exclusionary measure, but rather 
mechanisms for addressing the substantive social character of justification and the impact 
of social inequality on our practices of giving, hearing, and evaluating reasons. 
I do not raise this criticism as a wholesale rejection of reflective equilibrium since 
I see value in its strategy as a method of justification. However, I raise this concern in 
order to show how power can influence an individual’s defense of a given theory, even in 
quite subtle, hard-to-detect ways. As long as a theorizer is in a position of power and not 
forced to confront all relevant intuitions or perspectives, then he is more likely to merely 
confirm his own judgments and theoretical commitments. If a theorizer is merely 
confirming what he already maintains, then his theory lacks a mechanism to change in 
light of feedback that may prove valuable. Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as 
“confirmation bias,” or the “unwitting molding of facts to fit hypotheses or beliefs” 
(Nickerson 1998, 175). If no one is in a position to challenge the theorizer, then he will 
continuously “confirm” aspects of his theory despite the fact that it may be riddled with 
problems. This demonstrates a need for theorizers to address power dynamics between 
themselves and their subjects as one way to help mitigate the concerns of confirmation 
bias. An acceptable method of justification, then, must have some way of identifying 
relevant power dynamics in a situation and some way to mitigate harmful ones. 
 
3. Revisability Principle 
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The Revisability Principle serves two purposes. First, it requires that we subject 
all elements of our view to critical scrutiny with an openness that our views may be 
revised in light of them in an ongoing way. This need not occur all at once, but that all 
aspects of a theory are open to critical evaluation. Second, we must seek critical views 
from as many diverse perspectives to have a better chance at reflecting a broader 
understanding of the issues rather than a narrow understanding. To do this effectively, we 
must pay attention to power both within the views we seek out and between ourselves 
and those advocating for these alternative perspectives. 
One way to mitigate the problems associated with inadvertently smuggling in 
one’s own values and arbitrarily selecting others that may be used merely to confirm 
one’s own beliefs is to build a mechanism within a theory that has the ability to criticize 
its own components. Jaggar sums up what I call the Revisability Principle. She writes, 
“moral reasoning operates through critical feedback between what we take to be our best 
methods and our best conclusions, continuously re-evaluating each in the light of the 
others” (Jaggar 2006, 311). In other words, all of our commitments, from the beliefs we 
hold to the strategies used to justify those beliefs, are subject to criticism.  
A further commitment to revisability requires the theorizer to seek out many 
diverse perspectives (especially those who are traditionally marginalized) to question 
“whether any and all aspects of community norms, values, and practices…presume, 
reinforce, cause, or exploit power inequalities to the detriment of the less powerful” 
(Ackerly 2000, 76). To achieve genuine revisability, according to Ackerly, a theory must 
be committed to pursuing worldviews not shared with the theorizer, while paying close 
attention to the power dynamics within those voices (and their relationship to the 
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theorizer), and then use other perspectives as critical feedback to revise one’s theory. 
This also reveals the intimate connection between revisability and power dynamics; that 
is, the former cannot be genuinely satisfied unless power is adequately addressed. A 
person cannot be in a position open to revising their views unless he is already critically 
aware of power dynamics, otherwise, the views of those in positions of power will 
continue to be reinforced.  
At this point, one may question how Jaggar’s suggestion is any different from 
reflective equilibrium. This is an important question to answer since, if there are no 
salient differences, then Nussbaum has already addressed the question of where her 
theory is revisable by subjecting it to the processes of reflective equilibrium. In fact, 
Nussbaum was correct in seeking out Vasanti, Jayamma, and other perspectives in order 
to determine whether her theory needed to be revised in light of their worldviews. She 
has always maintained that her list is “open-ended,” “humble,” and subject to revision. 
Her discussions with Indian women serve as a means to realize this goal. However, their 
stories were “primarily educational” insofar as, if Nussbaum would not have sought out 
their voices, she may have “missed important problems, or missed their [capabilities] 
connections to one another” (Nussbaum 2011b, 80). For example, she explains that the 
interconnectedness of bodily integrity and private property were only revealed through 
her discussions with Indian women. To answer the above question, Jaggar’s points are 
not very different from Nussbaum’s commitment to reflective equilibrium, but Nussbaum 
doesn’t use diverse perspectives as part of reflective equilibrium. Diverse perspectives for 
Nussbaum are simply for her own understanding, to bolster and enhance her own view 
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and even fill any potential gaps in her theory, not as a potential source of criticism. 
Meanwhile, Jaggar asks us to seek out diverse perspectives for the purpose of criticism. 
Nussbaum allows for revisions that develop her proposed list, but not for 
revisions that may undermine it or offer serious challenges to the capabilities on her list 
or to her interpretations of them. In other words, the criticisms of her list cannot be 
substantive enough that their meanings become altered. For instance, bodily integrity 
entails “having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of 
reproduction” (Nussbaum 2006, 76).  Nussbaum interprets this capability as an absolute 
prohibition on female genital cutting, which she says is “ruinous to reproductive health” 
(Nussbaum 2005, 172). However, as I argued in Chapter 2, Theresa Tobin has shown that 
there are many kinds of female genital cutting and that they are performed for a wide 
array of reasons. I question, then, Nussbaum’s ban on all forms of female genital cutting 
(or as she says, “mutilation”) as running contrary to the capability of bodily integrity. 
This example demonstrates Nussbaum’s unwillingness to truly entertain challenges to her 
list. 
There are two reasons to doubt whether Nussbaum has fulfilled the 
methodological demands of the Revisability Principle. First, while some capabilities may 
have been highlighted or called to Nussbaum’s attention through discussions, there is no 
evidence that new capabilities were adopted or existing ones jettisoned. This is not to say 
that she ought to adopt all possible candidates for her list, but it does require that she at 
least demonstrate the superiority of her list over the many challenges that have been 
presented to her. In Chapter 3, I discussed challenges to Nussbaum’s list. For example, 
Ingrid Robeyns (2003) argues in favor of the capability “time-autonomy: being able to 
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exercise autonomy in allocating one’s time” of which she argues is missing explicitly 
from Nussbaum’s list (72). Robeyns argues that missing a capability like time-autonomy 
leads Nussbaum’s list to be “gender biased” because it “does not include care and 
household work, or time-autonomy” (73). 
Nussbaum has also failed to fulfill the Revisability Principle because, as Jaggar 
(2006) observes, Nussbaum “rarely offers examples of disagreement, nor does she 
explain her criteria for including or excluding contested items” (314). Nussbaum’s list 
has remained exactly the same since 2000, and the changes that were made between her 
earlier and later versions were minimal at best; thus, either she understands her list to be 
perfect as such, or she has not considered alternative lists. If the former, then she needs to 
demonstrate why specific capabilities are not included in her list that others have 
proposed (e.g., time-autonomy), or why she includes certain capabilities despite being 
challenged repeatedly to consider or revise them (e.g., assimilating “education” with 
“literacy”). The latter reveals the necessity of the Revisability Principle.34 
There seem to be at least two advantages of having a method of justification that 
is genuinely committed to the Revisability Principle. First, it helps individuals keep an 
open mind towards diverse perspectives and ultimately mitigate confirmation bias. As 
noted above, Robeyns, among others, has presented serious and well-known criticisms to 
Nussbaum’s list. Despite their challenges, Nussbaum has remained steadfastly committed 
to her list as it was originally proposed and defended. This over-commitment to her list 
reveals her unwillingness to revise it. Second, the Revisability Principle shows how a 
																																																								
34 Ingrid Robeyns is explicit that she differs from Nussbaum in a few ways, specifically in regards to the 
content of her list. For instance, Robeyns adds the capability of “time-autonomy,” which means her account 
of “gender inequality includes inequalities in time allocation, leisure time, time-related stress, and so forth” 
(2003, 75). 
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proposal has incorporated good criticism from diverse perspectives. If a list of 
capabilities, for example, addresses potential criticism, it shows that a theorizer is at least 
open to alternative possibilities. The next step would include revising the list in light of 
warranted challenges, but in order to take that next step, it seems important that one has 
the proper epistemic posture; namely, the ability to be self-critical. 
 
4. Self-Critical 
  
The previous methodological desideratum has demonstrated the importance of 
subjecting one’s position to critical scrutiny from outside perspectives with an 
expectation that such scrutiny will likely result in revisions to one’s ideas. However, just 
as a theory can be criticized from other perspectives, a mechanism ought to be in place 
for the theorizer to question her own method of justification and theoretical 
commitments. I offer the desideratum of being self-critical in addition to the already 
established Revisability Principle, since one could in principle generate a theory that is 
revisable from someone other than oneself but lack the self-awareness and ability to call 
one’s own method into question. In such cases, others would criticize a theorizer’s beliefs 
and practices but this is a separate process from the theorizer being able to criticize her 
own commitments. 
 Brooke Ackerly draws on the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), an 
organization for exploited self-employed Indian women workers, to illustrate what it 
means to be truly self-critical. SEWA, founded by Ela Bhatt, is a unionization that offers 
greater protection for individually contracted women who are otherwise taken to be 
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expendable.35 The women were receiving minimal wages, employed under frightening 
working conditions, and had little to no health coverage before SEWA. The organization 
also helps many women secure microcredit loans to help start a business, among other 
things.36 SEWA engages in the practice of self-criticism at two levels: organizationally 
and individually. On the one hand, it is committed to being self-critical of all its policies, 
including its most basic rules of who is permitted to join the organization. For example, 
when SEWA was originally developed, men were prohibited from joining, but after 
scrutinizing their own rules SEWA later allowed men to become members. This decision 
was reached because the addition of male members added the educative benefit of 
continuing to learn about government agencies and donor agencies, and bringing an 
outsiders’ perspective to examine SEWA’s own practices, but the organization did not 
grant men voting privileges. This example highlights the importance of self-criticism on 
an organizational level. 
Now, let us examine the importance of self-criticism from an individual 
perspective. Maria Lugones’s essay on playfulness and world-traveling provides an 
account of how to perform the task of self-criticism individually. She is interested in the 
problem of how to achieve understanding among people who stand in relations to each 
other of both diversity and power inequalities, and proposes the idea of playful world-
traveling as a self-critical mechanism for striving toward a level of understanding 
between individuals who inhabit different worlds. First, Lugones (1987) says a “world” 
can be “an actual society…or a society given an idiosyncratic construction” (10, her 
emphasis). Second, playfulness entails a “loving attitude in traveling across ‘worlds’” 																																																								
35 For further discussion on SEWA, See Bhatt (2006). 
36 Not everyone is as enthusiastic over microcredit loans as Nussbaum, for instance, see Kabeer (1999) and 
Poster and Salime (2002). 
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(Lugones 1987, 15). So playful world-traveling allows a way of epistemically inhabiting 
different social strata with an open mind because one has the proper epistemic and moral 
attitude. A loving attitude is one that centers the other, rather than the self, and is the 
opposite of an arrogant perception that forces the other’s views and preferences to 
conform to one’s own thoughts about them. Playfulness suggests a kind of not-too-
serious willingness to try things out, mess up, and bounce back, as well as an openness to 
creative exchange and emergences. 
Lugones emphasizes the need for us to be open to surprise and self-construction. 
Here, one embraces alternative understandings of oneself and the worlds one inhabits. 
For example, a person may occupy a world of being wealthy and another poor. Despite 
their different backgrounds, Lugones asks us to adopt a playful, loving attitude toward 
diverse others and the worlds they inhabit in order to attempt to understand those worlds. 
A wealthy person then may travel to a poor person’s world and understand challenges 
they wouldn’t otherwise consider, such as whether to visit the doctor (despite being ill) or 
eating healthy (even though it is better for oneself) because both run the risk of being 
very expensive. This attitude encourages us to understand those who are unlike ourselves, 
and do so in a way that is fun and loving. The poor and wealthy individuals must learn to 
navigate these spaces by not simply taking on the norms of a given world, but also by 
being open to the challenges and surprises that will arise within and between worlds. 
Lugones explains that we should not be worried about “competence, not being self-
important, not taking norms as sacred and finding ambiguity and double edges a source 
of wisdom and delight” (1987, 17). In other words, holding steadfast to our beliefs is 
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wrong-headed because they may change as quickly as the social strata we inhabit. Norms 
that may have appeared to be essential to one’s personhood may prove to be dubious. 
The above example shows the ways in which playful world-traveling supports 
critical thinking about one’s own views and reasons. It challenges our own perspectives 
by asking us to consider the way in which someone who inhabits a different world may 
view the same situation. Likewise, this attitude also encourages us to think critically 
about our reasons for why we believe what we do. The wealthy person may reevaluate 
the healthcare system, for example, by seeing the difficult decisions a poor person has to 
make before receiving medical attention.  
Lugones notes an added bonus of being self-critical, namely, that it helps one 
better navigate through their myriad of worlds. If an individual is open to criticizing her 
theoretical commitments as well as the methods that justify those beliefs, then it seems 
fair to claim that others will be more likely to aid in her journey to uncover and defend 
her theory. Otherwise, she runs the risk of engaging in theory-construction merely by 
oneself, which then subjects her to the same criticisms revealed in the previous section. A 
further advantage of being self-critical is that discursive participants, for instance, would 
now be more likely to work in conjunction with others because they recognize the 
limitations of putting forth and defending a theory on their own. 
Uma Narayan, a post-colonial feminist, poses a serious challenge to the incautious 
world-traveler, or as she calls it, to “border-crossing”. Narayan convincingly argues that 
agency under oppressive systems is complex, and she cautions against labeling an 
individual as a victim merely because she appears to prefer forms of treatment many in 
the West would consider harmful (Kleist 2013, 687). Consider Narayn’s example of the 
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Western fascination of sati, or widow-immolation, which she notes has been assimilated 
with traditional Indian culture. Narayan explains that the assimilation of sati and Indian 
women is a result of a “metonymic blurring of…‘burnt Indian women’ variously going 
up in flames as a result of ‘their Culture’” (Narayan 1997, 101). Because sati is seen as a 
practice of something that happens “over there,” according to Westerners, it is a very 
misunderstood concept. So, while many Westerners have been very critical of sati, this 
practice has only been understood through a “filter” of media sensationalism, which has 
wrongfully led to the assimilation of sati and dowry-murders and allowed Westerners to 
ignore their own problems of domestic violence murders (Narayan 1997, chapter 3). 
The above example illustrates the importance for a need to be self-critical, 
especially for those who are in positions of power and privilege because, as McIntosh’s 
examples illustrate, they are often blind to the way in which their power is manifested. 
This, in turn, may help them be open to alternative meanings. Narayn’s example 
illustrates that we should not engage in border-crossing, but Lugones’s playful world-
traveling offers an alternative way to understand the example of sati. Border-crossing in 
an arrogant way would be when, for example, Westerners project their world onto those 
of non-Westerners and encourage them to not be “duped” by their culture. In contrast, 
playful world-traveling helps us gain a more accurate understanding of the issues women 
in diverse cultural positions face because it asks us to be open to a way of life different 
from that of our own. Just as the wealthy person gains insights via playful world-
traveling into basic needs such as healthcare, those unfamiliar with the concept of sati 
would gain more critical awareness of it by situating it in a greater cultural and historical 
context, unimpeded by Western media biases. Thus, at the very least, even if a Westerner 
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cannot fully understand sati (which is fine given that playful world-traveling wouldn’t 
demand one do so), he is able to better identify and understand his own limitations and 
biases. 
Nussbaum would benefit greatly from the methodological desideratum of being 
self-critical since she would be forced, from the outset, to question the content of her list. 
I say “forced” because if this criterion is built into the theory, it requires the theorizer to 
confront possible biases in favor of one’s own values and beliefs. For example, 
Nussbaum could reconsider her interpretation of education, which requires being literate. 
Even if she rejects those who believe education is not a value for their community (at 
least in the way espoused by Nussbaum), she would be open to the possibility of 
alternative meanings. In other words, a commitment to self-criticism as an integral part of 
a method of justification will be more likely to have a kind of healthy skepticism towards 
toward one’s own views that mitigates the kind of dogmatism Nussbaum’s approach 
suffers. 
Lacking this methodological desideratum, then, is part of the reason why we 
should call the ways in which Nussbaum uses the justificatory methods of reflective 
equilibrium and overlapping consensus into question. In regards to reflective equilibrium, 
she determines not only whether her intuitions about human dignity, but also the 
intuitions of those who do not share her worldview of human dignity, are in harmony 
with principles of justice. This is problematic because she ultimately dismisses the 
intuitions of those who disagree with her as “corrupt” or “underdeveloped”. Because she 
lacks the ability to be genuinely self-critical, there is no real opportunity to revise her 
commitments. Thus her list, which she seeks as an object of overlapping consensus, also 
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lacks the opportunity to be wholly inclusive because it never truly represents a universal 
list, but that of Nussbaum (or those like her) alone. This also helps explain the 
interconnectedness of self-criticism and revisability; that is, genuine revisability seems to 
require some level of self-criticism. 
Ackerly is correct when she claims that it is especially important to be self-critical 
when putting forth universal values, as in the case of Nussbaum’s list of central 
capabilities. Ackerly writes, “although western women have been increasingly genuine in 
their use of violence against women as a universal value,” it must be “supplemented by a 
call to self-evaluation” (148). One may be well-intentioned in an effort to eradicate 
violence against women, however, the way in which one interprets what it means to be 
subject to “violence” will be manifested differently in different contexts.  
The hope of these first three methodological criteria is that they work in concert 
with one another. For instance, they all require epistemic humility: the ability to 
recognize our limitations as individual knowers. This, in turn, will hopefully lead us to be 
more self-critical and open to criticism from other perspectives. A theorizer can receive 
feedback on her belief system, but if she is unwilling to genuinely revise her position in 
light these criticisms, then the Revisable Principle is for naught. Of course, I am not 
claiming that we ought to change our beliefs at the moment of scrutiny; I am insisting, 
however, that without being open to revision our beliefs become dogmatic. Taking other 
people’s criticisms seriously demonstrates respect for them as interlocutors, something 
Nussbaum claims that we must do. In other words, as a theorizer receives feedback from 
others, while scrutinizing his own beliefs because he recognizes his fallibility, he must 
also be cognizant of the power dynamics between himself and those who are contributing 
		
163	
to his theory—both critics and supporters. Since in practice, satisfying these 
methodological desiderata can go awry, I believe it is important for theorizers to set 
modest goals; not to mention that seeking a single, global ethic as characterized by 
Nussbaum is in its own right an arrogant search. 
 
5. Modest Goals 
  
The three desiderata of adequacy discussed in this chapter have shown the ease 
with which a theorizer can be mistaken—whether identifying the best method of 
justification or attempting to apply that method. For example, we often misinterpret 
literature, fail to recognize key elements in various theories, dismiss others who should 
be consulted, downplay or ignore the magnitude of social inequalities, and privilege our 
own perspective. The hope is to mitigate these attitudes and behaviors as much as 
possible, which is why I call for methods of justification that facilitate theorizers in being 
cognizant of power dynamics, create a mechanism for a theory to be genuinely revisable, 
and ensure a theorizer is self-critical. I offer another methodological criterion that is 
meant to complement these, namely, putting forth modest goals. 
There are no strict accounts of what constitutes a “modest” goal, however two 
points may be helpful in its implementation. First, a theorizer should be modest about the 
level of certainty a method of justification can yield. We should recognize that regardless 
of how well conceived and applied a justification may be, it is prone to error. So we 
should always hold a humble status for the claims we justify, and this is all the more so 
when we are claiming to offer justification, for example, for a wide scope of people 
diversely and equally situated. A justification should not seek to provide foundational, 
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rational warrant for all people in all times, which is often the goal of a theorizer. 
Nussbaum, for example, uses a method of justification that is meant to be all-inclusive—
namely, wide reflective equilibrium—in that it is intended to be able to provide 
justification for the capabilities to all people at this point in time. Recall, reflective 
equilibrium is a method of justification that seeks coherence between (a) an individual’s 
considered moral judgments, (b) sets of principles, and (c) background assumptions. 
Wide reflective equilibrium not only considers one’s own judgments, but also competing 
theories. As I presented in Chapter 1, Nussbaum uses wide reflective equilibrium to 
demonstrate that the capabilities approach is more choice-worthy than competing theories 
of justice, including utilitarian desire-satisfaction and Rawlsian social-contract theory. 
However, Jaggar argues correctly that no method of justification is entirely 
foolproof since “even a generally reliable method may be misused by the person who 
employs it. Moreover, intuitions that are initially plausible may turn out, on further 
investigation, to be mistaken” (Jaggar 2006, 311). Here, she calls our attention to the 
seemingly obvious point that regardless of the theorizer, the application of the theory may 
be applied wrongly. Nussbaum may be a great theorizer who is attempting to be truly 
inclusive by considering various methods of justification, comprehensive doctrines, and 
competing theories. Despite an attempt to deter potential concerns, the ways in which her 
theory is implemented may yield unintended consequences.  
Keep in mind that I am not making any claims about the intentions of the 
theorizer; so, following the above example, Nussbaum may be a well-intentioned 
theorizer who (implicitly) endorses neo-colonial beliefs and practices. Furthermore, 
because mistaken intuitions can arise in many sources, including critics and supporters of 
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a theory, not to mention the theorizer, no method should be assumed to be free from 
error. Even our most refined intuitions may be mistaken because not all perspectives were 
consulted, or we did not consider the way in which certain perspectives challenged ours. 
This explains why we should strive for neither an error-proof theory nor pretend that we 
have constructed and defended one. 
Second, I seek modesty in the outcomes themselves and in the scope for which we 
are able to offer justification. If we are modest about our methods of justification, then 
the justified norms should also be modest. So for capabilities, it seems important to 
acknowledge that when a theorizer generates and defends a list that she recognizes that it 
is a list. That is, it is one among potentially many competing lists, not the single, 
universal list. To emphasize this point, Ackerly calls her list of capabilities “guiding 
criteria” since it “functions as criteria for social criticism intended to work together with 
deliberative inquiry and skeptical scrutiny as a cohesive method of social criticism” 
(113). Because she has methodological criteria built into her theory that allows for 
genuine revisions, Ackerly can call her list a genuine “work in progress”. The list one 
endorses should be a starting point for further discussion, not the end to which all lists 
must conform. 
In contrast, Nussbaum proposes a universal list that is meant to cover all peoples 
in all contexts in order to avoid the charge of relativism. She fears that if we produce 
multiple lists for various contexts, then there will be no general standard by which we can 
judge whether someone is harmed. However, my concern here is not about whether to 
generate a single universal list or multiple lists, but rather ensuring that whatever lists we 
do produce are modest in nature. So, as Ackerly notes, we should recognize that our list 
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is merely one among many. I advocate for multiple lists based on the need for modesty 
for two reasons. Keep in mind, part of the project of a global approach to ethics may be 
discerning how to meet more localized moral and political needs that nonetheless have 
origins and consequences that extend beyond national borders given the 
interconnectedness of global relationships. First, a commitment to modest outcomes says 
that, given the complexity of moral and political reality, it is likely that we will need 
more than a single list to address diverse contexts and situations. Second, given the same 
complexity noted in the first point, it is unlikely that we will be able to offer a global 
justification for any list, let alone providing compelling reasons to all peoples for a single 
list. That justification will itself always be more localized and tailored to particular 
contexts and peoples and their moral and political needs. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  
The four methodological desiderata in this chapter — to be cognizant of power 
dynamics, to have a mechanism in place to allow for revisions to the theory from other 
perspectives, to be self-critical, and to put forth modest goals—are meant to help 
theorizers decide which methods of justifications are most beneficial and how to use 
them. I am certain that more criteria could be uncovered, especially if one consults more 
perspectives, and thus my list is not meant to be exhaustive. However, it does provide 
enough guidance for theorizers to mitigate some of the concerns noted in this chapter and 
the previous one. 
 In the following chapter, I will argue that discourse ethics as a general approach 
to moral justification is a better approach than those Nussbaum employs because it 
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requires dialogue with all those affected by the norms under discussion, but also that we 
need something superior to traditional versions of discourse ethics due to the fact that 
theyare vulnerable to the same problems to which Nussbaum’s monological methods are 
vulnerable as I discussed in chapters 2 and 3. I believe a feminist inspired version of 
discourse ethics is more likely to satisfy the desiderata outlined in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: FEMINIST DISCOURSE ETHICS 
  
Discourse ethics, as espoused by Habermas, Apel, and Benhabib, claims that a 
moral norm is rationally justified if all affected by the outcome could accept it under 
conditions of free and equal discourse. However, as I have argued in the chapter three, 
these conditions are rarely met, and so traditional forms of discourse ethics seem 
ultimately ineffective as a method of justification and are not viable as an alternative 
method for justifying the capabilities as a cross-cultural, gender sensitive tool for 
assessing justice. I argue that we need to abandon the formal equality of Hambermas in 
favor of substantive equality, one that is an explicitly feminist version of discourse ethics. 
In this chapter, I articulate a feminist version of discourse that I propose as a method to 
justify capabilities as well as applicable to real world situations. I attempt to do this 
through what I call “Feminist Discourse Ethics,” (FDE) which is largely indebted to 
Alison Jaggar’s “Feminist Practical Dialogue” (FPD). The end of this chapter will 
illustrate the advantages of FDE over Nussbaum’s methodologies through a case study on 
the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. 
FPD is a version of discourse ethics that is empirically rich (due to the fact that it 
draws on discursive norms from actual feminist activist groups), pragmatically valuable, 
and committed to feminism. Jaggar’s version of discourse is more pragmatic than 
Habermas’s idealized version because it begins with real world actors, problems, and 
responses to those problems. Furthermore, FPD is feminist insofar as it is committed to 
ending women’s subordination. It also incorporates both traditionally “feminine” traits 
such as caring, reciprocity, and sharing intimate feelings, and prioritizes concrete 
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experiences over idealized abstract subjects and “masculine” traits, such as the values of 
equality and fairness.37 
 
1. Feminist Practical Dialogue 
  
I begin by outlining Alison Jaggar’s version of Feminist Practical Dialogue, from 
which I build my account of feminist discourse ethics. Jaggar grounds her version of 
discourse in the discursive activities of contemporary consciousness raising groups, 
including Feminist Healthcare Activism, Feminist Antimilitarist Activism, Feminist 
Pedagogy, and African American Women’s Dialogue. Because FPD is situated within an 
activist framework, as opposed to an academic one, she believes her theory is 
“empirically and conceptually richer than that found in many philosophical theories” 
(Jaggar 1995, 137). 
Drawing from these activist groups, Jaggar articulates a working account of 
feminist practical dialogue aimed at addressing some of the problems with traditional 
versions of discourse ethics mentioned in the previous chapter. Specifically, she presents 
norms that are more likely to yield substantive equality and respect among participants, 
especially as they stand in relations of unequal social power. She argues that discourse 
should (1) begin with narrative as opposed to argument, (2) adopt practices of moral 
deference to those with less social power, (3) emphasize and practice listening, (4) 
engage nurturing rather than adversarial modes of discourse, and (5) seek consensus. 
																																																								
37 It is of note that FPD is committed to the values of equality and fairness insofar as it strives for the moral 
equality of women to men. FPD attempts to understand how substantive equality and fairness might be 
achieved under those conditions and looks to how feminist communities have worked toward this. To 
correct real world inequalities, then, FPD has prioritized the values of concrete experiences over idealized 
subjects. 
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Feminist Practical Dialogue is an intersubjective method of moral reasoning that 
begins with first-person narratives, which are taken to be opportunities for individuals to 
discuss and reflect on their moral and political experiences. This not only provides 
dialoguers the opportunity to speak, it also allows other participants to learn from that 
person’s experience and critically reflect on their own lives. Narratives have the ability to 
link experiences relationally to other aspects of a context and so have the potential to be 
illuminating, that is, to reveal aspects of a situation that might be overlooked by abstract 
theorizing. However, they do not encompass the totality of the dialogue but only serve as 
a starting point since narratives often conflict with one another and so require further 
critical scrutiny. 
One problem with narratives simpliciter is that not all experiences are treated 
equally. For example, women tend to be seen as “over-emotional” and so their narratives 
(or arguments, more broadly) are often taken less seriously than men’s perspectives. To 
address this concern, Jaggar argues in favor of “substantive equality” over “formal 
equality”. The formal equality in discursive interactions, advocated by both Habermas 
and Benhabib, mandates that all participants have an equal opportunity to question 
others’ positions, to offer arguments of their own, or to raise a completely new topic of 
discussion. However, as I argued in chapter three via Iris Marion Young’s Hegemonic 
Discourse Objection, a discursive model that recommends that all participants have the 
same opportunity to speak cannot address the greater systematic problem that not all 
views receive equal uptake. In contrast, requiring norms that generate substantive 
discursive equality means giving “socially disempowered women…special respect, but it 
does not assume that any woman is necessarily a moral expert or authority” (Jaggar 1995, 
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129). In other words, some women’s (and other members of marginalized communities) 
experiences are given respectful consideration insofar as they ought to be taken especially 
serious, but not as the final word. 
Second, Jaggar, unlike her predecessors, recognizes that listening is essential for 
effective discourse. Listening is not a passive process whereby the hearer simply takes in 
the information given by the speaker, but an active engagement between participants. 
Moreover, she argues that the best atmosphere for speakers and hearers to flourish is 
“nurturant” rather than “adversarial”. Jaggar attempts to avoid language that sounds like 
“litigation,” as we find in Rawls’s discussion of “parties” behind the veil of ignorance, 
for example. In contrast, participants within FPD do not seek to overpower one another 
with strong rational argumentation, but “support each other in reevaluating their initial 
conceptions of themselves and their experience, their history and culture, their relations 
to each other, and their perceptions of conflicting interests” (Jaggar 1995, 133). In other 
words, rather than basing dialogue off war metaphors (e.g., battling it out) and 
confrontation, FPD advocates cooperation and understanding. 
Keep in mind that while Jaggar’s feminist practical dialogue is considering 
dialogue between feminists, my project is much broader in scope and aims to include 
people who may not have these shared starting points. So I would not want to mandate 
nurturance between discursive participants since those who inhabit less social power may 
need the space to be adversarial and still be taken seriously. The larger point that I am 
sympathetic to is Jaggar’s commitment to creating a discursive atmosphere likely to 
enable diminished social groups to express themselves, which will often require dominant 
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group members to take a more conversational attitude that tends to be nurturing as 
opposed to adversarial.  
One should not misunderstand the commitment to nurturant attitudes as a 
rejection of disagreement. The discussion amongst participants will be rigorous, and they 
may be frustrated as their positions are undermined. In fact, disagreement has the 
advantage of encouraging speakers to reconsider their own experiences. So while 
disagreement is not pursued for its own sake (as it appears with traditional forms of 
discourse), it seems inevitable in almost all discussions and salutary. For instance, 
compassionate listening might start with recognizing why a person feels the way she 
does, but then suggest other interpretations of that experience. Moreover, respecting 
one’s interlocutors requires critically examining their views and not accepting them 
blindly. For example, a woman who expresses frustration over sexist jokes at work may 
be told that she is being overly sensitive and simply needs to relax and “lighten-up”. In 
such cases, it would be important to mention that we can understand her interpretation of 
that experience in light of living in a patriarchal society propose that her concerns are 
valid, and that she is not, in fact, being hypersensitive. This is not to claim that 
oversensitivity cannot occur, or that it may even cause an understandable amount of 
paranoia. 
The goal of FPD is consensus, but like Benhabib, Jaggar recognizes that 
consensus may be unattainable. In such instances, Jaggar claims we ought to suspend 
discourse temporarily although, as soon as the opportunity arises, the group must return 
to discourse in hopes of achieving action. An obligation to sustaining discourse is vital 
for FPD because it’s ultimately a commitment to a method of justification that can yield 
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action-guidance. Nonetheless, Jaggar states that moral deliberation is valuable in itself as 
it helps develop responsibility, self-discipline, respect, cooperation, struggle, courage, 
caring, loyalty, self-knowledge, imagination, sensitivity, and empathy (1995, 136). 
 
2. Procedural Constraints/Conditions for Inclusive Discourse: Building on Jaggar 
 
There are a number of procedural constraints we can discern from Jaggar’s 
account of discourse ethics, which include: (1) encouraging first person narratives, (2) 
providing moral deference to socially disadvantaged groups, (3) hearing virtuously, (4) 
developing nurturant attitudes, and (5) understanding consensus as process. In general, I 
am sympathetic to each of these points, but I believe each can be elaborated and 
extended. These elaborated discursive constraints can serve as guidelines to help establish 
discursive communities that are more likely to secure cross-cultural validity and gender 
sensitivity of the capabilities. 
 
2.1 Non-traditional Forms of Speech 
  
Whereas Jaggar defends the value of first person narratives as discursive starting 
points, FDE builds on this by suggesting that a variety of non-traditional forms of speech 
be encouraged. This is a vital commitment as it provides access to a broader range of 
relevant “reasons” and enables more relevant participants to participate by allowing 
people to communicate in ways they may be more comfortable with (such as those that 
do not require formal training in argumentation or high levels of education). Narrow 
accounts of rational speech, according to Iris Marion Young, confine speech to 
“universalistic, dispassionate, culturally and stylistically neutral arguments that focus the 
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mind on their evidence and logical connections, rather than move the heart or engage the 
imagination” (2000, 63). The history of Western philosophy has been obsessed with 
offering loquacious and often impenetrable arguments. Socratic dialogues, for instance, 
discuss valuable topics such as defining virtue and justice, and the immortality of the 
soul, and yet they are riddled with dialoguers attempting to quibble with nearly 
everything their interlocutor says. For example, the actors in Platonic dialogues 
continuously demand clearer and more precise arguments and definitions, that is, more 
logical ones. Of course, defining terms is helpful for any argument. However, if so much 
emphasis is placed on these activities, to the exclusion of other modes of reasoning and 
other ways of advancing claims, then narrowly defined rationality will have a stronghold 
on discursive communities which may disadvantage people from marginalized social 
groups. 
Academics have the privilege to work through these arguments carefully, and I 
have no qualms with preserving this pursuit within our discipline. However, the way in 
which this can be used to manipulate others in real world moral discourse is very 
troubling. This is one of my biggest concerns with Nussbaum’s approach; namely, that 
she uses her privileged position of being a Western academic to her advantage by 
marginalizing (however inadvertently) her interlocutors. Through her methods of 
reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus, she theorizes at a very high and 
abstract level on her own. Her monological method of moral reasoning allows her to 
imagine criticisms to her position, which often come in the form of straw-person like 
arguments. In order to address my straw-person concern, Nussbaum would need to take 
“non-academic” criticisms seriously, such as her discussions with Vasanti, Jayamma, and 
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members of the Self Employed Women’s Association. At best, as I demonstrated in 
Chapter 2, she asserts that those who do not appreciate her list lack a full understanding 
and appreciation for them. Taking non-academic perspectives seriously requires 
legitimizing non-traditional forms of speech. 
As Iris Marion Young explains, the “norm of ‘articulateness’ devalues the speech 
of those who make claims and give reasons, but not in a linear fashion that makes logical 
connections explicit” (2000, 56). In practice, individuals with critical reasoning skills 
(which tend to be people from educated backgrounds) are able to discern logical fallacies 
and gaps in arguments. The moment an individual identifies flaws in another’s argument, 
depending on how the criticism is presented, the targeted person is at risk of being 
silenced. Despite these concerns, we would not want to simply ignore mistaken 
logic/reasoning. So how the mistake is presented, and determining whether the mistake 
matters, will be crucial to ensure the person who made the error is not silenced. 
FDE allows so-called non-rational “arguments” to play a role in discourse, which 
includes greetings, rhetoric, narratives, and emotional expressions in general. For 
instance, subordinate peoples who pay a disproportionately high price for maintaining the 
status quo often experience “conventionally unacceptable” emotions in response to the 
status quo, which Alison Jaggar calls outlaw emotions (Jaggar 1989, 166). For example, 
if a woman is subjected to sexist jokes, she may become uneasy, nervous, or even scared. 
However, because the socially appropriate response to sexist jokes is to laugh, the woman 
feeling outlaw emotions is unlikely to articulate her experience for fear that she has an 
inappropriate response, and may even begin to question her rationality. Jaggar argues that 
outlaw emotions may have important epistemic weight because they can highlight 
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systematic injustices that might be overlooked, but sharing these experiences does not 
follow the traditional premise-conclusion form; thus, FDE broadens the kinds of speech 
people are permitted to use in discourse to include things like communicating their 
experiences of outlaw emotions as a critical moment for discussion, and a way to actively 
seek marginalized perspectives. 
 In addition to encouraging the expression of emotional experiences, Young offers 
three non-traditional forms of communication that ought to be included in discourse: 
greeting, rhetoric, and narrative. Greeting is the “simple” acknowledgement of another. 
This can be performed when one first meets another with a “Hello” or “How are you?”, 
or as one is leaving by saying “Good bye” or “See you soon”. Greeting opens up an 
individual to being vulnerable since she is now attempting to build a “bond of trust” 
necessary to “listen and take responsibility for her relationship to her interlocutors, and at 
the same time that it announces her distance from the others, their irreducible 
particularity” (Young 2000, 59). Greeting is necessary, though not sufficient, for rational 
dialogue as it contributes to creating space for genuine dialogue. 
 The second form of communication that FDE accepts is rhetorical speech, which 
is often contrasted with rational speech. Rhetoric tends to be defined as manipulative 
speech which is used as a means of persuasion, unlike rational speech which is filled with 
substantive arguments in their logical sequence and delivered in a dispassionate manner. 
Rhetoric has been viewed suspiciously since its misuse can manipulate audiences, 
especially those who are not trained to identify logical fallacies. 
Young identifies four aspects of rhetoric: (1) various emotional tones such as 
anger, frustration, and joy, (2) many figures of speech including similes, metaphors, and 
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puns, (3) expressing oneself not merely in speech, but also (for instance) through 
demonstrations, sit-ins, symbols, and banners, and (4) paying attention to the particular 
audience, their history and commitments, to best orient one’s speech (Young 2000, 65). 
These four aspects of rhetoric can be extended. For instance, one could extend (3) to 
include other forms of artistic expression such as interpretive dance and poetry. Rhetoric 
has the advantage of realizing an FDE goal of treating others as concrete individuals 
since rhetorical speech is aimed at particular audiences with particular histories. 
However, that does not address the above concern of abusing rhetoric. Because FDE 
follows FPD in that being a supportive discourse participant entails challenging fellow 
group members, rhetorical discourse riddled with fallacies and harmful speech will be 
subject to criticism like any other statement. 
 Finally, like Jaggar’s Feminist Practical Dialogue, Feminist Discourse Ethics 
begins with individuals sharing first-person narratives.38 Narratives entail individuals 
sharing their experiences, which often includes providing emotional responses to a given 
situation. Narratives have facilitated women’s abilities, through consciousness-raising 
groups, to realize that their experiences are shared with other women. As I noted with 
FPD, narratives have the ability to provide the listener with an insight into the 
experiences of diverse others whose experiences might not be otherwise available to the 
listener. However, as Laura Black argues, story-telling is not simply someone discussing 
“personal reasons”, since that reduces the speaker’s point to mere idiosyncrasy and thus 																																																								
38 Very few would outright reject the use of stories in discourse, but their disdain for them comes under the 
guise of “acceptable outcomes”. Joshua Cohen, for instance, accepts narratives in the discourse in order to 
be inclusive, but his greater commitment to rationality is apparent. He says “acceptable outcomes of a 
deliberative process…can be justified given the requirements on finding reasons acceptable to others” 
(Cohen 1996, 105, his emphasis). A similar point could be charged to Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson (1996) since they argue that even “extreme nondeliberative methods may be justified as 
necessary steps to deliberation” (135, emphasis added). 
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is not a real object of discussion; if that were the case, then any criticism of what the 
speaker says will appear to be an attack on her as a person. Furthermore, she argues that 
accepting stories as reasons “fails to recognize how storytelling involves identity 
negotiation and the potential for perspective taking” (2008, 110). So story-telling is 
neither reducible simply to the individual nor should it be understood as a universal 
experience, but rather as a way to illustrate how narratives and stories help connect 
features of a person’s experiences with others. It is in this way that her story might be 
extended to relate to the experiences of others who are similarly situated. 
These stories have the ability to undermine and correct pre-given stereotypes. For 
example my father, who barely graduated from high school, was born and raised in the 
same rural farming community he lives in today. He is not politically well informed, as 
made apparent by not knowing the current vice president of the United States. However, 
he is caring and inquisitive. During a recent encounter, my father met an individual from 
Iraq who started discussing his life back home. My father was amazed to learn about the 
native Iraqi’s experience. Most notably, I remember him telling me emphatically and 
sincerely: “Chad, you couldn’t imagine what life is really like in Iraq. Did you know they 
had highways?” This moment may appear ignorant to many who are already aware of 
this. However, I find this story to be very powerful insofar as an individual sharing his 
experiences of Iraq was able to dispel my father’s stereotypical generalization of a region 
that he would never have cared to know about or change. He is now in a position to 
critically evaluate his preconceived notions of Iraq (and what he sees as “all those 
countries”) and its citizens. He certainly would not have gained this understanding from 
books or the media, especially since the latter often reinforces his preconceived notions 
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and the former may not be accessible to him given his level of education. I am confident 
that my father’s experience of hearing a narrative about Iraqi life from a person who was 
raised in Iraq shifted his thinking about the people of Iraq in a way that more traditional 
forms of argumentation and speech could not. 
One could argue that, in principle, he could have received this information from a 
plethora of media outlets, including television, Internet, newspaper and so forth. I do not 
deny the feasibility of this option. However, active conversational exchanges between 
dialoguers who share in narratives from experiences of their lives have the ability to 
make individuals reflect on their own lives and the lives of others in a way that other 
sources cannot. Furthermore, my father’s disposition as a caring and inquisitive person is 
certainly beneficial as well. He was able to listen in a way that someone else might not be 
able to, including academics (like Nussbaum) who may be more inclined from the outset 
to view ordinary people (i.e., non-academics) as having very little to offer in terms of 
epistemic value. This example is meant to illustrate that the power of narratives should 
not be understated. 
To illustrate the above point, let’s consider Nussbaum’s steadfast commitment to 
the capability of education. She argues that, as a basic good, it should be guaranteed to 
everyone. A necessary condition of education for Nussbaum is literacy since it functions 
as a fertile capability, that is, a capability that can lead to the fulfillment of other central 
capabilities. Given high illiteracy rates in Bangladesh, Nussbaum concludes incorrectly 
that Bangladeshi people do not value education. However, as I presented in Chapter 2, 
Brooke Ackerly shows that after speaking with 800 rural Bangladeshi women that they 
do understand the value of education, but that it is also an unrealistic option for most 
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since it is too expensive. This points to the fact that, like Ackerly, serious attention to first 
person narratives requires rethinking the capability of education, or at least the resolution 
of that kind of tragic dilemma advocated by Nussbaum.  
 Some philosophers have rejected the idea that narratives and nurturant attitudes 
might be useful discursive methods. For example, Tibor Machan’s review of Jaggar’s 
articulation and defense of Feminist Practical Dialogue questions the use of narratives, 
emotions, and nurturant attitudes in striving for justice. He argues that Jaggar’s FPD asks 
us to “talk about how [we] feel, not what [we] think” (Machan 1997, 61 n.2). Following 
the Kantian project of disembodied rational agents, Machan calls on us to use our rational 
faculties to make an argument rather than relying on our feelings, which, in themselves, 
have no political basis other than clouding our ability to make a sound moral and political 
judgment.  
 I contend that Machan is deeply mistaken. His mode of reasoning to understand 
the world assumes a purely argumentative framework by displaying logically valid 
arguments in traditional premise-conclusion form. This method of moral reasoning is so 
narrow that it fails to capture the various ways “common folk” communicate with one 
another. We need an account of moral reasoning that is usable and inclusive by 
embracing many forms of communication. The use of storytelling, for example, has the 
potential to expand participants’ political and social awareness in a way that purely 
rational discourse cannot.39 Again, my father is a good example of someone who would 
not have benefited from Machan’s rejection of narratives since my father needed those 
stories to broaden his social understanding and re-evaluate his prior generalizations. 																																																								
39 For further discussion on the epistemic and political benefits of storytelling in small groups, see Ryfe 
(2007). 
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I am not claiming that we ought to banish premise-conclusion argumentation. 
Rather, FDE maintains that genuine inclusion of all those affected by a potential outcome 
can be best realized if we do not privilege certain forms of communication that tend to 
exclude non-dominant group members. Because acquiring critical reasoning skills to 
identify argumentative flaws tends to require a level of educative privilege, FDE takes all 
precautions to mitigate this advantage and to recognize how this privilege can impede 
access to relevant capabilities. So I recognize that using one’s critical reasoning can be 
beneficial insofar as one may improve their position, however it can also be used to the 
advantage of one person and to the detriment of another by silencing her with a 
bombardment of accusations of logical fallacies and condemning her use of non-
traditional forms of argumentation. 
It is clear that I am arguing in favor of expanding our understanding of reason and 
argument to encompass those things which are more likely to garner us access to more 
important data than traditional philosophical argumentation may allow. For instance, 
Nussbaum may offer (persuasive) arguments for why female genital cutting (FGC) is 
morally pernicious. However, as I argued Chapter 2 by drawing on the work of Theresa 
Tobin, to make such claims about FGC—even if logically valid—without understanding 
the context of these practices is morally problematic.  Nussbaum’s claims about FGC 
would be better served with a more comprehensive anthropological account of a 
particular group that shares their stories and narratives. This would allow Nussbaum to 
better situate the practices of FGC in a larger historical and socio-economic context. 
Nonetheless, despite all the advantages of narratives, they are always subject to 
criticism. Because narratives are an individual’s account of her experiences, FDE is 
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cautious about how the challenges are presented. The person must be given the full 
opportunity to not only share her experience, but also be given the opportunity to share 
her insights into possible steps toward alleviating her concern. Her interlocutors are then 
in a position to raise criticisms with regard to her story and potential solutions, but they 
must do so in a way that gives prima facie moral deference, as we will see in the 
following section, to those who are non-dominant group members. 
 
2.2 Moral Deference 
 
Iris Marion Young discusses two barriers for achieving substantive equality in 
discursive encounters that she calls external and internal exclusion, respectively. External 
exclusion prevents individuals or groups from participating in the discussion-making 
process. Young attributes limited resources and the struggle for power as common 
contributors to external exclusion. So while it may be illegal to outright prevent a 
particular group from joining the political discussion, they may make it very difficult for 
them to access it. For instance, the dominant group can set meetings at inconvenient 
times and have polling stations in locations that are difficult to reach. Young sums up this 
kind of exclusion succinctly when she writes, “issues of external exclusion…concern 
how people are kept outside the process of discussion and decision-making” (2000, 55, 
her emphasis). 
One may argue that Feminist Discourse Ethics would address the concern of 
external exclusion by emphasizing its central tenet that if an individual’s interests are 
actually affected by the outcome, then she has an opportunity to participate in the 
discourse. This response, however, does not fully address the problem. We can imagine a 
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difficult situation in which identifying who ought to constitute the discursive group is not 
very clear. For instance, a person may be considering the action of cutting back hours at 
work in order to care for an ailing loved one. In order to determine if this action is 
justified and thus should be pursued, she ought to consider the perspectives of the ailing 
loved one, and perhaps even her children who will be affected by the decision. The 
degree to which she consults her child will depend to some extent on their age. The 
mother may need to demand greater responsibilities of the child or perhaps even borrow 
against his college fund, but that does not seem to force her to fully consult her child. 
Nonetheless, the child should have some input or ability to express feelings and thoughts 
on whether the mother should cut back her working hours.  
FDE demands allowing all affected parties to have an opportunity to shape the 
outcome, and the child will certainly be affected by the decision, and thus, should have 
some voice in the decision. The initial decision of who should participate is not an easy 
one, but one the mother will make in consultation with her ailing loved one. She ought to 
include her child in the discussion, but limit the child’s participation. SoI do not 
anticipate external exclusion objection causing much problem since FDE demands all 
affected interests to have an opportunity to participate. 
My discussion of FDE thus far has been described as if the discursive community 
is closed off from outside interference. This may appear problematic as it is a kind of 
external exclusion. To some degree this is true. However, I argue that it may be a 
justified kind of exclusion in light of unequal social power relations. It may be essential 
that a community is closed initially while its members share their experiences of 
oppression. This moment is indispensable since it creates the space to share experiences 
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without fear of being questioned or judged. Patricia Hill Collins discusses the need for 
safe spaces for Black women’s resistance, which includes places like churches and 
extended families. She explains that these spaces are not merely safe, but form “prime 
locations for resisting objectification as the Other...the dominant ideology promulgated 
not only outside Black communities but within African-American institutions” (Collins 
2000, 101). 
As a collective identity emerges out of the discussion, it is then important for the 
group to open itself to scrutiny from the larger public. If a community remains closed, it 
runs the risk of “repression and denial of autonomy, dogmatism, intellectual dishonesty 
and self-deception, elitism, and partialism” (Jaggar 1998, 16). Thus, Jaggar coins these 
groups “temporarily closed communities”. FDE may advocate for beginning discourse as 
a temporarily closed community. However, it will never remain completely closed for 
fear of being epistemically dishonest since that would assume outsiders have nothing to 
contribute to the discussion. If a particular group truly believes they are immune to 
criticism, then it should be all the more welcoming of criticism in order to show the 
strengths of their positions. 
Internal exclusion, on the other hand, is a much more difficult challenge since the 
issue is not about being admitted into the decision-making process; instead, it arises out 
of the problem that because people’s claims are “not treated with equal respect...[they] 
lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access 
to fora and procedures of decision-making” (Young 2000, 55). Marginalized group 
members tend to not be taken as seriously, so FDE must compensate to address this 
power inequality. Following Jaggar, I argue that we ought to reject formal equality in 
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favor of substantive equality, a kind of “discursive affirmative action, necessary to 
counterbalance the socially imposed obstacles to some women’s full participation in the 
dialogue” (1995, 128). There are a number of constraints on the dialogue to realize 
substantive equality, beginning with Laurence Thomas’s account of “moral deference”. 
Thomas argues that we ought to give “moral deference” to those from 
“diminished social categories,” which includes people who are valued negatively and 
who are especially vulnerable to others in virtue of their social category. He explains that 
when individuals inhabit different social categories, the ways in which they experience 
their respective vulnerabilities will also be different.40 For example, if a white person is 
beaten by a black person, the white individual has the advantage of healing by removing 
himself from black and brown spaces because he no longer trusts them. However, a black 
person would not be able to heal as easily if he were beaten, since the social world is 
constructed in such a way as to force blacks to inhabit white spaces. The act of beating an 
innocent person is inexcusable regardless of race, although Thomas points to the 
important role social categories play in understanding reality. Because the basis of social 
identity often produces unfavorable credibility judgments on the part of dominant group 
members judging subordinate group members, the interpretation of reality individuals 
from the non-dominant group construct is less likely to be deemed credible by dominant 
group members. 
Maria Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman discuss some of the questions they 
encounter when attempting qua “outsiders” to give an account of an “insider” 																																																								
40 This point can be likened to Vrinda Dalmiya and Linda Alcoff’s “G-experiential,” that is, “gender-
specific experiential knowing” (1993, 228). For example, a man (however empathetic) will never know 
what it is like to be a woman in a patriarchal marriage or rear children without the expectation of doing so. 
Their point is that men only have “propositional knowledge” about women’s experiences of oppression, 
whereas women have direct access to knowledge associated with those experiences. 
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perspective: “Why should you or anyone else believe me?”, “Could I be right?”, “What 
conditions would have to be obtained for my being right?”. These questions will lead a 
non-dominant group member to “doubt her own judgment and to doubt all interpretation 
of her experience. This leads her to experience her life differently” (Lugones and 
Spelman 1983, 577). This is doubly troubling—on the one hand, those from socially 
diminished categories have to fight for respect from those in positions of power, but also, 
on the other, they doubt their own experiences and understanding of them. FDE attempts 
to address these very real concerns by giving moral deference to people from diminished 
social categories. 
To give moral deference would entail prima facie acceptance of an individual’s 
account of her experience because she is speaking from a vantage point that cannot be 
accessed by someone located outside her social category. Thomas explains that there 
“should be a presumption in favor of the person’s account of her experiences” which is 
“warranted because the individual is speaking from a vantage point to which someone not 
belonging to her diminished social category group does not have access” (1992-3, 244, 
emphasis added). This still doesn’t explain why we should give moral deference to 
marginalized persons, as opposed to dominant group members. To this, we can recall the 
above example of blacks inhabiting white spaces. Because black people are forced to be 
in white worlds, black people have access to those worlds in a way that white people may 
not have access to black spaces or even their own worlds. It is in this sense that FDE 
prima facie privileges non-dominant group members by embracing their experiences as 
starting points despite the fact that they will often not match the experiences of privileged 
group members. 
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FDE’s commitment to moral deference (and inclusion, more generally) is one way 
to mitigate the problem of internal exclusion. Moral deference not only gives traditionally 
silenced voices an opportunity to speak, but privileges their experiences over members 
from dominant positions as a starting point. A step in the right direction is taken to treat 
members of socially diminished categories with the full respect and dignity they deserve 
by privileging their first-person narratives. Feminist Discourse Ethics, like FPD, works to 
create a safe space where a sense of community and trust is built between its members, 
and becoming more inclusive is one way to begin achieving this goal. 
One may question my commitment to moral deference, fearing that privileged 
persons will have no genuine opportunity to shape the dialogue. Machan expresses a 
concern similar to this one. He says, upon first reading Jaggar’s FPD, that he “felt hurt, 
indignant, about being unjustly accused, caricatured, stereotyped, demeaned, 
misunderstood, and derided because, well, I am a male” (1997, 54). Here, he argues that 
individuals ought to be understood as just that, individually.41 He says: “I am the target of 
irrational discrimination, unjustly accused of crimes I not only wasn’t guilty of but hadn’t 
even imagined” (Machan 1997, 55, emphasis added). He continues, “Yet it is simply 
false that I had any part in such a policy” (1997, 56, his emphasis). 
The problem with this position is that it assumes an implausible conception of the 
person and responsibility. Jennifer Everett and Shelley Wilcox argue successfully that 
“individuals can contribute to [racism and sexism] that subtly communicates messages of 
unwelcomeness, inferiority, and marginalization towards members of certain groups” 
																																																								
41 For a further defense of the need for individuals, as opposed to collectives, within political dialogue see 
Machan (1996). 
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without having an idea that they are doing so, or an intention to do so (1998, 149).42 FDE 
understands that injustices operate at a structural level. In fact, the condition of prima 
facie moral deference attempts to mitigate the structural impact of power inequalities on 
discursive encounters by giving those from socially diminished categories a genuine 
opportunity to be heard and ultimately shape the outcome of the dialogue. 
 
2.3 Listening Carefully 
 
 The discussion of moral deference in the previous section means very little unless 
the other participants are listening properly. One deficiency in Habermas’s and 
Benhabib’s models of discourse is that they dedicate so much attention to the speaker 
(e.g., what is being said) that they fail to pay adequate attention to the listener. FDE 
maintains that listening is not a passive endeavor whereby the person merely takes in 
what is being said, but rather an active engagement of listening to what the speaker says, 
interpreting their words, and offering feedback. This section attempts to offer an account 
of listening that will contribute to achieving substantive equality—or perhaps more 
genuine discursive inclusion. 
Thomas explains that moral deference is the act of “listening…until one has 
insight into the character of the other’s moral pain, and so how he has been emotionally 
configured by it” (1992-3, 246-7). The hope is that giving prima facie moral deference to 
another will eventually lead to bearing witness. The idea here is that if the listener earns 
the speaker’s trust, the speaker will now be able to converse with confidence about her 
moral pain. Bearing witness requires a deeper and much more intimate connection 
between the speaker and listener than moral deference. The move from moral deference 																																																								
42 For further discussion on implicit bias, see Gendler (2011), Payne (2001), and Saul (2013). 
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to bearing witness is not easy, and, in fact, it takes great courage to bear witness. 
However, it takes even more courage on behalf of the speaker to discuss her moral pain 
without fear of being judged, and so, if one has the opportunity to bear witness, then a 
special bond has been built between the speaker and her interlocutor.  
We can imagine a woman who shares her story about being sexually harassed, a 
Black person who remembers being called the n-word as he walked into white space, or 
the atrocities a Jewish person faced in Nazi Germany. In all these instances, if the speaker 
opens up about their experience, the listener has an obligation to not only listen 
attentively, but treat the speaker as an “informant,” to borrow a concept from Miranda 
Fricker, rather than as a mere “source of information”. 
Recall from Chapter 2, Miranda Fricker offers an insightful distinction between 
“sources of information” and “informants”. I find the distinction helpful for thinking of a 
way in which listeners are able to give moral deference and have a greater opportunity to 
bear witness to the moral pain of others. Fricker (2007) explains that “informants are 
epistemic agents who convey information, whereas sources of information are states of 
affairs from which the inquirer may be in a position to glean information” (132, emphasis 
added). The informant and source of information both provide information to the 
inquirer, but how he treats them is very different. On the one hand, the informant never 
loses her subjectivity when providing the information being sought. The source of 
information, on the other, is reduced to an object (i.e., she loses her subjectivity) in virtue 
of being treated merely as a thing from which to glean information. Put simply, the 
inquirer treats the informant with the respect and dignity she deserves, and the source of 
information is stripped of her dignity.  
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So if a person is treated as a source of information then perhaps the listener did 
enough to earn the trust of the speaker to share her experience, but for whatever reason, 
the listener does not respect the speaker. Here the speaker never had a genuine 
opportunity to be an “active epistemic agent,” that is, someone who is able to contribute 
to the group’s knowledge. Fricker explains that when a person has suffered “testimonial 
injustice” that she has been relegated to the “same epistemic status as a felled tree whose 
age one might glean from the number of rings” (2007, 133). In other words, just as the 
tree stands as a passive object to be examined for the person’s benefit, the listener treats 
the interlocutor as if she is a passive object for information to be gleaned as the interested 
person sees fit. It should be no surprise that Feminist Discourse Ethics demands all 
(marginalized and non-marginalized) participants be treated as informants and not mere 
sources of information. 
To be a successful listener requires giving moral deference to marginalized 
peoples and supporting them in bearing witness to their own pain by treating them as 
informants. In order to do this successfully, one must not only develop the right epistemic 
posture, but also have a sense of openness. Lugones captures what it means to be open 
through her discussion of “playful world-traveling”. There are two parts to this notion 
that are especially relevant for this discussion. First, she says a “world” may be an actual 
society. Worlds can be imposed on us, as is the case for marginalized group members. 
Or, we can choose our worlds, as we often do when we join particular organizations. To 
describe one’s world is to offer a “description of experience, something that is true to 
experience even if it is ontologically problematic” (Lugones 1987, 11). Second, being 
“playful” entails a “loving attitude in traveling across ‘worlds’” (Lugones 1987, 15). One 
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must be open to the way in which reality looks from the other world. This may entail 
being a “fool,” as Lugones states, or suspending norms that we take for granted as good. 
So playful world-traveling describes an epistemic and moral openness that allows a 
person to perceive others and the worlds they inhabit with loving eyes and an openness to 
those unlike herself. 43 
I find playful world-traveling to be particularly helpful for FDE because it offers 
participants a way in which they can develop a sense of openness to inhabit different 
worlds; it is beneficial for both dominant and marginalized group members. For the 
former, it opens them up to a reality that they are otherwise able to avoid. Because 
dominant group members are not forced to inhabit the worlds of non-dominant spaces, 
the former are often left greatly ignorant to the plight of marginalized peoples. For 
example, wealthy people may claim that they “could only imagine” what it would be like 
to be poor, but traveling to their world offers insights that could not be gained 
otherwise.44 
Lugones explains why playful world-traveling is also beneficial for non-dominant 
group members. Since they are already forced to inhabit difficult spaces, this gives them 
an opportunity to do so in a playful manner. I am not trying to romanticize traveling 
between worlds, but following Lugones, playfully attempting to travel to other worlds 
seems to be epistemically and morally better than traveling in a bitter and frustrated way. 
This benefits dominant group members especially because they will likely be more open 																																																								
43 The notion of perceiving with a loving eye can be traced back to Frye’s (1983) concept of “loving 
perception” and Iris Murdoch’s (1970) “loving gaze”. For a further discussion on Murdoch’s conception of 
a loving gaze, see Snow (2005). 
44 The CEO of Panera Bread, Ron Shaich, attempted to live off $4.50 per day, which is typical on the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, formerly known as the Food Stamp Program. He said that 
only after a few days he “can’t stop thinking about food”. http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-
mo-panera-ceo-food-stamps-20130916,0,2313385.story. Accessed 10/1/13. 
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to understanding worlds other than their own and learning from those perspectives. 
Furthermore, as contentious as this might be, it’s also important for non-dominant group 
members to listen to those who are privileged. One might be resistant to this because the 
former are forced to hear them anyway. While this is certainly true, it would be a mistake 
to think that all dominant perspectives are dominant in the same way. Because FDE 
claims discourse must take place between concrete others, marginalized individuals must 
understand the dominant person’s history, and at this point, the person of privilege will be 
in a better position to give moral deference since he will have developed a connection 
with the speaker, treat the speaker as an informant, and hopefully, bear witness to her 
pain. 
 Lugones and Spelman capture the importance of good listening and the difficult 
nature of doing so. They claim: 
[I]f white/Anglo women are to understand our voices, they must understand our 
communities and us in them. […] This learning calls for circumspection, for 
question of yourselves and your roles in your own culture. […] This learning is 
extremely hard because it requires openness…sensitivity, concentration, self-
questioning, circumspection. It should be clear that it does not consist in a passive 
immersion in our cultures, but in a striving to understand what it is that our voices 
are saying (Lugones and Spelman 1983, 581). 
 
Listening requires great epistemic humility, especially from those who are dominant 
group members, for many reasons, including an attempt to earn the trust of marginalized 
group members, to question one’s own commitments and values critically, and bear 
witness to the suffering of marginalized populations without the dominant person 
thinking he “passes” for one of them. 
There is very little difference between FDE and FPD in regard to striving for 
substantive equality between speaker and listener. Both seek to go beyond the bare 
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requirements of formal equality, each recognizing that power inequities within discursive 
communities are inevitable and that one way to address this is by being inclusive and an 
active listener. However, as I will show in the following section, the similarities end 
there. 
 
2.4 Incommensurability 
 
We may accept all the forms of communication provided by Feminist Discourse 
Ethics, in addition to being an open speaker and an active listener, but this does not 
ensure we will be able to reach commensurability. Commensurability occurs when an 
agreement and understanding is reached between dialogue participants. It is of note that 
commensurability is closely related to, though not identical with, consensus. 
Commensurability attempts to reach a mutual acceptance on a given meaning, and 
consensus seeks a mutual agreement on a course of action. The presumption seems to be 
that commensurability is necessary for consensus, since without a mutual understanding 
of the terms under discussion, a genuine consensus on the matter cannot be achieved. 
Commensurability, like consensus, is often a goal of discursive communities. I’m 
not inherently opposed to this goal. However, there is a reason to call its primary value 
into question, namely, because agreement may be reached “formally,” but not 
“materially”. For example, one may concede a point in order to avoid backlash, and so 
agreement may have been formally but not substantively or actually achieved. Members 
of marginalized groups are disadvantaged in this way since dominant groups do not 
experience the same concerns of suffering backlash. In contrast, acceptance means the 
discursive participants had a genuine opportunity to reject or adopt the norms under 
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discussion and have chosen to embrace them as their own. They did not agree to them 
because they felt forced to assimilate or couldn’t speak up, but rather because they 
actually found them to provide the best guidance for their group. 
Benhabib claims, as I have shown in the Chapter 3, that the goal of discourse is 
not consensus, but a “process for the cooperative generation of truth or validity” (1992, 
37). In other words, it is not the end-product (viz., consensus) that concerns Benhabib, but 
how consensus is achieved. So while consensus is not the explicit goal of discourse, it is 
clear that she hopes to attain consensus if the right conditions are satisfied. These 
conditions include possessing shared meanings or interpretations—or 
commensurability—on at least her two core principles of “universal respect” and 
“egalitarian reciprocity”. These principles, according to Benhabib, provide a 
limit for our intuitions: in some deep sense we know that the plight of women like 
Metha Bai and her condemnation practically to death by an outmoded and 
irrational purdah system is unjust…because we can understand her language, her 
actions, her emotions, her needs, and because we can communicate with her and 
see the world, more or less, maybe never wholly but adequately enough, as she 
sees it (Benhabib 1995, 251). 
 
To support her claims, Benhabib cites a case study from Martha Chen where she 
discusses the plight of “poor women in poor economies, like…Metha Bai, who must 
break with tradition and act independently because they lack the security the tradition is 
supposed to offer” (Chen 1995, 37). Benhabib (1995) argues that one can simply read 
about a “system of familial solidarity and interdependence [that] has collapsed leaving 
widows like Metha Bai destitute and desperate” (240). Regardless of one’s geo-political 
location, the principles of universal respect and egalitarian reciprocity for Benhabib 
express to us that Metha Bai, and women like her, are suffering under the system of 
purdah. 
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I find this to be a deeply problematic assumption (or intuition) on two levels.45 
First, cultural outsiders who read Metha Bai’s story are likely to suffer interpretive 
challenges and biases; they will not have a full understanding of the situation itself and 
how it fits into the greater geopolitical and socioeconomic picture. Second, on a more 
intimate level, I’m not convinced that one will necessarily understand Metha Bai’s 
language or emotions based on an intuition that we supposedly all share of “universal 
respect”. Our intuitions are shaped by the worlds we inhabit, so attempting to understand 
a world completely unbeknownst to a reader will likely produce different (perhaps, 
mistaken) intuitive responses. There are also other concerns of whether her perspective 
represents women similarly situated. Hopefully, through a version of discourse ethics like 
the one I propose, I would have the opportunity to bear witness to her moral pain (if in 
fact this is what she has endured), but this is far from a guarantee. And even if bearing 
witness is possible, it will not necessarily reveal Benhabib’s “obvious” conclusion that 
women like Metha Bai are suffering from a tradition that perpetuates women’s 
subordination. 
Uma Narayan has shown the problems with assuming we all share a basic 
understanding of any event or structure, even if it appears to be an “irrational system”. 
For instance, sati, the practice of widows immolating themselves on a pyre, has been a 
fixation for many Westerners. Narayan argues convincingly that sati is not a practice that 
the West ought to take up as their “free women from backwards cultures” project. She 
explains that sati became a “widespread phenomenon whereby local practices and 
																																																								
45 I have argued elsewhere (Kleist 2013, 276) that Amartya Sen makes the same mistake as Benhabib. He 
claims that we should take an agent’s “positional objectivity” (or social-situatedness) seriously, but the 
hope is transcend that our particular situation by understanding many different points of view, what he calls 
“transpositional objectivity” (Sen 2002, 477). 
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localized ‘traditions’ in Third-World contexts were constructed into ‘national 
traditions’…[which] became crucial components of political struggles for independence 
from colonial rule” (Narayan 1997, 67). Many people in the West will decry the use of 
sati and its continuous practice in “Indian culture”. However, those unfamiliar with the 
culture, and who lack an understanding of its history, including colonial influences, 
should refrain from judgment.  
This example reveals (among many things) that despite Benhabib’s insistence that 
consensus is not a goal, she has constructed a version of discourse based on two 
principles that shows her commitment to universal shared understandings. The fact that 
commensurability is an easily achievable condition of discourse for Benhabib, she is able 
to endorse the ensuing action-guiding norms reached by consensus. Rather than obsessing 
over trying to identify shared and common understandings, FDE accepts the fact that 
there will likely always be incommensurability between discursive participants, that is, 
some remainders of meaning that are not shared. 
Ofelia Schutte argues that there is epistemic and moral value found within 
“incommensurability”. She understands “incommensurability” as the “residue of meaning 
that will not be reached in cross-cultural endeavors” (Schutte 1998, 56). She explains that 
this occurs in conversations where “the other’s speech…resonates in me as a kind of 
strangeness, a kind of displacement of the usual expectation” (56). There will always be 
points of incommensurability in cross-cultural dialogue, however it’s how we understand 
the difference that will enable dialogue to flourish. The most common residue in cross-
cultural dialogue is the untranslatable parts of another language through one’s own. 
Schutte explains that to address this problem many have advocated for trying to include 
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as much meaning as possible to be exchanged. However, she fears this will lose cultural 
differences. Instead, she argues to preserve aspects of speech that “resonates in me as a 
kind of strangeness, as a kind of displacement of the usual expectation” (Schutte 1998, 
56). That is, we should value incommensurability of meanings, those aspects of another’s 
experience that are not entirely accessible to me. 
In light of Schutte’s account of incommensurability, FDE embraces the 
inevitability that discursive participants will not always reach a mutual understanding on 
the topic at hand. So in the case of sati, Narayan is able to present a more accurate 
representation of the term. She is not offering an alternative perspective of sati, but an 
explanation for a concept that many Westerners believe they understand with little 
examination. Once a person understands the concept, then she is in a better position to 
evaluate value judgments on it. However, despite this newfound understanding, it would 
be very difficult for someone outside the tradition to fully grasp the meaning of sati. 
There are three advantages to understanding dialogue in a way that embraces 
incommensurability. First, discursive participants will have a commitment to dialogue as 
an on-going process. Incommensurability is often a conversation-stopper for people, but 
it need not be taken in this way. Rather, it can be a point of departure to continue 
discussions in light of the “residue” or even instill in interlocutors that whatever 
agreement has been achieved thus far is never a fait accompli. The residual meanings are 
provisional and subject to further revision, even if for now they are well enough 
established to support action.  
Second, in light of the first point, the epistemic posture taken by those engaged in 
dialogue who value incommensurability is likely to be one of openness since they are not 
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trying to force a conclusion. Instead, these discursive participants understand that the 
dialogue may continue without reaching a definitive conclusion. So if a person is 
committed to incommensurability, she is likely to consider many viewpoints, even those 
that run contrary to her own, in hopes of advancing her own position. This is significant 
because it creates the possibility for personal transformation, which is a necessary 
condition for moral deference and bearing witness. Moral deference and bearing witness 
require an individual to gain insight into their interlocutor’s world, and so they must be 
willing to change their perception of reality in order to better understand the other’s 
perspective. 
Finally, as insisted by both Benhabib and Jaggar, moral discussion is “valuable 
for its own sake” since it helps cultivate empathy, trust, care, imagination, and many 
other democratic virtues (Jaggar 1995, 136). Rather than forcing discussion to end by 
possibly forcing a consensus, incommensurability creates a space for further discussion; 
it is not just any conversation, though, but one with a new point of departure based on the 
remaining epistemological and moral residue. This is not to say an agreement cannot be 
achieved, and in fact I would not argue against trying to reach an agreement. However, if 
primary value is given to achieving agreement then the discussion runs the risk of 
glossing over differences, dismissing meanings that are complicated, and preventing 
further discussion when apparent impasses have been reached. So I argue that when 
incommensurability is reached, we look to continue the discussion as opposed to halting 
it. 
Feminist Discourse Ethics, unlike traditional discourse ethics and Feminist 
Practical Dialogue, does not aim at commensurability or consensus, although, if it 
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happens, it will of course be accepted. I fear that making these a goal will lead to 
compromises, which will most likely be from marginalized group members since they 
have the most to lose if they do not consent. Or, if they disagree with the dominant 
perspective, they run the risk of backlash. I hope FDE has placed enough substantive 
constraints on the dialogue to mitigate this problem, however there is no guarantee that 
backlash will not occur. 
Consensus, for most discourse ethicists, would be the criterion for supporting 
action. So one may raise the concern of not knowing when enough substantive agreement 
has been reached to support action. I would argue that incommensurability is not 
incompatible with supporting action. A group may be unable to achieve shared 
understandings on particular concepts, and yet understand that action must be taken in 
order to achieve a greater life. However, as a theorizer, I would not feel comfortable 
setting the proper amount of agreement. That determination would likely occur by the 
group itself. More importantly, I challenge the group to remain persistent and keep in 
mind that incommensurability is a point of departure for more discussion and not a 
discursive stop loss. These new discussions may spark conversations previously 
unconsidered or advance the discussion in an unexpected way. Now, the final question 
one may ask: who actually participates in the discussion? 
 
3. Defining Who Participates in the Dialogue 
 
Following Robert E. Goodin, I adopt his language of “constituting the demos” to 
address the problem of who should be included in the discussion. 46  The question Goodin 																																																								
46 This problem has also been stated as “The Boundary Problem” can be found in Whelan (1983) and the 
“Problem of Inclusion” in Shklar (1991). 
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asks is this: what principle might we accept to determine the initial membership of the 
demos? He begins to answer this question by arguing that the principle must be 
independent of the procedure used to achieve outcomes. As he argues, constituting the 
demos is logically prior to any other part of the democratic process. The decision of how 
to constitute the demos cannot be democratic since that would be simply question-
begging. As Goodin (2007) says, that would be like claiming the “winning lottery ticket 
will be pulled out of the hat by the winner of that selfsame lottery” (43). If the person 
who picks the winning number is already the winner before the lottery then it is not really 
a lottery. Likewise, deciding who participates in the discourse cannot initially be a 
democratic process because there is no need to make a decision because the group 
making that decision would already exist. 
The most plausible answer for who constitutes the demos is “all those affected by 
the decision”. What it means “to be affected by” is rather ambiguous. Goodin offers a 
number of plausible candidates, including “all actually affected interests,” “all possibly 
affected interests,” “all and only all affected interests, and “all probably affected 
interests”. It is beyond the scope of this project to discuss these at length, but I argue in 
favor of “all actually affected interests,” which includes actual interests affected by actual 
decisions. Goodin (2007) criticizes this position because “it is unable to tell us who is 
entitled to vote on a decision until after that very decision has been decided” (52). In 
other words, because we cannot truly determine who all is affected by a decision until 
after the decision is made, there is no true way to decide who should participate at the 
outset of the discourse. This is a consequence I am willing to partially accept. It is not 
that it is incoherent, but a matter of fact for most groups.  
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Every group must begin somewhere. For example, Ela Bhatt, founder of the Self-
Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), had to make difficult decisions about how to 
start the organization. The founder of a group, in this case Bhatt, is forced make a 
difficult (albeit not impossible) decision about who constitutes its original members. That 
process cannot be understood in a vacuum; once the group develops, its members are able 
to make decisions in regards to whom can be admitted, and of the admitted, who has 
voting rights, and so forth. In other words, it is the responsibility of the founder(s) and its 
subsequent members to seek out to the best of their ability all those who will actually be 
affected by their decisions. 
One might ask about the connection between defining who participates in the 
dialogue and my conception of feminism, given that my version of discourse is explicitly 
feminist. Women’s subordination is highly contextual. Well-intentioned feminists from 
the West have expressed frustrations over the way in which “poor women from poor 
countries” are being treated. However, post-colonial theorists such as Uma Narayan 
(1997), Chandra Mohanty (1991), and Alison Jaggar (2005), have argued that Westerns 
should not cast judgment without first closely examining a community’s socioeconomic 
and historical context. I believe this reveals the need for localized groups to be 
constituted out of all who will actually be affected by the decision, especially actively 
seeking out non-dominant group members since they often have much to contribute as 
epistemic and moral agents despite often being silenced. 
A central methodological commitment of Feminist Discourse Ethics is to 
prioritize the most marginalized groups who are likely to be silenced and provide them a 
voice, with an eye towards gender injustice, and possible avenues to address these harms. 
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Recall, a problem with Nussbaum’s methods of justifying capabilities is that she silences 
marginalized groups which ultimately undermines her claim that she achieves cross-
cultural validity and gender-sensitivity for her version of capabilities. In contrast, FDE 
seeks to eliminate those who silence voices by creating an atmosphere that respects 
traditionally marginalized voices, which includes having a space for them to speak freely 
(whether that be in a nurturant or adversarial manner). Furthermore, those who inhabit 
non-dominant groups are given moral deference in order to ensure their stories are 
listened to and taken seriously. Vasanti and Jayamma, for instance, would be given an 
opportunity to genuinely criticize Nussbaum’s list. This would force Nussbaum to 
respond to their criticisms by either defending specific capabilities on her list or explain 
why prospective capabilities should not be included. As I have shown in Chapter 2, 
Nussbaum’s monological moral reasoning has led her to ignore other perspectives, and 
ultimately harmful implicit biases and prejudices have infiltrated her theorizing. This 
reveals two important points of the scope: (1) it needs to be restricted insofar as it should 
include initially only those who are most directly impacted first and then widen the 
discourse if need be (as SEWA did) and (2) it must be inclusive of the most marginalized 
among those actually affected, which is influenced by the feminism of FDE. 
 
4. Answering the Critics 
 
 The goal of this section is to see the advantages of drawing on Feminist Discourse 
Ethics for the purpose of justifying capabilities as cross-culturally valid and gender 
sensitive over other versions of discourse and Nussbaum’s primary justificatory methods 
of reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus. To realize this goal, I will present a 
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case study on the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee in order to show how my 
account of FDE is better able to satisfy the methodological criteria proposed in Chapter 3, 
namely, addressing unequal social power relations, developing a method that has 
revisable and self-critical principles built in it, and striving for modest goals. I hope to 
show that FDE is able to address these problems in a way that other versions of discourse 
cannot. 
 
4.1 Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee: A Brief Case Study 
 
 The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) was started in 1972 as a 
development organization dedicated to alleviating poverty and empowering women. 
Their mission is as follows: to empower people and communities in situations of poverty, 
illiteracy, disease and social justice.47 For purposes of our discussion, I will focus on 
literacy. Martha Chen (1995), a former BRAC worker and philosopher, describes the 
program as a place for women who “needed to break out of enforced seclusion to enter 
the labour force” (39). This was accomplished primarily through training, credit (micro 
loans), and extension services, all in effort to enhance productivity outside traditional 
home roles. Specifically, Chen notes that the women took advantage of BRAC offerings, 
such as “non-formal education classes” (1995, 44). The Non-Formal Primary Education 
model, according to the BRAC Education Program (BEP), is a “three year programme for 
poor children aged 8-10, who were never enrolled or had dropped out of formal 
schooling”. 
 The BEP has not wavered since 1985 when it first launched 22 one-room primary 
schools “to develop a school model for poor, rural children, especially girls, which would 																																																								
47 The mission of BRAC can be found at http://www.brac.net/our-approach. 
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equip them with basic reading, writing, numeracy and life skills”.48 As BEP states, they 
have had many accomplishments recently, including a 99.99% pass rate of BRAC pre-
school graduates in a Primary School Certificate exam (significantly higher than the 
national average of non-BRAC students), 93.7% pass rate of girls in a 2014 Secondary 
School Certificate exam, and nearly 2,000 girls receiving undergraduate scholarships. 
The benefits of BEP are undeniable. Between 2008-2012, the total adult literacy 
rate of Bangladeshi people is 57.7%. This has grown exponentially from 1980-1989 when 
15-24 year old Bangladeshis had a literacy rate of 27%. Interestingly, as of 2012, youth 
(18-24) literacy rates slightly favor females (80.4%) over males (77.1%).49 The 
exponential growth would have been unthinkable just a few decades ago. I provide this 
background as one way to show that the people of Bangladesh have placed great 
importance on, and dedicated resources to, education. However, what remains unclear is 
whether Nussbaum believes this commitment to education was a recent development. 
Nussbaum, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, claims everyone must be given the 
opportunity to fulfill the basic good of education, which for her includes literacy. So the 
question is: why do the people of Bangladesh (especially women in the 1980s) have high 
illiteracy rates? To answer this question, Nussbaum writes,  
The poor and deprived frequently adjust their expectations and aspirations to the 
new low level of life they have known … They may not even know what it means 
to have the advantages of education … They may have fully internalized the ideas 
behind the traditional system of discrimination, and may view their deprivation as 
“natural” (1995b, 91). 
 
																																																								
48 See the BEP fact sheet at https://www.brac.net/sites/default/files/factsheet/june15/education.pdf. 
49 All current literacy statistics on Bangladesh can be found in the Statistics section of UNIEF, 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/bangladesh_bangladesh_statistics.html#117. For the 1980-1989 
literacy statistic, see the Human Development Index chart in Nussbaum’s Introduction (1995b, 20). 
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Nussbaum seems to believe that Bangladeshi women do not place much value on 
education. In some sense, they appear “duped” by their “traditional systems of 
discrimination”. If the traditional system claims that Bangladeshi women should not 
place a high priority on education (and ultimately literacy), then they have internalized 
these beliefs and adapted their preferences to believe it to be the case. This commitment 
is further iterated in her 2011 work on capabilities when she claims that even women who 
gain new information on the benefits of education may be unable to change their view, 
especially those “who have deeply internalized the idea that a proper woman does not go 
in for schooling” (84). 
 The above example of BRAC will be used to highlight the ways in which FDE as 
a method of justification better satisfies the following methodological criteria than either 
of Nussbaum’s justificatory strategies. 
 
4.2 Power Dynamics 
 
 In Chapter 2, I demonstrated the ways in which Nussbaum’s theory dismisses 
viewpoints from marginalized groups without any major recourse. This point is captured 
in the case study presented above. Nussbaum doesn’t consider the complexities for why 
Bangladeshi women may not value education in the way Nussbaum does. She cites 
Martha Chen’s work on BRAC, in addition to literacy statistics from the Human 
Development Index (HDI), and draws the conclusion that Bangladeshi women simply do 
not have preferences that favor education and literacy because of longstanding traditional 
systems. She never really engages Bangladeshi women. 
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I attempt to provide a discourse ethics response to this concern in Chapter 4, as 
presented by Habermas and Benhabib; their version of discourse accepts that people are 
more-or-less diversely socially situated, but they offer no substantive constraint to 
address the impact of social inequalities on discourse. They argue that we ought to strive 
for “egalitarian reciprocity,” however, in reality this is highly unlikely to be achieved 
through mere striving. The issue is that they posit equality rather than telling us how 
discursive equality might be achieved. Rather than striving, FDE offers discursive 
constraints aimed at bringing discourse participants toward equality and respect in the 
discourse. 
 One of the ways in which power manifests itself is in and through language. As a 
defensive mode, educated people often resort to using complex terms in a very logically 
structured manner. We often see this practice in academia. For example, an instructor, 
who is in a position of authority, may silence a student by “talking over her head,” so-to-
speak, or discuss a topic that is beyond her comprehension of that area. One way to 
mitigate this problem is to accept more inclusive forms of communication (e.g., 
greetings, rhetoric, and narratives) as reason-giving. Being more inclusive does not entail 
banishing traditional accounts of premise-conclusion argumentation, but emphasizes the 
importance of other types of communication. 
 Moreover, giving prima facie moral deference to the moral experiences of 
individuals from socially diminished categories renders these individuals as quasi-
authorities on particular matters. A proponent of FDE would examine the low literacy 
rates of Bangladeshis much differently than Nussbaum. For instance, rather than using 
one’s privilege to project a conception of the good (viz., education) on those who are 
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embracing it wholeheartedly, FDE begins with their experiences. Upon further 
investigation, Nussbaum would have realized that women value education in general, but 
that it is very expensive. So they are often confronted with a tragic dilemma to provide 
education to either themselves or their children, and Bangladeshi women will almost 
indefinitely choose their children as they will have greater opportunities. More 
importantly, high illiteracy rates are not simply about women taking on oppressive 
preferences; instead, it includes “economic and social circumstances that affect the entire 
population” (Ackerly 2000, 107). Being highly educated and inhabiting a political super 
power (like Nussbaum) brings an undeserved amount of power and privilege, but moral 
deference and bearing witness to another’s pain is meant to balance or check this 
inequity. 
 A final way to diminish the epistemic impact of asymmetrical power relations is 
to become virtuous listeners. Formal equality of traditional discourse ethics supports the 
rights of all participants to speak. However, as I argued earlier, the problem is not with 
how much people are able to speak, but what sort of speakers and forms of speech are 
excluded from the discourse, whether those speaking are heard, and whether there is any 
genuine uptake of their perspectives. Good listening is required in order for participants 
to genuinely contribute to the outcome. 
 
4.3 Revisability  
 
 I have argued that a list of capabilities, for instance, ought to be revisable. In 
Chapter 2, drawing from Jaggar, I pointed out the need for a feedback loop between our 
methods and conclusions, where we re-evaluate each in light of one another. 
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Furthermore, I called for the need to seek out multiple perspectives since that will force 
our theory (and its principles) to be tested from an array of beliefs. 
 Nussbaum’s method of moral reasoning is monological, meaning that the theorist 
is the sole agent and arbiter while reasoning about morality and politics. Yet, as I argued 
in Chapter 2, Nussbaum has no mechanism built into her methods of justification that 
subject her views to criticism from the outside that result in a reevaluation of those 
beliefs and practices in light of the criticism. Her methods of reflective equilibrium and 
overlapping consensus have no on-going process of critical feedback between herself and 
her critics. This allows Nussbaum to make sweeping claims about what women in 
Bangladesh really prefer in regards to their educational future. She is able to say they do 
not value education without being concerned as to whether her definition of education 
should be reconsidered (or even possibly jettisoned from her list), or uncovering outside 
circumstances that may shed more light on why they have not “chosen” to receive a 
formal or informal education. 
 To be genuinely revisable, it is not enough to simply seek other values and 
beliefs. Nussbaum, for instance, is adamant that her views are subject to scrutiny and 
criticism and she claims to have sought out critical perspectives, as, for example, when 
she interviewed Vasanti and Jayamma. The goal of the interviews is to draw on their 
experiences as women who inhabit different social strata from Nussbaum and then use 
their accounts to help provide feedback on her list. Despite these conversations, however, 
her list remained unchanged. Their perspectives did not provide genuine feedback, which 
could shape the list of capabilities or their interpretation. Nussbaum’s methods of 
justification make her version of the capabilities immune to external critical perspectives.  
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Discourse ethics as a method of justification has mechanisms in place to 
encourage revisability of participants’ views because they are dialogical. However, 
traditional discourse ethics doesn’t satisfy this condition as well as Feminist Discourse 
Ethics because FDE not only engages in a method of moral reasoning where its members 
are continuously challenging one another, but actively seeks perspectives that challenge 
the discursive community’s outcomes. FDE would not simply accept the fact that 
Bangladeshi women do not value education because their illiteracy rates are higher than 
that of any Western nation. Rather, they would investigate current economic and social 
circumstances that impacted specific decisions of whether to pursue an education. 
However this is not enough; it also demands seeking alternative considerations as well. 
FDE may remain closed temporarily if a safe space needs to be created, but through time 
it must open itself to scrutiny from the larger public. Thus, the norms that emerge out of 
the discourse are also subject to scrutiny by both its own members and those outside the 
community. 
 
4.4 Self-Critical 
 
 The methodological criterion of being self-critical is related to the criterion of 
revisability because it would be very difficult to have a genuinely revisable theory with 
individual group members who relentlessly maintained their beliefs. At the moment our 
beliefs are challenged, many try to hold onto them tighter. However, this is deeply 
problematic as it displays a form of dogmatism. My concern with Nussbaum is that she 
imports her own values into her theory and does not critically engage those who do not 
share her beliefs. As Ackerly (2011) explains, Nussbaum believes “literacy promotes 
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women’s economic flourishing, autonomy, and self-respect … However, economic 
flourishing, autonomy and self-respect have significantly different meanings” for poor 
rural Bangladeshi women (108). Likewise, interestingly enough, while traditional 
discourse ethics allows everyone to participate in the dialogue equally, it has no 
constraints on the dialogue to encourage self-criticism.  
 FDE encourages its members to assume a level of epistemic humility since we are 
all fallible. This will impact both the way in which we present our position and how we 
listen to others. In regards to the former, members are less likely to convey their position 
in a forceful or demeaning manner since they recognize their position has limitations. 
There is a lot at stake in how we present our views, and if we do so in a way that is open 
and malleable, then others will feel more comfortable challenging and advancing it. FDE 
discourages combative attitudes where discursive participants try to overpower others 
with their arguments, but rather embraces an atmosphere of “friendship, love, and care 
for concrete rather than generalized others” (Jaggar 1995, 138). 
The conversationalist, now in a position where she will listen more carefully, 
knows that the speaker’s views contribute to both the group’s norms and one’s own 
position. This should not be mistaken as an assumption that the listener should simply 
praise everything the interlocutor says. Instead, the listener should treat the speaker with 
respect by ensuring that she has interpreted the speaker accurately and then offer 
feedback. 
One of the most important reasons for members of FDE to be self-critical is that 
they are attempting to identify the very complex ways in which subordinated peoples are 
silenced and possible avenues to address them. Both identifying and ameliorating their 
		
211	
subordination, which includes devoting attention to other socio-political factors, is highly 
contextual, and there are nearly an endless number of positions. Returning to our case 
study, Ackerly asks us to pay better attention to the “particularities of a society” (109). 
This will require Nussbaum to examine her commitments, such as placing primary 
importance on education and autonomy. If she were to do so, Nussbaum may uncover the 
belief that economic stability (likely through credit) may prove a better option for 
achieving economic flourishing and interdependence than literacy. 
So as FDE engages in this process it reminds its members that despite how well-
positioned one might be to assess the situation, others also have valuable insights. To this 
extent, members participating in FDE are more likely open to change by remaining self-
critical. 
 
4.5 Modest Goals 
 
 There is no precise definition of what I mean by “modest goals,” but there are two 
ways in which FDE is not an overreaching method for justifying capabilities; instead, it 
seeks to achieve feasible goals. First, the aim of FDE is not placing primary importance 
on consensus. There seems to be little benefit in trying to force a group to arrive at a 
consensus since I fear this will most likely lead to non-dominant group members 
assimilating to dominant perspectives in order to avoid fear of backlash. Nonetheless, 
deliberative skills such as empathy and listening virtuously are still being cultivated. FDE 
recognizes that discourse often leads to incommensurability between discursive 
participants.  
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One may be concerned at identifying the appropriate point at which the discourse 
has achieved enough justification for the time being to support action. As noted above, a 
group’s call to action is fully compatible with incommensurability. I believe the 
discursive participants can predetermine the amount of agreement needed to move ahead 
with supporting action from the outset of their discussion. However, I suggest not getting 
caught up in that determination since it may detract from the larger benefits of 
incommensurability, namely, creating discussions that otherwise would not be had or 
advancing a current discussion in a way previously unconsidered. 
 Second, FDE is a method committed to supporting the tentative and revisable 
nature of claims because individuals who produce the theory, regardless of how well-
intentioned they may be, are fallible. So our theories too may be fallible, especially the 
way in which the theory is put into practice. Following Brooke Ackerly, rather than 
treating the norms that emerge out of the discourse as “the” answer to a given problem, 
participants of FDE consider them to be “guiding criteria” in a first step moving forward. 
This is not to say that all norms emerging out of the discourse are any less valid or 
worthy of implementing. I am simply shifting the emphasis from immutable norms to 
suggested criteria or provisional outcomes. 
Rather than seeking a universal commitment to end all illiteracy and demand 
secondary education, as we see with Nussbaum, FDE encourages non-Bangladeshi 
peoples better understand the complexities around literacy and education in Bangladesh. 
It would likely result in refraining from immediate judgment based on literacy statistics 
and then giving prima facie moral deference to the local people most directly affected by 
the situation. They would then shed light on their complex situation for high illiteracy 
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rates and the best way to address the situation, if they think it is even best to do so. 
Furthermore, the Bangladeshi peoples may encourage those unfamiliar with their 
situation to reevaluate their current understanding of education and literacy, much like 
Nkiru Nzegwu, and replace it with concepts more applicable to their situation.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I articulated a version of discourse ethics I call “Feminist 
Discourse Ethics”, which has been inspired greatly by Alison Jaggar’s Feminist Practical 
Dialogue. FDE is a method for justifying capabilities and is gender sensitive, with the 
explicit goal of identifying the ways in which women are subordinated and finding 
practices to address these harms. In doing so, though, FDE does not ignore other socio-
economic factors such as race, class, geo-political positioning, sexuality, religion, and the 
like which may further contribute to the outcome. I argue that all actually affected by the 
discourse have the opportunity to participate, especially those from traditionally 
marginalized groups. 
FDE, like all versions of discourse, is committed to everyone having the 
opportunity to speak freely and equally. It follows Jaggar’s FPD by welcoming first-
person narratives and story-telling, in addition to greetings and rhetoric as acceptable 
forms of communication. However, allowing everyone the opportunity fails to achieve 
substantive equality since certain voices are not taken as seriously. To address this 
concern, FDE gives prima facie moral deference to non-dominant perspectives, and if 
trust is earned, participants may be willing to share their moral pain for others to bear 
witness. Moreover, FDE demands its listeners not merely receive the information from 
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speakers passively, but treat them as informants by actively engaging their comments. 
These discursive constraints are then used to help achieve substantive equality. 
 A concern that one might raise with FDE is its inability to support action given a 
commitment to incommensurability. To this, I argued that incommensurability and action 
guidance are not incompatible. The discursive community will need to set at the outset 
the proper amount of agreement needed in order to move forward with action. Again, it is 
important not to get riddled with identifying that amount, but instead staying focused on 
the advantages of incommensurability. 
 The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate that FDE, as a method of justifying 
capabilities, is superior to not only traditional versions of discourse ethics, but also 
Nussbaum’s methods of reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus. I attempted to 
realize this goal through a case study on the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. 
The inclusive nature of FDE allows it to seek diverse and marginalized perspectives in a 
way that the previously mentioned methods cannot. Furthermore, FDE has mechanisms 
that allow its participants to be genuinely self-critical and subject their positions to 
revision. This has the advantage of realizing Nussbaum’s own goals of having a list that 
is achieves cross-cultural support, and yet is subject to on-going revision. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The capabilities approach is meant to be a global moral theory. Martha 
Nussbaum’s justifications for claiming this status is that (1) the capabilities genuinely 
represent "our" intuitions about dignity, (2) there is convergence or overlapping 
consensus among reasonable comprehensive doctrines on the conception of dignity 
expressed by her proposed list, and (3) her theory has the ability to identify gender 
specific harms.  This dissertation was not meant to undermine the capabilities approach 
despite my critical analysis of Nussbaum’s version, but rather strengthen it. My approach 
to doing so is centered on creating criteria of adequacy, which are used to determine 
whether a method of justification is satisfactory for defending capabilities as a global 
moral theory. The relationship between a theorizer’s method of justification and their 
theory is especially valuable when the theorizer seeks to defend a universal list that 
claims to have cross-cultural support. Given the fact that Nussbaum is striving for her 
commitments to be endorsed by individuals who possess incompatible religious and 
moral doctrines and inhabit a myriad of social backgrounds, she must be particularly 
cautious not to dismiss relevant viewpoints or overpower non-dominant perspectives. 
In Chapter 1, I closely examined Nussbaum’s two methods for justifying her list 
of capabilities, namely, reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus. First, reflective 
equilibrium is meant to offer cross-cultural support to her list since this method asks the 
theorizer to consider other points of view and test one’s intuitions against them while 
seeking coherence between her moral judgments and theoretical principles. Nussbaum 
concludes that our intuitions about dignity match her list of ten central capabilities. 
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The second method Nussbaum uses to justify her approach is overlapping 
consensus. Overlapping consensus is achieved when reasonable citizens are able to agree 
on a theory of justice that is compatible with many reasonable comprehensive moral and 
religious doctrines. Nussbaum believes her list of central capabilities is a political 
doctrine that can be an object of overlapping consensus since citizens from diverse moral 
and religious backgrounds can agree that everyone ought to have the ability to fulfill 
them. The distinct advantage of overlapping consensus over reflective equilibrium is that 
in international settings, it is much more plausible that consensus on ten highly abstract 
basic entitlements can be reached among persons with different comprehensive doctrines 
than it would be to achieve coherence between one's beliefs, the principles underlying 
those beliefs, and (since Nussbaum seeks wide reflective equilibrium) subjecting our 
beliefs to further criticisms by pondering other doctrines and determining on which 
grounds our theory is more choice-worthy. 
I believe Nussbaum's methods for justifying capabilities are weak and threaten to 
undermine the very values her theory seeks to secure for all individuals.  She appears to 
underestimate the importance of interpreting and evaluating capabilities.  For example, 
reflective equilibrium must answer the question, “whose intuitions are considered most 
salient to reach coherence?” and overlapping consensus, “who determines which political 
doctrines are worthy of consideration for overlapping consensus?”  These justifications 
do not in fact ground the universal authority Nussbaum claims for her theory, and the 
biggest problem is that these methods are too easily exclusionary of dissenting or 
marginalized voices, making it too easy to rationalize the interpretations and views of 
dominant perspectives, especially Nussbaum's own.  Both methods of justification 
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provide no guidance as to whom has the authority to police intuitions and why they have 
that authority; likewise, we are not given any indication as to which comprehensive 
doctrines are reasonable or which interpretations of a comprehensive doctrine are 
reasonable, and who has the authority to decide these questions and why they have that 
authority. 
 The following criteria of adequacy are not meant to be exhaustive, but provide a 
theorizer with substantive guidance by which she can judge her current methods of 
justification against. If it fails to satisfy these criteria, then I suggest re-evaluating one’s 
current method. The desiderata for justifying a theory should (1) be cognizant of power 
dynamics, (2) remain self-critical, (3) have a mechanism to revise one’s list or theory, 
and (4) set modest goals. I have shown that reflective equilibrium and overlapping 
consensus fail to satisfy these criteria. There may be other criteria, and I understand that 
identifying what those might be may force us to abandon Feminist Discourse Ethics in 
favor of a different method of justification. However, for now, FDE is able to account for 
the above criteria in a way that Nussbaum and traditional versions of discourse fail to do 
so. 
FDE, which is greatly indebted to Alison Jaggar’s Feminist Practical Dialogue, 
accepts the traditional Habermasian discourse ethics claim that everyone ought to be 
treated with respect and have an equal opportunity to shape the outcome of the debate.  
However, dialogue rarely occurs between socially-situated individuals of equal power.  
Thus, the following FDE constraints are proposed to help produce just norms: (1) 
accepting non-traditional forms of communication, (2) giving moral deference to non-
dominant group members, (3) listening carefully by treating discursive participants as 
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informants and not as mere sources of information to which one gleans information, (5) 
accepting incommensurability between dialoguers, and recognizing the potential need for 
temporarily closed communities. 
With respect to realizing the three central tenets of capabilities noted at the outset 
of this section, I argue that FDE as a method for justifying capabilities is superior to 
Nussbaum’s reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus. First, while I do not claim 
FDE is foolproof because it requires on-going discussions, it seems better situated to 
determine harmful outcomes and subject them to further scrutiny than Nussbaum's 
methods of justification.  FDE welcomes all intuitions of those affected by the outcome 
and subjects them to criticism. It demands our most basic assumptions and intuitions be 
revisited, not to mention our conclusions.  Having a mechanism that not only checks our 
conclusions, but the process by which that conclusion is reached, provides a multi-
layered safeguard against harmful norms. The outcomes then do not simply represent a 
single perspective but, given the many layers of scrutiny in addition to ensuring 
marginalized peoples have a voice by giving them prima facie moral deference, a true 
representation of intuitions have been included. 
Second, FDE does not shy away from the fact that it allows so-called mistaken 
and corrupt perspectives, but embraces them. For example, if education is on the list, it 
needs to be defended from more than the just the theorizer’s perspective. FDE would 
demand reasons why education is valuable enough to be a primary good, how demanding 
it affects groups differently, and how to interpret what 'education' means. So by 
considering nearly all perspectives, FDE offers a more universal justification for 
capabilities than Nussbaum's methods of justification. To better garner genuine cross-
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cultural support, my method of justification welcomes a wide range of incompatible 
worldviews to shape the outcome. 
Finally, Nussbaum is adamant that her version of capabilities is able to address 
gender specific norms. However, as I have shown, Nussbaum fails to address her feminist 
critics that propose capabilities that challenge her list. For instance, Ingrid Robeyns 
argues in favor of “time-autonomy” as a central capability because it accounts for the 
unequal distribution of time commitments placed on women. FDE is able to better 
identify gender specific capabilities because the substantive constraints on the discourse 
create the proper conditions to achieve substantive equality, that is, for women (and 
members of non-dominant groups in general) an opportunity to genuinely shape the 
outcome. At best, Nussbaum speaks on behalf of marginalized group members (e.g., 
Indian women) but is unable to fully understand their commitments. If we want to 
generate a theory or list of capabilities that is truly inclusive and represents the group at 
hand, then we need give them an opportunity to speak. Feminist Discourse Ethics takes 
the real experiences of concrete individuals and provides an avenue for them to share 
their stories and shape the outcome of the discussion. So rather than generating highly 
abstract capabilities that provide little substantive guidance, FDE has the potential to 
produce a list of capabilities based according to the group’s needs, and, of course, if the 
list is failing to achieve its own goals, FDE has mechanisms in place to subject its own 
conclusions to scrutiny.  
I have two concerns regarding whether Feminist Discourse Ethics as a method of 
justification can produce universal moral norms. First, FDE is likely to begin with small 
groups – perhaps even temporarily closed communities. However, the list of capabilities 
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is meant to gain cross-cultural support that applies to all those affected by the outcome. 
We seem to have reached an impasse – on the one hand, FDE works well with local 
communities (often with at least some shared understandings), and on the other, we are 
seeking a list that requires a method of justification that applies to everyone. Capabilities 
is a global moral theory, and so following the spirit of Nussbaum’s commitments, its list 
too must be universal in scope. One could argue in favor of larger discursive 
communities to accommodate the scope of capabilities. However, this would create a 
similar problem that I noted in the first chapter. That is, the discursive community will 
produce norms that are either so vague they become meaningless or any substance added 
to them and they will be too exclusionary. 
Second, the substantive constraints demanded by FDE seem to prevent it from 
producing truly universal moral norms. FDE requires discursive participants to pay moral 
deference to marginalized group members in hopes of ultimately bearing witness to their 
moral pain. This long and arduous process, while necessary to really understand another’s 
perspective, requires a true understanding of not only what the speaker is saying, but also 
their greater socioeconomic context. In an attempt to grow this on a global scale, 
participants would need, in some sense, to learn the social contexts of people all over the 
world. While a fruitful endeavor, I question its practicality, since ultimately the goal is to 
create a list that is applicable to all people. 
I do not believe the above concerns should cause us to abandon Feminist 
Discourse Ethics as the method of justification for generating a list of capabilities or 
defending the capabilities approach as a global moral theory. It satisfies the criteria of 
adequacy and meets the challenges that Martha Nussbaum fails to meet. I challenge 
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practitioners to consider FDE as they determine which capabilities are most relevant, how 
to resolve tragic dilemmas (since not all capabilities can be realized at a given moment), 
and how to best realize capabilities for a local community. 
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